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Abstract
This thesis studies the theory of intermediation in trade problems arising from the
allocation of a single indivisible object.
Chapter I considers a general trade problem with a single seller and multiple
buyers. I analyze a game, where multiple intermediaries compete with each other
by designing contracts that determine the terms of trade between the bargaining
parties. I show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes. Repeat-
ing the analysis for the case of a single monopolist intermediary, I compare the
equilibrium outcomes and show that allocative efficiency is strictly improved as a
result of the competition among intermediaries.
Chapter II considers a bilateral trade problem with two-sided asymmetric infor-
mation where the buyer’s valuation may depend on the private information of both
bargaining parties. I analyze the impact of intermediation by a profit-maximizing
intermediary in a game, where the seller has the ability to trade directly with the
buyer. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium outcomes
with the presence of an intermediary to be strictly more efficient than those that
are attainable in its absence.
Lastly, in Chapter III, similar to the previous chapter, bilateral trade problems
with informational externalities arising from interdependences are considered. I
analyze a game, where the seller designs a contract at ex-ante stage before learn-
ing his private information. I characterize the optimal mechanisms and show that
they attain second-best outcomes. The Pareto optimality of ex-ante contracting in
the absence of an intermediary, in turn presents a natural limit to the benefits to
be accrued from intermediation.
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Preface
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the theory of intermediation in trade problems
of a single indivisible object. To that end, I submit three papers, each of which
analyzes a different problem related to intermediation in these single object bar-
gaining scenarios.
In Chapter I, I consider a trade setup between a seller and multiple buyers over
the transaction of a single indivisible object and analyze a game, where multiple
intermediaries compete with each other to attract the seller. Agents have indepen-
dent private valuations for this object and all players have quasilinear preferences.
I show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes. In any equilibrium,
all intermediaries make zero expected profits, while the unique allocation rule
and the expected payoffs agents receive are equal to those that are accrued under
seller’s revenue maximizing auction. Hence these unique outcomes can be imple-
mented in an equilibrium in which all intermediaries announce the seller’s optimal
auction with discriminatory reserve prices. Characterizing the unique equilibrium
outcomes when there is a single monopolist intermediary, I show that competition
among intermediaries unambiguously improves allocative efficiency, as well as the
agents’ expected payoffs. However, I also show that, relative to the equilibrium
under competition, a social planner may further increase total surplus.
In Chapter II, I consider a bilateral trade problem, where the seller and the
buyer have quasilinear preferences. In this setup, however, I allow for interdepen-
dent valuations where the seller’s private information becomes relevant for the
buyer’s valuation. I first characterize the equilibria of the informed seller’s sig-
naling game where the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Then, I consider
another game with an uninformed intermediary as the third player, who designs
menus of prices to facilitate trade between the two parties. In this game, the seller
decides whether to use the intermediary or to trade directly with the buyer on his
own. The possibility of direct trading enables the seller to generate revenues from
direct sales, which creates outside options depending on the seller’s type. Conse-
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quently, the intermediary competes with the seller when designing the menu of
prices. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implemented trade
probabilities in the game with an intermediary to be strictly more efficient than
those in any equilibrium of the informed seller’s game without an intermediary.
Hence, this condition characterizes cases under which intermediation by a profit-
maximizing third-party proves to be beneficial by improving welfare, as measured
by expected gains from trade.
Lastly, Chapter III also considers a bilateral trade problem with quasi-linear
preferences allowing for informational interdependent valuations. I analyze a
game, where the seller designs a trading mechanism at ex-ante stage before learn-
ing his private information. I characterize the seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism
and show the the unique equilibrium outcomes of this game. I also show that
the seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism is Pareto optimal in the sense of ex-ante
interim efficiency. Hence, ex-ante commitment leads seller’s revenue maximizing
behavior to result in second-best outcomes. In turn, the seller’s ability to attain
Pareto optimality without an intermediary can be interpreted as a natural limit to
the benefits of intermediation.
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CHAPTER I
Competing Intermediaries
I.1 Introduction
A central problem in mechanism design deals with bargaining situations between
a seller and multiple buyers over the allocation of a single indivisible object in
the presence of two-sided asymmetric information arising from independent pri-
vate valuations (henceforth IPV). It has been shown in Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) for the case of bilateral trade, and later in Williams (1999) for multiple
buyer environments that there are no transfer rules which implement the efficient
allocations in a budget balancing way. It is common for many scenarios that the
bargaining is carried out via an intermediary. As shown in Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983), when there is a single monopolist intermediary who aims to maxi-
mize profits, the introduction of additional monopoly distortions exacerbates the
efficiency losses. A natural next line of inquiry would be to consider the impact of
competition among multiple intermediaries. In this paper, I analyze the compet-
itive contract market among multiple profit-seeking intermediaries who compete
over facilitating trade in these bargaining situations.
To achieve this goal, I consider a trade setting with a single seller possessing
one unit of an indivisible good, n-many buyers who want to buy that good where
n is at least one, and m-many intermediaries who compete over mediating the
trade, where m is at least two. I assume that the agents have private valuations
for the object that are independently drawn from the same interval.1 These val-
uations represent the respective types of the agents, where for brevity I refer to
1I use the female pronoun for the seller, male pronouns for the buyers, and neuter pronouns for
the intermediaries.
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them as the cost for the seller and value for the buyers, respectively. All players
have quasilinear preferences. The collection of m + n + 1-many players engage
in the Intermediation Game played over three stages. In the first stage, the in-
termediaries simultaneously announce their mechanisms2 to the seller. Following
the announcements, in the second stage the seller moves by first choosing an in-
termediary and next by sending her private message to the chosen intermediary.
Finally, in the last stage the buyers, observing only seller’s chosen mechanism,
send their private messages. The collection of messages sent to the seller’s chosen
mechanism determine the outcome.
I show two sets of results. Firstly, I characterize the unique equilibrium out-
comes of the intermediation game whenever there are two or more intermediaries.
Secondly, characterizing the unique equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation
game when there is a single monopolist intermediary, I show that, compared to the
case of monopoly, competition unambiguously improves welfare from an alloca-
tive efficiency point of view. However, I also show that relative to the equilibrium
under competition, a social planner may further increase total surplus by design-
ing a mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints of the agents.
The intermediation game with multiple intermediaries belong to the frame-
work of common agency as the intermediaries compete over general mechanisms
to attract the agents. As shown in Peters (2001), an immediate obstacle in the
common agency literature is the failure of the standard solution techniques from
the single principal mechanism design literature. In these games, it is with loss
of generality to restrict attention to simpler and smaller mechanism spaces for
the principals (i.e. the intermediaries in the context of this paper), because such
restrictions may eliminate outcomes that are supported by an equilibrium in the
original game, or conversely may create outcomes that were not supported by an
equilibrium in the original game.3 Hence, without any restrictions on the strat-
egy spaces, I resort to the revelation principle, which provides a set of necessary
conditions any equilibrium outcome has to satisfy. The conditions imply the fa-
miliar payoff equivalence result for the agents from the auction literature, which
suggests that I can characterize the agents’ equilibrium expected payoffs by only
describing the equilibrium allocation rule and the equilibrium expected payoffs for
the highest cost seller and lowest value buyers.4 Nevertheless, a difficult problem
2Given the trade context, a mechanism is a collection of allocation and payment rules that are
determined according to the messages sent by the seller and buyers.
3For a more detailed discussion, please refer to Martimort and Stole (2002).
4These types are referred to as the “worst” types of the respective agents.
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still prevails where I need to identify the unique equilibrium allocation rule and
expected payoffs for worst type agents and prune all others that satisfy the nec-
essary conditions. Furthermore, for the intermediaries revelation principle only
summarizes the sum of their nonnegative expected payoffs which is equal to the
surplus net of the agents’ ex-ante expected payoffs. Therefore, another complica-
tion may arise in characterizing the equilibrium payoffs to the intermediaries from
a mere sum.
In light of the necessary conditions, I show the uniqueness of equilibrium out-
comes in two steps. In the first step, I show that in any equilibrium the expected
profits of the intermediaries and the expected payoffs of the lowest value buyers
are zero. Furthermore, there exists a set of buyer specific reservation values such
that the allocation rule has to award the object to the buyer with the highest vir-
tual valuation5 so long as it exceeds his reservation value. In the second step, I
characterize the unique set of the reservation values, which pins down both the
allocation rule and the expected payoff to the highest cost seller, and consequently
the unique equilibrium outcomes.
In both of the steps, I prove the statements by contradiction where I show
that, if the assumed equilibrium outcomes do not satisfy the claims, then there
exists a profitable deviation mechanism for at least one intermediary. The intu-
ition behind these deviation mechanisms is an undercutting argument. However,
under the competing mechanism design context with two-sided asymmetric infor-
mation, their construction is more complicated than small enough increments to
the agents’ payoffs. The problem is that a profitable deviation mechanism might
require agents to play a particular equilibrium at the subgame following the devia-
tion, which might be different than the strategy profile that supports the assumed
equilibrium outcomes. Hence, the main challenge is to make sure the behavior of
agents is precisely the way that deems the deviation mechanism profitable. A con-
tribution of this paper at a technical level is to show that, one can construct strictly
dominant strategy mechanisms for which the dominant strategy equilibrium yields
the desired profitable deviation profits.
I show that for every cost, the unique equilibrium allocation rule implements
same trade probabilities as those under the seller’s revenue maximizing auction
if her types were commonly known. There are several important implications of
this equivalence. Firstly, when buyers do not observe seller’s costs, the informed
seller’s revenue maximizing auction implements the same allocations because the
5Virtual valuation of a buyer’s type can be interpreted as the marginal revenue he can generate,
which is net of his information rents, if the good were to be allocated to him.
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seller’s costs are independently distributed of the buyers’ valuations.6 Secondly,
the seller’s revenue maximizing auction yields the same expected payoffs to the
agents as those in the unique equilibrium of the intermediation game with mul-
tiple intermediaries, because the expected payoffs for the worst type agents are
also equal to zero. These suggest that the seller’s revenue maximizing auction is
free from cross-subsidization across seller types as it awards maximal expected
revenues generated, when her costs were observable. Thirdly, the unique equilib-
rium outcomes of the intermediation game can be attained by the intermediaries
announcing the seller’s optimal auctions. In other words, existence of equilibrium
can be established by constructing one, where all intermediaries identically an-
nounce these auctions free from cross-subsidization. Finally, the equivalence also
suggests that allowing intermediaries to have access to a larger space of mecha-
nisms do not improve the outcomes from the equilibria of the informed seller’s
optimal auction. Furthermore, in the symmetric case where buyers all have the
same distribution of types, the seller’s optimal auction can be implemented by a
classical auction; e.g. a second-price auction with reserve prices. Hence in a way,
the result verifies the popularity of using auctions in real life applications, such
as the allocation of a good in secondary markets, sale of a house in real estate
markets, and sale of an antique or fine art in auction houses.
The intuition behind the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes is in the spirit
of Bertrand competition. The intermediaries compete with each other in order to
attract the seller. However the existence of private information causes the inter-
mediaries to contest over every type of the seller. This competition drives their
profits down to zero and leads every seller type to be offered the maximum ex-
pected payoff she can receive subject to the necessary conditions. The remaining
equilibrium outcomes have to equal to those accrued under the seller’s revenue
maximizing auction, so long as they satisfy the equilibrium conditions, which they
do in the IPV framework. Furthermore, similar to the Bertrand competition, the
unique equilibrium outcomes for the agents and the allocation rule remain the
same for any number of intermediaries m larger than two.
There are two important aspects of the way I model competition that is crucial
for the uniqueness result. Firstly, I assume that the buyers observe only the mech-
anism announced by the seller’s chosen intermediary. This information structure
eliminates a fundamental problem inherent in the common agency models, which
6This equivalence for the bilateral trade case is noted in Yilankaya (1999). More generally,
Skreta (2011) establishes the irrelevance of private information in the IPV for the informed seller’s
revenue maximizing mechanism.
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in turn clears the way for the result on zero intermediary profits. If the buyers
also observed the whole array of mechanisms, then it would be possible to have
equilibria where an intermediary makes positive expected profits, because it could
bully away potential deviation from a competitor by awarding the seller with huge
monetary transfers at the expense of huge expected losses. In this argument the ar-
ray of mechanisms would be used to coordinate equilibrium play on the part of the
agents. As the buyers observe only the seller’s chosen mechanism, such schemes
are not possible in this game.7 Secondly, the timing assumption grants the choice
of intermediary to the seller, which in turn brings the intermediary competition
down to attracting the seller. Lack of cross-subsidization in the seller’s revenue
maximizing auction establishes the equivalence for the remaining unique equilib-
rium outcomes. I acknowledge the importance of this model of competition for
the uniqueness result. At the same time I believe it is not unreasonable to assume
that the seller chooses the mechanism while the buyers observe only seller’s cho-
sen mechanism. In particular, it is common that the seller has an advantageous
position in the bargaining situation by choosing among alternatives and the buyers
are uninformed about the whole set of mechanisms offered. When considering the
real estate market, the owner of the property picks her preferred agent, while it is
highly unlikely that the buyers are aware of the alternative mechanisms the seller
faced from competitor estate agents. Similarly, in the case of fine arts or antiques
auctions, the seller chooses the auction house and the buyers participate at the
chosen location without knowing the alternative auction offers from competing
auctioneers.
The second set of results relates to the welfare comparisons of equilibrium out-
comes between different regimes. Considering the intermediation game with a
single monopolist intermediary, I characterize the unique equilibrium outcomes.
Similar to the competition case, the allocation rule also awards the object to the
highest virtual valuation buyer, but subject to a different set of reservation val-
ues. In both regimes, each buyer’s optimal reservation value in the equilibrium
allocation rule is determined by equating his marginal revenue to the marginal
cost. Although the marginal revenues are calculated the same way, the discrep-
ancy arises from how the monopolist intermediary assesses the marginal costs.
Under competition, marginal cost equals to only the seller’s true cost of the good,
while under monopoly the seller’s information rents are also accounted for. As
a result, for all costs the highest virtual valuation buyer exceeds the reservation
7There exists a subliterature that analyze folk theorem results for competing mechanism envi-
ronments. Some examples include Yamashita (2010) and Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013).
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value more often in the equilibrium with multiple intermediaries than under the
monopolist intermediary. Furthermore, the additional trade scenarios award the
object to a buyer, who values it more than the seller, which implies that competi-
tion unambiguously improves allocative efficiency for any possible vector of agent
types. It is also shown that the efficiency improvements lead to increases in the ex-
ante total surplus and the agents’ expected payoff schedules. These results are in
line with the intuition from received wisdom that competition improves efficiency.
Despite the increase in allocative efficiency, the equilibrium outcomes under
competition are not ex-post efficient due to two reasons; the highest virtual val-
uation buyer might not be the buyer with the highest actual valuation, and in
some cases the reservation values require the object to be retained by the seller
even though the highest virtual valuation buyer has actual valuation that exceeds
the true cost. Focusing on efficiency maximization, I show that a larger ex-ante
expected surplus can be achieved relative to the equilibrium outcomes under mul-
tiple intermediaries. As a second-best benchmark, I characterize the constrained-
efficient outcomes as those that are accrued under a benevolent social planner
who maximizes ex-ante expected gains from trade subject to the necessary con-
ditions implied by the revelation principle. The utilitarian welfare maximizing
outcomes implement an allocation rule where the object is awarded to the buyer
with highest α-weighted virtual valuation for some constant α ∈ (0, 1) subject to
the social planner’s optimal reservation values. Comparing the unique equilibrium
outcomes from competition with those from the social planner, it is shown that a
planner can increase the size of the expected surplus by improving total ex-ante
expected payoffs of the buyers at the expense of seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs.
A more detailed analysis of allocative efficiency proves to be difficult in the gen-
eral case of heterogeneous buyers. As the parameter α does not have an analytic
solution, the differences in the allocation rules can not be compared.
Restricting attention to the case of homogeneous buyers with identical distri-
butions, I show both equilibrium allocations award the object to the highest actual
valuation buyer, albeit subject to different reservation values. More specifically, I
show that the planner sets lower reservation values for low costs, while the reser-
vation values for high costs are lower under the equilibrium of multiple interme-
diaries. Hence, the social planner improves total surplus by inducing more trade
for low cost seller types, despite the reduction in the surplus arising from lowered
trade for high costs. Comparing the expected payoffs of the agents does not yield
clear cut predictions because of this aforementioned nonmonotonic relationship
between the reservation values. Namely, the constrained-efficient outcomes im-
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plement more efficient trade for (sufficiently) low cost seller while the equilibrium
outcomes under competition are more efficient for (sufficiently) high cost seller.8
However, I show that compared to the case of competition, the ex-ante losses in
seller’s expected payoffs could be to the extreme that every seller type becomes
weakly worse off under the social planner. I provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for this Pareto dominance relation to hold. Interpreting the condition
suggests that the seller types are better off under competition, whenever the av-
erage of the seller’s interim expected trade probabilities across all their types are
weakly greater than the corresponding average trade probability under the social
planner. I also do the analogous analysis for the buyers and provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for their interim expected payoffs under social planner to
Pareto dominate the payoffs from the equilibrium of multiple intermediaries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the rest of this section, I will
present the related literature. In Section I.2, I define the model, the equilibrium
concept, and the revelation principle. Section I.3 establishes existence of equilib-
ria and characterizes the unique equilibrium outcomes in terms of allocation and
expected payoffs. In Section I.4, I derive the outcomes of the Intermediation Game
under a single profit maximizing intermediary in the absence of competition. Sec-
tion I.5 analyzes efficiency of the equilibria outcomes by comparing expected gains
from trade and expected payoffs under competition and monopoly. I extend the
comparative statics exercises by considering the constrained efficient mechanisms.
Finally, Section I.6 concludes. All proofs are presented in Appendix A.
I.1.1 Related literature
There is a growing literature on competition among intermediaries. A large strand
concentrates on general two-sided markets with multiple agents on both sides,
where the intermediaries are interpreted as platforms that match these two sides;
for example competing matchmakers in Caillaud and Jullien (2003) or credit cards
in Rochet and Tirole (2003). Different than my paper, this literature concentrates
on the network externalities that arise from matchings of the two sides as in Rochet
and Tirole (2006) and restricts intermediaries’ strategies from general mechanism
spaces to specific tools such as prices in Armstrong (2006) or listing and closing
fees in Matros and Zapechelnyuk (2012).
More recently, Condorelli et al. (2013) consider, similar to this paper, a single-
unit auction setting with a single seller, multiple intermediaries and multiple buy-
8Similarly, social planner is more efficient for low valuation buyers while competition is for high
valuation buyers.
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ers. In their setup, each intermediary is linked to a subset of buyers, where the
subsets are mutually exclusive across the intermediaries. They analyze a game,
where the seller can trade the object one of two ways; either directly with a buyer,
who was referred by an intermediary for some referral fee, or with an intermedi-
ary, who in turn resells the object to one of its exclusive buyers. The authors focus
on the role of referrals, in particular impact on efficiency, in these markets with
intermediaries. In their paper, the seller has all the bargaining power by designing
the trading mechanism, whereas in my paper the intermediaries design the trad-
ing mechanisms. Furthermore, I consider a bargaining situation with two-sided
asymmetric information, as the seller also possesses private information.
A few recent papers consider competition among intermediaries over mecha-
nisms. In Feldman et al. (2010), inspired by the internet ad auctions, the authors
consider multiple intermediaries competing for the purchase of a single good from
an upstream seller, via a second price auction with reserve price, in order to sell to
their respective “captive” buyers in the downstream auctions. The paper tries to
identify the equilibrium downstream auctions for the intermediaries. This paper
differs in the feature that the intermediaries do not have captive buyers and hence
do not offer up and downstream auctions. Furthermore, the intermediaries have
access to a larger strategy space than second-price auctions. Closer to my paper
is Loertscher and Niedermayer (2008) and Loertscher and Niedermayer (2012),
where the authors consider competition among intermediaries over announce-
ments of auctions with a fee that is levied on the realized price. They consider
a dynamic random matching model where a seller, a buyer and an intermediary
are matched, which yields the intermediaries temporary monopoly powers over
the traders until they are rematched. In my paper there is a single seller, who
optimally chooses the intermediary as opposed to being randomly matched to an
intermediary. Altogether, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that
attempts to analyze competition among intermediaries over general mechanisms
in the context of trade.
Insofar as the intermediaries are competing designers, this paper also relates to
literature on competing mechanism design. The existing papers, such as McAfee
(1993), Peters and Severinov (1997), Burguet and Sákovics (1999), Pai (2009)
and Virág (2010), all consider sellers as the designers. Furthermore, the papers
restrict the sellers’ strategy spaces to direct mechanism or auctions. In that regard,
my paper differs in having the intermediaries as designers who have access to a
larger set of mechanisms. An interesting result close to the findings presented here
is found in McAfee (1993). In that paper, the author considers many sellers com-
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peting with each other over direct mechanisms in order to attract buyers. Concen-
trating on “large” market equilibria where the sellers’ mechanism announcements
do not alter the distribution of buyers at other sellers’ mechanisms, he shows that
auctions arise endogenously as trading institutions. I show that a similar result is
retained in the model of competition considered here, where the intermediaries
are the designers. The result is stronger in my paper, because it is maintained even
though the intermediaries have access to a larger strategy space than the space of
direct mechanisms.
The existence of multiple principals competing over mechanisms relates this
paper to the competing mechanisms in common agency literature. There are sev-
eral theoretical papers that offer methods to cope with the difficulties arising from
common agency problem. The main methods offered in the literature to tackle
common agency problems include universal type space approach from Epstein and
Peters (1999) and the menu theorem approaches in Martimort and Stole (2002),
Peters (2001) and Han (2006), where the last one develops menu theorems for
bilateral contracting with multiple agents. More recently, Attar et al. (2011) con-
sider multiple-principal and multiple-agent games of incomplete information in
which each agent can at most participate with one principal. They show that in
such games with a single agent, it is without loss of generality to restrict princi-
pals’ strategies to direct mechanisms and the agent reporting his type truthfully.
Unfortunately, as there are multiple agents in the setup considered in this paper,
the results from Attar et al. (2011) can not be applied. Nevertheless, the partic-
ular model of competition I analyze skirts the greater difficulties related to the
common agency framework and the revelation principle provides the means to
characterizing the equilibrium outcomes.
The special case of a single buyer relates this paper to the literature on bi-
lateral trade initiated by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983). The monopolist intermediary’s optimal mechanism and the
constrained-efficient mechanism have been identified in Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983). The double-auction analyzed in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)
is a particular trading mechanism that implements the constrained-efficient out-
comes.
The seller’s revenue maximizing auctions are central to the analysis. In the
context of bilateral trade, seller’s optimal mechanism when her types are com-
monly known has been examined by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). As summarized
in Yilankaya (1999), in the IPV case the informed seller’s optimal mechanism is
equivalent to the ex-ante optimal mechanism of the seller, which was separately
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studied in Williams (1987). The equivalence between informed seller’s ex-ante
optimal mechanism and the optimal mechanism if her private information were
commonly known holds generally for the IPV setup as shown in Skreta (2011).9
Finally, various techniques from the vast literature on optimal design are em-
ployed in the proofs. The optimal mechanisms are derived using approaches es-
tablished in the seminal Myerson (1981) paper on optimal auction design. On a
more technical level, in two of the contradiction proofs, I construct profitable de-
viation mechanisms that have strictly dominant strategies or satisfy strict ex-post
incentive compatibility. Some results I find useful include the equivalence between
Bayesian implementation and dominant strategy implementation as shown in Ger-
shkov et al. (2013) and Manelli and Vincent (2010), and the characterization of
ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms from Chung and Ely (2002). Account-
ing for entry decisions of the seller requires techniques from optimal mechanism
in arbitrary (possibly nonconvex) type spaces to be applied. I appeal to Skreta
(2006) where she establishes revenue equivalence results for optimal mechanisms
defined on general type spaces. Lastly, my proof techniques are also related to
the work in Jullien (2000) where the author considers the problem of optimal
design under type dependent outside options. A similar scenario arises endoge-
nously in the model considered here, as every intermediary faces the problem of
attracting seller types that receive particular expected payoffs from the competitor
intermediary’s announced mechanisms.
I.2 Intermediation Game with Multiple Intermedi-
aries
I.2.1 Primitives
Consider a trading problem where a seller, denoted s, owns a single indivisible
object that a set of n buyers, each denoted by j ∈ {1, . . . , n} want to buy. The
agents have their own valuations for the object which are privately known. There
is a set of intermediaries I = {1, . . . ,m} for m ≥ 2 who try to intermediate the
transaction between the agents, without knowing how much the object is worth
9Maskin and Tirole (1990) analyzes the general principal-agent relationship when the principal
has private information. However, their analysis does not apply to the informed seller’s optimal
mechanism design in (bilateral) trade problems directly as several assumptions such as the finite-
ness of type spaces or the sorting assumption do not hold.
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to either agent.10
All of the players in the game are risk neutral. They all have outside options
with payoffs normalized to 0. The intermediaries care only about money. The
agents have additively separable and linear preferences over both the good and
money. I refer to the seller’s valuation for the object, or her opportunity cost of
selling it, as her cost and denote it by c, while the valuation of buyer j is denoted
by vj. I assume that c is distributed on interval C = [0, 1] according to distri-
bution F , while vj ’s are independently distributed on the same interval, denoted
by Vj = [0, 1] according to distributions Gj. I also assume that the distribution
functions F and Gj ’s are differentiable and are commonly known. In addition,
their corresponding density functions f and gj are assumed to be strictly positive
everywhere, satisfying the usual monotone hazard rate properties; F/f is strictly
increasing and (1 − Gj)/gj is strictly decreasing. The random variables c and vj ’s
are private information of the seller and the buyers, respectively, and hence will
be referred to as the types of the agents.
I will find it convenient to define ψj(vj) = vj − 1−Gj(vj)gj(vj) as the virtual valuation
of a buyer j. By monotone hazard rate property, ψj(vj) is strictly increasing in vj
for every j. Similarly define ψs(c) = c +
F (c)
f(c)
to be the virtual cost of the seller. By
the same token, ψs(c) is also a strictly increasing function in c.
Finally, I use V = ×nj=1Vj = [0, 1]n to denote the set of all possible vectors
of valuations for all of the buyers, while V−j = ×k 6=jVk = [0, 1]n−1 represents
the set of all possible vectors of valuations for all of the buyers other than j.
Similarly let v = (v1, . . . , vn) denote a vector of valuations for all of the buyers,
while v−j = (v1, . . . , vj−1, vj+1, . . . , vn) denotes a vector of valuations for all of the
buyers other than j. The joint distribution of v on V is denoted by G = ×nj=1Gj,
while G−j = ×k 6=jGk denotes the joint distribution of v−j on V−j. In that regard
g(v) and g−j(v−j) denote the corresponding densities.
I.2.2 Timing of the Game
These players participate in the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries
that is player over three stages where in the first stage the intermediaries announce
their mechanisms simultaneously to the seller. After the mechanism announce-
ments, at the second stage the seller moves, initially picking which intermediary
mediates the bargaining with the buyers and later sending her private message to
10For the rest of the paper, I reserve subscripts for the agents while the superscripts for the
intermediaries.
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that chosen mechanism. Finally in the third and last stage, the buyers observe only
the seller’s chosen mechanism and send their private message to that previously
chosen mechanism. The game ends with the chosen mechanism implementing its
specified outcome.
At the first stage of the game, every intermediary i ∈ I offers a mechanism,
denoted γi. The vector of announced mechanisms is denoted by γ = {γ1, . . . , γm}.
I use Γ to refer to the space of mechanisms that each γi belongs to. Due to the
symmetry of the intermediaries’ preferences and information, it is without loss of
generality to assume that all announced mechanisms come from the same space
Γ. Hence Γm = ×mi=1Γ represents the joint mechanism space to which the vector γ
belongs.
Following the mechanism announcements, at the second stage the seller moves.
She first takes her entry decision which is publicly observed. The seller chooses
one of the announced mechanisms from γ . Since the entry decision entails choos-
ing an intermediary, a typical action is denoted by i ∈ I. Following an entry choice
i ∈ I, the seller at subgame s.i sends her private message to intermediary i, where
a typical action is denoted by mis and belongs to the set M
i
s, while the game is
over for all the other intermediaries who receive outside option payoffs of 0. This
concludes the second stage and the game proceeds to the third and final stage.
In the last stage, following seller’s entry action of i ∈ I, the buyers observe
only γi. Then each buyer j at subgame j.i sends his private message to the chosen
intermediary i. Again, a typical action is denoted by mij and belongs to the set
M ij for all buyers j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. I denote the vector of buyers’ messages by mib =
(mi1, . . . ,m
i
n). Finally, given a vector of messages (m
i
s,m
i
b), the chosen mechanism
γi implements its outcome and the payoffs are realized.
I.2.3 Behavioral Strategies, Beliefs and Payoffs
I will define the behavioral strategies starting with the entry decision of the seller
from the second stage. For all announced mechanisms γ and types c ∈ C, the seller
picks an intermediary from the set of intermediaries I. A (pure) entry strategy of
the seller is defined by the mapping η : C × Γn → I.
Following an entry decision of i ∈ I, the seller at subgame s.i chooses her
communication strategy which is a mapping µis : C × Γm → M is. I will use
µs = (µ
1
s, . . . , µ
n
s ) to denote the shorthand notation for the set of communication
strategies of the seller at subgames s.i for all i ∈ I.
Similarly at the third stage each buyer j at subgame j.i chooses his commu-
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nication strategy which is defined by a mapping µij : Vj × Γ → M ij . Observe
that for every buyer j, their communication strategy mapping accounts for the
fact that they observe only the seller’s chosen mechanism. Also note that for
all agents, the messages specified by their strategies are sent only to the cho-
sen intermediary i and no other intermediaries receive any messages. It will be
convenient to define µib = (µ
i
1, . . . , µ
i
n) as the shorthand for the set of communi-
cation strategies of all buyers at subgame following entry to i. Similarly denote
by µi−j = (µ
i
1, . . . , µ
i
j−1, µ
i
j+1, . . . , µ
i
n) as the collection of communication strategies
of all buyers other than j following entry to i. Finally µb = {µib}mi=1 denotes the
overall collection of communication strategies of all buyers at all subgames.
It will be assumed that for all agents and all intermediaries the message spaces
M is and M
i
j are rich enough to include a message that upon sending guarantees
the outside option payoff of 0 to that agent. One way to interpret this message is
“leaving the negotiation table”.11
The behavioral strategies for the intermediaries are choices of their respective
mechanisms. Given the bilateral trade context, a mechanism γi offered by in-
termediary i ∈ I comprises the allocation rule Qi = {Qi1, . . . , Qin} and payment
rule τ i = {τ is, τ i1, . . . , τ in}. Each term Qij corresponds to the probability of buyer
j receiving the good. The payment τ is represents the transfer to the seller from
intermediary i, while τ ij is the transfer from buyer j to intermediary i, respectively.
It will be assumed that the transfers belong to the set [−K,K] for a large enough
constant K that satisfies 1  K < ∞.12 Hence a mechanism γi is defined by the
mapping γi : M is ×M i1 × · · · ×M in → [0, 1]n × [−K,K]n+1 where the inputs are
the private messages sent by each agent to the intermediary and outputs are trade
probabilities and transfers in the aforementioned order.
As is standard in the literature, it is assumed that intermediaries are not al-
lowed to offer mechanisms which are contingent on other mechanisms and that
the intermediaries can and will perfectly commit to the mechanisms they offer. A
mechanism is said to satisfy resource constraints if for any vector of messages, the
sum of trade probabilities are at most 1. Given there is a single indivisible object
to be allocated, I restrict attention to mechanisms that satisfy resource constraints
and denote the space of all such mechanisms by Γ, which is compact. Because it
11This assumption allows me to, without loss of generality, assume that the seller’s entry choice
is followed by participation of the buyers. In other words, any alternative model with “nonpartici-
pation” among the set of entry choices for the seller or at the beginning of the third stage allowing
the buyers first to choose whether to go to seller’s chosen mechanism or to stay at home do not
alter the results.
12Observe that K can be made arbitrarily large. This assumption makes the general mechanism
space compact, however has no impact on the results.
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is assumed that the good can not be destroyed, from resource constraints one can
define Qis =
∑n
j=1 Q
i
j to be the probability of the good leaving the hands of the
seller. Hence 1−Qis = 1−
∑n
j=1Q
i
j is the probability that the seller keeps the object.
Hence a pure strategy of an intermediary is to announce a mechanism γi ∈ Γ. De-
note by γ−i = (γ1, . . . , γi−1, γi+1, . . . , γm) the strategies of all intermediaries other
than i.
Next, I will define the beliefs in the game. For all the intermediaries, their
beliefs of seller’s types c and buyers’ types vj are given by the prior distribution
functions F and Gj ’s, respectively.
In order to define the beliefs of the agents, consider the information nodes
(c,v, i, γ) which is composed of the vector of agents’ types, seller’s entry decision
and vector of announced mechanisms, respectively. Seller at subgame s.i forms
beliefs denoted by βs(v|c, i,γ) over buyers’ types v. It will be convenient to sup-
press seller’s entry choice in the notation by using βis(v|c,γ) and whenever there is
no confusion about histories I will refer to seller’s beliefs at subgame s.i in short-
hand by βis. The collection of seller’s beliefs over all subgames are denoted by
β s = (β
1
s , . . . , β
n
s ).
On the other hand, each buyer j at subgame j.i forms beliefs over seller types
c, types of the other buyers v−j and the mechanisms γ−i announced by the inter-
mediaries other than i. Buyer j’s beliefs will be denoted by βj(c,v−j, γ−i|vj, i, γi).
Similar to the seller’s beliefs, suppressing seller’s entry choice, I will denote buyer
j’s beliefs at subgame j.i by βij(c,v−j, γ
−i|vj, γi) and refer to them by βij in short-
hand. The vector of all buyers’ beliefs following entry to i are denoted by β ib =
(βi1, . . . , β
i
n) and the term β b denotes the whole system of buyers’ beliefs over all
subgames.
Next I define the payoffs in the game. Consider a terminal node defined by a
history of actions with array of mechanisms γ , entry to intermediary i and mes-
sages sent mis and m
i
b. Then the realized payoffs are given by:
Us
(
γ, i,mis,m
i
b|c
)
= τ is
(
mis,m
i
b
)−Qis(mis,mib)c
Uj
(
γ, i,mis,m
i
b|vj
)
= Qij
(
mis,m
i
b
)
vj − τ ij
(
mis,m
i
b
) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
U i
(
γ, i,mis,m
i
b
)
=
n∑
j=1
τ ij
(
mis,m
i
b
)− τ is(mis,mib)
Uk
(
γ, i,mis,m
i
b
)
= 0 ∀k 6= i
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Finally, I define the expected payoffs at the relevant subgames where the corre-
sponding players move. For the rest of the section, consider a profile of strate-
gies (γ, η,µs,µb) and beliefs (β s,β b). At the beginning of the third stage, for ev-
ery buyer j and entry choice i, the expected payoff at subgame j.i is denoted by
Uj
(
γ, i, µis,µ
i
b|vj
)
which is equal to:
Uj
(
γ, i, µis,µ
i
b|vj
)
=
∫
Uj
(
γ, i, µis(c,γ), µ
i
j(vj, γ
i),µi−j(v−j, γ
i)|vj
)
βij
(
c,v−j, γ−i|vj, γi
)
d(c,v−j, γ−i)
For the seller at the second stage, there are two expected payoffs to be defined.
Firstly, following a realized entry decision of i, seller at subgame s.i receives an
expected payoff denoted by Us
(
γ, i, µis,µ
i
b|c
)
which is equal to:
Us
(
γ, i, µis,µ
i
b|c
)
=
∫
Us
(
γ, i, µis(c,γ),µ
i
b(v, γ
i)|c)βis(v|c,γ)dv
Secondly, when deciding on the entry decision η(c,γ), the seller receives an ex-
pected payoff denoted by Us
(
γ, η,µs,µb|c
)
and is equal to:
Us
(
γ, η,µs,µb|c
)
=
∑
i∈I
Us
(
γ, i, µis,µ
i
b|c
)
I
(
η(c,γ) = i
)
Lastly, in the first stage each intermediary i ∈ I receives an expected profit denoted
by U i
(
γ, η,µs,µb
)
and is equal to:
U i
(
γ, η,µs,µb
)
=
∫
c
∫
v
U i
(
γ, i, µis(c,γ),µ
i
b(v, γ
i)
)
dG(v)I
(
η(c,γ) = i
)
dF (c)
I.2.4 Equilibrium
An assessment Eˆ consisting of strategies (γˆ , ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb) and beliefs βˆ = (βˆ s, βˆ b) forms
a sequential equilibrium, or equilibrium for short, whenever the strategies satisfy
sequential rationality with beliefs βˆ and the beliefs βˆ are consistent with the strate-
gies. First consider the sequential rationality conditions of the strategies given the
belief system βˆ . The communication strategies µˆis and µˆ
i
j for all buyers at subgames
s.i and j.i for any i ∈ I have to satisfy:
Us
(
γ, i, µˆis, µˆ
i
b|c
) ≥ Us(γ, i,mis, µˆib|c)
Uj
(
γ, i, µˆis, µˆ
i
b|vj
) ≥ Uj(γ, i, µˆis,mij, µˆi−j|vj)
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for every c ∈ C, vj ∈ Vj, all mechanism announcements γ , all entry strategies
i ∈ I and all messages mis ∈ M is and mij ∈ M ij , in the corresponding way. The
entry strategy of the seller from the beginning of the second stage has to satisfy
the following condition:
Us
(
γ, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb|c
) ≥ Us(γ, i, µˆs, µˆb|c)
for every c ∈ C, all strategies γ , the optimal communication strategies µˆb and µˆs,
and any entry decision i ∈ I. At the first stage, by announcing γˆi each intermedi-
ary’s expected profits have to satisfy:
U i
(
γˆ , ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb
) ≥ U i(γi, γˆ−i, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb)
for every γi ∈ Γ.
Next consider the equilibrium beliefs of the agents. Consistency of βˆ requires
that there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategies γi,h ∈ ∆Γ for each i and
ηh ∈ ∆I that converge to the equilibrium strategies13 and that the equilibrium
beliefs satisfy βˆ = limh→∞βh where the sequence of beliefs are generated from the
sequence of strategies using Bayes’ rule.
Consistency implies that the agents have correct beliefs at the information sets
that are reached with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Then given an
equilibrium vector of mechanisms γˆ , the beliefs of the seller at subgame s.i that
is reached with positive probability, i.e.
∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c) > 0, for every type
c ∈ C are given by:
βˆis(v|c, γˆ) = g(v)
Similarly, given an equilibrium mechanism γˆi that is chosen with positive proba-
bility on the equilibrium path, the beliefs for any type vj ∈ Vj of any buyer j at
subgame j.i are given by:
βˆij
(
c,v−j, γ−i)|vj, γˆi
)
=

I
(
ηˆ(c,γˆ)=i
)
f(c)∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(c,γˆ)=i
)
dF (c)
g−j(v−j) if γ−i = γˆ
−i
0 o/w
If the equilibrium mechanism γˆi is not chosen by any type of the seller or an
intermediary announces a deviation mechanism γi 6= γˆi, the subgames are out-of-
equilibrium path and hence are reached with zero probability. In either of those
cases, the beliefs are equal to the limit of belief sequences generated by the cho-
13The sequences {γ1,h, . . . , γm,h, ηh}∞h=1 satisfy limh→∞ γi,h = γˆi for every i and limh→∞ ηh = ηˆ.
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sen sequence of convergent strategy sequences. It turns out that the seller’s equi-
librium beliefs at any information node is equal to βˆis(v|c,γ) = g(v), no matter
whether the array of mechanisms are the equilibrium strategies or not. This result
follows from the consistency of the beliefs and is proved in Appendix A.1.2.
Finally, it will be convenient to define shorthand notations for the equilibrium
expected payoffs of the agents and the intermediaries. Letting Eˆ be an equilibrium,
then for any seller with type c, for any buyer j with type vj and any intermedi-
ary i, denote by Uˆs(c), Uˆj(vj) and Uˆ i their expected payoffs on the equilibrium,
respectively:
Uˆs(c) = Us
(
γˆ , ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb|c
)
Uˆj(vj) =
∑
i∈I
Uj
(
γˆ , i, µˆis, µˆ
i
b|vj
) [∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
]
Uˆ i = U i
(
γˆ , ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb
)
Similarly, I will denote by Qˆ = (Qˆ1, . . . , Qˆn) the allocation rule that is implemented
on equilibrium. For any vector of types (c,v), define for each j the probability of
trade by:
Qˆj(c,v) =
∑
i∈I
Qˆij
(
µˆis(c, γˆ), µˆ
i
b(v, γˆ
i)
)
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
My aim is to provide a full characterization of the equilibrium outcomes in terms
of the implemented allocation rule Qˆ and the expected payoffs Uˆs(c), Uˆj(vj)’s and
Uˆ i’s.
I.2.5 Revelation Principle
In mechanism design problems with a single principal, the revelation principle
pioneered in Myerson (1981) establishes that, it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to a simple class of mechanisms called direct mechanisms where
the agents’ message spaces are equal to their type spaces. As pointed out by Peters
(2001) and Epstein and Peters (1999) among many others, existence of multiple
principals poses a major challenge. In particular, in such environments it is with
loss of generality to restrict attention to the principals announcing direct mecha-
nisms.
Insofar as the multiple competing intermediaries are mechanism designers, this
paper also falls into the latter category. Despite the difficulties with the revelation
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principle,14 it turns out that in this setup I can use it to characterize the equilibrium
outcomes in terms of the implemented trade probabilities and expected payoffs to
the players. Before proceeding, I go over some terminology and definitions that
are used in the rest of the paper.
Feasible Direct Revelation Mechanisms and Their Properties
The intermediation game considered in this paper is a Bayesian game of incom-
plete information with m + n + 1 players. The aim of the subsection is to show
that for any equilibrium of the intermediation game, there exists a direct revelation
mechanism (DRM), an auxiliary Bayesian game where players report their types
with a payoff equivalent truthful type-telling equilibrium. In the setup of this pa-
per, as it is only the agents (n+1-many players) who have private information, it is
also only them who report their types in the DRM and the m-many intermediaries
do not take any actions.
In the context of the intermediation game, a DRM denoted by δ, is a collection
of allocation rule Q¯ = {Q¯1, . . . , Q¯n} and transfer rule τ¯ = {τ¯s, τ¯1, . . . , τ¯n, τ¯ 1, . . . , τ¯m}
where the outcomes are determined by the agents reporting their types. Sim-
ilar to an intermediary’s mechanism, each term Q¯j denotes the probability of
buyer j receiving the good, and the sum of Q¯j ’s corresponds to the probability
of the good leaving the hands of the seller. Furthermore, τ¯s and τ¯ i’s are transfers
made to the seller and intermediaries denoted by i, while τ¯j ’s are the transfers
made from the corresponding buyer j. Hence a DRM is defined by the mapping
δ : C ×V→ [0, 1]n × Rm+n+1.
Assuming agents report types truthfully, the expected trade probabilities, trans-
fers and consequently payoffs for the agents are defined as follows:
q¯s(c) =
∫
v
Q¯s(c,v)dG(v) q¯j(vj) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
Q¯j(c,v)dG−j(v−j)dF (c)
t¯s(c) =
∫
v
τ¯s(c,v)dG(v) t¯j(vj) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
τ¯j(c,v)dG−j(v−j)dF (c)
U¯s(c) = t¯s(c)− q¯s(c)c U¯j(vj) = q¯j(vj)vj − t¯j(vj)
Similarly, the expected transfers and payoffs for the intermediaries are:
t¯i =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
τ¯ i(c,v)dG(v)dF (c) U¯ i = t¯i
14See Martimort and Stole (2002) for a detailed discussion of the difficulties with the revelation
principle in common agency framework.
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A DRM δ is feasible if and only if it satisfies individual rationality (IR), incen-
tive compatibility (IC), resource constraints (RES), and budget-balancedness (BB).
A DRM satisfies IR if the expected payoffs players receive are weakly larger than
their outside option payoffs, IC if it is an equilibrium for all agents to report their
types truthfully, RES if for any vector of reported types the sum of trade probabil-
ities are at most 1, BB if there are no net transfers in or out of the system. These
constraints can be expressed as follows:
IR : U¯s(c), U¯j(vj), U¯ i ≥ 0 ∀c, ∀j and vj, ∀i
IC : U¯s(c) ≥ U¯s(c′|c), and U¯j(vj) ≥ U¯j(v′j|vj) ∀c, c′, ∀j and vj, v′j
RES : 0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
∑n
j=1 Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
BB :
∑n
j=1
[∫ 1
0
t¯j(vj)dGj(vj)
]
− ∫ 1
0
t¯s(c)dF (c)−
∑m
i=1 t¯
i = 0
Consider the implications of feasibility for a DRM δ. Using standard arguments as
in Myerson (1981) or Krishna (2009), IC for buyer j implies that the expected pay-
off function U¯j(vj) is a maximum of a family of affine functions. Thus U¯j(vj)’s are
absolutely continuous convex functions that are differentiable almost everywhere
with derivative q¯j(vj) which is weakly increasing in vj. By RES q¯j(vj)’s are bounded
and thus buyer j’s expected payoffs are equal to U¯j(vj) = U¯j(0) +
∫ vj
0
q¯j(yj)dyj.
Then IR constraint of buyer j simplifies to holding only at the “worst” type vj = 0.
Similar arguments for the seller yield that U¯s(c) is an absolutely continuous
convex function that is differentiable almost everywhere with derivative q¯s(c) which
is weakly decreasing in c. Given q¯s(c)’s are bounded by RES, the seller’s expected
payoff for any type c can be written as U¯s(c) = U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx. In turn the IR
of the seller simplifies to hold only at c = 1.
Finally BB suggests that the sum of expected transfers to the intermediaries are
equal to the expected revenue generated from the agents, which is the difference
between the sum of expected transfers from the buyers and the seller. For a given
feasible DRM δ, it will be convenient to denote this revenue from the agents by
R(δ). The following remark summarizes the necessary conditions from above for
feasibility of a DRM δ. The proofs are omitted as they are standard results from
mechanism design:
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Remark I.1.
If a DRM δ is feasible, then the following must be true:
i) U¯s(c) = U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx, U¯s(1) ≥ 0, dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
ii) U¯j(vj) = U¯j(0) +
∫ vj
0
q¯j(yj)dyj, Uj(0) ≥ 0, dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
iii) U¯ i = t¯i ≥ 0,
∑
i∈I
U¯ i =
m∑
i=1
t¯i = R(δ) ∀i
where R(δ) is the expected revenue generated from the agents and is defined as:
R(δ) =
n∑
j=1
[∫ 1
0
t¯j(vj)dGj(vj)
]
−
∫ 1
0
t¯s(c)dF (c)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v
 n∑
j=1
q¯j(c,v)
[
vj − c
]− n∑
j=1
U¯j(vj)− U¯s(c)
 dG(v)dF (c)
Observe that given a feasible DRM δ = (Q¯, τ¯ ), the agents’ expected payoffs can
equivalently be characterized by only considering the allocation rule Q¯ along with
the endpoint expected payoffs U¯s(1) and U¯j(0)’s for all j. Also observe that, the
same information characterizes R(δ).
Payoff Equivalence to a Feasible DRM and Its Implications
Here’s the main result of this subsection:
Lemma I.1.
Given any equilibrium Eˆ of the intermediation game, there exists a feasible DRM δ
that has a payoff equivalent truthful type-telling equilibrium.
The proof incorporates a standard indexation and composition argument. There
are two important points to take away from Lemma I.1. Firstly, given any equilib-
rium Eˆ of the intermediation game, the implemented allocation rule Qˆ is equiva-
lent to the allocation rule implemented in the truthful type-telling equilibrium of
some feasible DRM δ = (Q¯, τ¯ ).
Secondly, combining Remark I.1 with the equivalence between the agents’ ex-
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pected payoffs, the following equalities can be attained:
Uˆs(c) = U¯s(c) = U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx ≥ 0 ∀c
Uˆj(vj) = U¯j(vj) = U¯j(0) +
∫ vj
0
q¯j(yj)dyj ≥ 0 ∀j and vj
where q¯s(c) and q¯j(vj)’s are the weakly monotonic expected trade probabilities
for the corresponding agents while U¯s(1) and U¯j(0)’s are the expected payoffs of
the agents for their corresponding “worst” types. Furthermore, by Remark I.1 the
agents’ equilibrium expected payoff schedules Uˆs(c) and Uˆj(vj)’s are absolutely
continuous in their own types. Hence characterizing the allocation rule and the
nonnegative expected payoffs at the corresponding endpoint types of the payoff
equivalent feasible DRM’s provides a full summary of equilibrium outcomes on the
agents’ side.
On the other side, however, the same knowledge of allocation rule and ex-
pected payoffs of agents at corresponding endpoints does not provide a full de-
scription of the intermediaries’ expected payoffs on the equilibrium. Nevertheless,
due to BB, the sum of the expected payoffs for the intermediaries is equal to R(δ):
Uˆ i = U¯ i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I ⇒
m∑
i=1
Uˆ i =
m∑
i=1
U¯ i = R(δ)
In the next section, I will uniquely characterize the outcomes of the intermediation
game using the set of feasible DRM’s. The main challenges will be to pin down
the allocation rule Q¯ and agents’ expected payoffs at endpoints U¯s(1) and U¯j(0)’s
of a feasible DRM that are consistent with an equilibrium. It will also be another
challenge to separate the intermediaries’ equilibrium expected payoffs U¯ i’s from
an identified R(δ).
I.3 Equilibrium Outcomes with Multiple Intermedi-
aries
In this section I present the main results of the paper including the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes in the intermediation game with multiple
intermediaries. I begin by describing a feasible DRM that plays an important role
in the rest of the analysis.
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I.3.1 Seller-Optimal DRM
I start with the following definition:
Definition I.1.
A seller-optimal DRM, denoted by δ∗ = (Q∗, τ ∗), is a feasible DRM that maximizes
seller’s ex-ante expected payoff.
Proposition I.1.
The seller-optimal DRM, denoted by δ∗ is characterized by the following:
1. There exists a unique allocation rule Q∗ = (Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
n) where for any vector
of truthful type reports each term Q∗j is equal to:
Q∗j(c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj) > max
{
c,max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk)}
}
0 o/w
(I.1)
2. Agent’s expected payoffs at corresponding endpoints satisfy U∗s (1) = U
∗
j (0) = 0
for all j.
3. The expected revenue generated from the agents satisfies R(δ∗) = 0, which in
turn implies U i,∗ = 0 for all i ∈ I.
There are several important properties associated with the seller-optimal DRM
δ∗.
The unique allocation rule is dominant-strategy IC: For every j, given any
reported vector of types the trade probability Q∗j(c,v) is weakly increasing in vj
and weakly decreasing in c. The latter property suggests that Q∗s(c,v) is also
weakly decreasing in c as it is equal to the sum of Q∗j ’s across all j. Therefore
the seller-optimal allocation rule Q∗ is dominant-strategy implementable.15
The agents’ expected payoffs are uniquely defined: For any feasible DRM δ,
Remark I.1 establishes that the agents’ expected payoffs are defined by the alloca-
tion rule and the constants U¯s(1) and U¯j(0)’s. For δ∗, there is a unique allocation
rule Q∗ and the endpoint expected payoffs satisfy U∗s (1) = U
∗
j (0) = 0 for all j.
Hence agents’ expected payoff schedules are unique.
No cross-subsidization across seller types: Consider for the moment that
there are no intermediaries and the seller is the designer in a situation where her
15Truthful type-telling is dominant strategy for the mechanism γ∗ = {Q∗, τ ∗}where the payment
rules τ ∗ are τ∗s (c,v) = Q
∗
s(c,v)c +
∫ 1
c
Q∗s(x,v)dx, and τ
∗
j (c,v) = Q
∗
j (c,v)vj −
∫ vj
0
Q∗j (c, y,v−j)dy
for all j, and τ i,∗(c,v) = 0 for all i.
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cost is commonly known by the buyers. Standard results from optimal mechanism
design theory suggests that, the following auction γS = {QS, τ S} is an optimal
mechanism in the sense that it maximizes her expected revenues:16
QSj (c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj) > max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk)} and vj > rSj (c)
0 o/w
∀j, c, v (I.2)
τSj (c,v) = Q
S
j (c,v)vj −
∫ vj
0
QSj (c, y,v−j)dy ∀j, c, v (I.3)
where rSj (c)’s form a set of optimal discriminatory reserve prices defined by r
S
j (c) =
ψ−1j (c) for each j.
17 Note that the monotone hazard rate property implies ψj(vj) is
strictly increasing in vj for each j, and therefore ψ−1j is well defined.
Next, assume that the buyers do not observe the seller’s cost. It turns out that in
the IPV paradigm, the informed seller’s revenue maximizing mechanism yields the
same outcomes as in the truthful type-telling equilibrium of γS. In other words,
γS is also an optimal mechanism for the informed seller. In particular, it imple-
ments the same allocation as QS shown above. This is because the seller’s cost
is distributed independently of the buyers’ valuations. Hence her private infor-
mation does not influence the maximal revenue she can generate.18 For the rest
of the paper, I will refer to γS described above, as the informed seller’s optimal
mechanism.
At a closer look, one can see that for every c, the two allocation rules Q∗ and
QS are the same; they both award the good to the buyer with the highest virtual
valuation subject to the same discriminatory reservation values. Furthermore,
under the seller’s revenue maximizing auction, the expected payoffs for the buyers
with lowest valuation vj = 0 for all j and seller with highest cost c = 1 are equal
to zero. To see why, observe that the reservation values are increasing in c and
satisfy rj(c) ≥ rj(0) = ψ−1j (0) > 0 for all c. Hence a buyer with lowest valuation
never gets the object and receives zero expected payoffs. Similarly, seller with cost
c = 1 sets the same reservation value ψ−1j (1) = 1 for all j, which in turn implies no
probability of trade. Hence revenues are zero for highest cost seller yielding zero
expected payoff.
16See for instance Myerson (1981), or Section 5.2 in Krishna (2009).
17Note that, there is slight abuse of notation as the optimal mechanism would not depend on the
seller’s private information as it is assumed that her cost is common knowledge. In order to make
explicit connection in the rest of the analysis, the optimal mechanism under symmetric information
is described this way.
18See Footnote 6.
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These observations establish the equivalence in agents’ payoffs and the allo-
cation rules between the truthful equilibria of the seller-optimal DRM and the
informed seller’s revenue maximizing auction. An important implication of this
equivalence is that δ∗ is free from cross-subsidization across seller types. In other
words, for every type c the seller’s expected payoffs are exactly equal to the maxi-
mal expected revenue net of buyers’ total information rents conditional on c. Since
the seller’s optimal auction when her types are commonly known does not display
cross-subsidization of expected payoffs across seller types, the equivalence result
implies that neither does the seller-optimal DRM.
The allocation rule is invariant to the seller’s type distribution: One related
point implied by the previous no cross-subsidization property is the invariance of
the allocation rule to seller’s type distribution F (c). Because the revenue maximiz-
ing auction is optimal for every type of the seller, any change in the distribution
does not alter the allocation rule. This is evident from the fact that the only point
where the seller’s private information appears in the allocation rule, i.e. the opti-
mal reservation values, are free from distribution F .
Intermediaries make zero expected profits: By Remark I.1, it is established
that in any feasible DRM δ, the sum of all intermediaries’ payoffs is equal to R(δ),
i.e. the revenue generated from the agents. For the seller-optimal DRM δ∗, this
revenue R(δ∗) is equal to zero. Given the IR constraints imply nonnegativity of
the intermediaries’ payoffs, it must be the case that U i,∗ = 0 for all i. This is
not surprising, because any expected profits an intermediary makes can always
be transferred to the seller as an increase in the additive constant Us(1) without
violating any of the feasibility constraints. In light of the previous properties, this
observation can be strengthened in the following sense.
Corollary I.1.
A feasible DRM δ¯ for which the truthful type-telling equilibrium yields U¯s(c) ≥ U∗s (c)
for all c has to satisfy R(δ¯) = 0, thus U¯ i = 0 for all i and consequently U¯s(c) = U∗s (c)
for all c.
From the corollary above, it follows that there is no feasible way of improving
the seller’s expected payoffs from those that accrued under δ∗. Hence the payoff
schedule U∗s (c) is Pareto optimal and Q
∗ is a second best allocation. Furthermore,
providing these optimal expected payoffs to the seller requires the intermediaries
to make zero profits.
Seller-optimal DRM is invariant to the number of intermediaries: The
derivation of δ∗ did not rely onm, the number of intermediaries. Hence the charac-
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terization of Proposition I.1 is valid for any number of competing intermediaries.19
I.3.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium Outcomes
In this subsection I prove the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes in the inter-
mediation game with multiple intermediaries. So far Lemma I.1 established the
existence of a feasible DRM that has a payoff equivalent truthful type-telling equi-
librium. It turns out that there is a unique feasible DRM that characterizes the
outcomes in all equilibria of the intermediation game:
Theorem I.1.
Given any equilibrium Eˆ of the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries,
the unique outcomes are characterized by the truthful type-telling equilibrium of the
seller-optimal DRM δ∗ and hence are given by:
1. The allocation rule satisfies Qˆ = Q∗.
2. The seller’s expected payoffs satisfy Uˆs(1) = 0, and Uˆs(c) = U∗s (c) for all c.
3. For every buyer j, their expected payoffs satisfy Uˆj(0) = 0, and Uˆj(vj) = U∗j (vj).
4. Every intermediary i receives zero expected profits Uˆ i = U i,∗ = 0.
I prove the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes in two steps. In the first step, I
show that in any equilibrium Eˆ , it has to be the case that the intermediaries make
zero expected profits, the buyers with lowest valuation receive zero expected pay-
offs and the equilibrium allocation rule awards the object to the buyer with the
highest virtual valuation subject to some buyer specific reservation values. As a re-
sult, the first step establishes the unique equilibrium payoffs for the intermediaries.
Furthermore, the full characterization of the remaining outcomes only requires a
description of the reservation values and the highest cost seller’s expected payoff.
In the second step, I precisely show that the unique set of equilibrium reservation
values are equal to those under the seller-optimal DRM, or equivalently the seller’s
revenue maximizing auction.
In both steps I prove the steps by showing the existence of a strictly profitable
deviation for at least one intermediary if the payoff equivalent feasible DRM of
the considered equilibrium violates the claimed properties. However, the main
challenge is to circumvent the beliefs and consequently behavior of the agents at
19For that matter, characterization is also valid for the special cases of no intermediaries m = 0
and a single intermediary m = 1.
36
out-of equilibrium subgames. A technical contribution is the construction of the
strictly dominant strategy deviation mechanisms.
The intuition for the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes and their equivalence
to the outcomes from the truthful type-telling equilibrium of the seller-optimal
DRM is in the spirit of Bertrand competition. The intermediaries compete with
each other in order to attract the seller. However the existence of private infor-
mation results in the intermediaries contesting over every type of the seller. This
competition drives their profits down to zero and leads every seller type to be
offered the maximum expected payoffs they can receive subject to the feasibility
constraints. In turn, this yields the equivalence of outcomes in any equilibrium
to the unique DRM outcomes that achieve the maximal payoffs for the seller in a
feasible manner.
The equivalence to the seller-optimal DRM result has other crucial implica-
tions. In the previous subsection, several important properties associated with δ∗
were established. By virtue of equivalence, all those properties can be carried over
to the equilibria of the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries. In par-
ticular, the outcomes are invariant to the number of competing intermediaries and
the seller’s underlying type distribution. Furthermore, because the allocation rule
and the expected payoffs to the agents under the truthful type-telling equilibrium
of δ∗ are equivalent to those that are accrued under the truthful type-telling equi-
librium of the seller’s revenue maximizing auction, the equivalence carries over to
the intermediation game. The remark below summarizes the last point:
Remark I.2.
In any equilibrium Eˆ of the intermediation game, the expected payoffs to the agents
and the implemented allocation rule are equivalent to those that are accrued un-
der the truthful type-telling equilibrium of the informed seller’s revenue maximizing
auction γS.
Furthermore, in the symmetric case where all the buyers have the same type dis-
tribution, the optimal mechanism γS can be implemented as a second-price auction
with reserve prices that are same for all buyers.
The importance of this equivalence result is that, availability of more compli-
cated mechanisms do not improve the outcomes that are achieved by the informed
seller’s optimal auction. Furthermore, it provides guidance for what a candidate
equilibrium. Namely, one where intermediaries announce mechanisms that imi-
tate the informed seller’s revenue maximizing auction γS. This is precisely the aim
of the next subsection.
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Lastly, Remark I.2 suggests that under the symmetric case, the equilibrium
outcomes can be implemented by classical auctions, because the payoff equivalent
mechanism γS is a second-price auction with reserve prices. Hence, the results of
Theorem I.1 highlight the robustness of classical auctions under certain scenarios,
which in turn might be interpreted as a verification for the popularity of their
usage.
I.3.3 Existence of Equilibrium
The equilibrium outcome characterization relied on assuming the existence of an
equilibrium. The results would be moot if there were no equilibria of the inter-
mediation game with multiple intermediaries. As the next proposition establishes,
that is not the case:
Proposition I.2.
An equilibrium of the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries exists.
In light of Theorem I.1 and Remark I.2, an equilibrium is constructed where all
intermediaries announce the same mechanisms that mimic the informed seller’s
optimal mechanism γS as described before. Namely, the allocation rule is equiva-
lent to the unique seller-optimal DRM allocation rule Q∗ (or equivalently to QS)
and the transfer rule yields zero realized profits for all possible message reports.
More specifically the transfer rule for the buyers are equivalent to τSj (c,v) as de-
cribed in (I.3) and the transfer rule for the seller simply equals the sum of all the
buyer transfers, i.e.
∑
j τ
S
j (c,v). It is shown that these transfers make sure the
agents’ equilibrium expected payoffs are equivalent to those attained under the
truthful type-telling equilibrium of the seller-optimal DRM.
These mechanisms implement the seller-optimal DRM by essentially replicat-
ing the informed seller’s optimal mechanism with reserve prices. Namely, after
buyers bid valuations and the seller submits cost, the submitted cost determines
the buyer-specific reserve prices for every buyer. The winner then is the highest
virtual valuation buyer subject to the discriminatory reserve prices who makes a
payment of the smallest value that would still make him win.
I.4 Intermediation Game with a Single Intermediary
In this section the case of the monopolist intermediary is considered. The model
is kept the same way as in the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries.
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Hence this game is referred to as the intermediation game with a single monopo-
list intermediary. Namely, at the first stage monopolist intermediary announces a
mechanism. At the second stage the seller moves by reporting her private message
and at the last stage the buyers move by reporting their private messages. Note
that as there is only one intermediary, the seller has a trivial entry strategy of par-
ticipating in that single mechanism. Hence a single designer case is considered,
where the agents play a Bayesian communication game.
It follows from standard results such as Myerson (1981) or Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) that in this context due to the revelation principle, it is without
loss of generality to restrict attention to equilibria where the intermediary an-
nounces a feasible DRM δ and the agents report their types truthfully.
Definition I.2.
A monopolist’s optimal DRM, denoted by δM is a feasible DRM that maximizes the
monopolist intermediary’s expected payoff.
In the context of a single intermediary, δM satisfying BB implies the expected
profit of the monopolist intermediary is equal to the revenue generated from the
agentsR(δ). Hence, in this case it is redundant to describe a set of transfers specific
for the intermediary. Furthermore, by Remark I.1, all the outcomes are described
by the allocation rule and the constant expected payoffs for the worst types of the
agents. In light of that, the following proposition summarizes the monopolist’s
optimal DRM:
Proposition I.3.
The monopolist’s optimal DRM δM is characterized by the following:
1. There exists a unique allocation rule QM = (QM1 , . . . , Q
M
n ) where for any vector
of truthful type reports each term QMj is equal to:
QMj (c,v) =
1 if ψj(vj) > max
{
ψs(c),max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk)}
}
0 o/w
(I.4)
2. Agents’ expected payoffs at corresponding endpoints satisfy UMs (1) = U
M
j (0) =
0 for all j.
Remark I.3.
The unique equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation game with a single monopo-
list intermediary are summarized as follows:
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1. The implemented allocation rule is QM .
2. The seller’s expected payoffs satisfy UMs (c) =
∫ 1
c
qMs (x)dx for all c.
3. For every buyer j, their expected payoffs satisfy UMj (vj) =
∫ vj
0
qMj (yj)dyj for all
vj.
4. Intermediary receives strictly positive expected profits UM = R(δM).
Similar to the seller-optimal DRM δ∗, the monopolist’s optimal DRM δM also
has a unique allocation which is dominant-strategy IC and the agents’ expected
payoffs are uniquely defined. Furthermore, δM can also be implemented as an
auction that awards the object to the highest virtual valuation buyer subject to
reservation values.
The main difference between the allocation rules Q∗ and QM is that in the
monopolist’s optimal DRM, the buyers are subject to a different set of reservation
values, which are the unique solutions to ψj
(
rMj (c)
)
= min{ψs(c), 1} for all j and c.
The intuition is simple. The monopolist intermediary tries to screen the agents in
order to maximize its expected profits. The marginal revenue from allocation good
to buyer j is given by ψj(vj) while the marginal cost is ψs(c). Hence its expected
profits achieve maximum when the object is awarded to highest marginal revenue
buyer only if it is higher than the marginal cost.
These reservation values, however make the allocation rule responsive to the
seller’s type distribution. Hence unlike in the seller-optimal DRM, the allocation
rule in the monopolist’s optimal DRM is varying in seller’s underlying distribu-
tion F . This follows from the previous point that the optimal screening requires
assessment of the marginal costs which are changing in F .
I.5 Welfare Comparison
In this section, welfare of equilibrium outcomes are compared from an efficiency
point of view. I start with an analysis of outcomes under the two regimes; compe-
tition and monopoly.
I.5.1 Competition versus Monopoly
In light of Theorem I.1 and Remark I.3, the unique equilibrium outcomes of the
intermediation game with multiple intermediaries and single monopolist interme-
diary implement allocation rules Q∗ and QM , respectively. Both of these award the
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object to the highest virtual valuation buyer, but they differ in the buyer specific
reservation values. Denoting these reservation values by r∗j (c) for the competition
case and by rMj (c) for the monopoly case, for each buyer j they are the unique
solutions to:
ψj(r
∗
j (c)) = c, ψj
(
rMj (c)
)
= min{ψs(c), 1} for all c
Firstly observe that ψs(c) is strictly increasing and satisfies ψs(c) > c for all c ∈
(0, 1]. Secondly, ψs(cM) = 1 at some interior value cM ∈ (0, 1). Then it can be seen
that buyer j’s reservation values under the two regimes equal each other only at
the end points, and for all interior costs r∗j (c) < r
M
j (c). Furthermore, from the
definition of ψj ’s it can be seen that r∗j (c) > c for all c ∈ [0, 1). These imply that for
any given type vector (c,v), the trade probabilities satisfy Q∗j(c,v) ≥ QMj (c,v) for
all j. To be more precise, letting buyer k have the highest virtual valuation, the
inequalities are strict if r∗k(c) < ψk(vk) < r
M
k (c). As virtual valuation of a buyer is
less than the actual valuation and reservation values are above seller’s actual costs,
such an increase in trade probability translates into an improvement in allocative
efficiency.
The point is that in the equilibrium under competition, intermediaries choose
mechanisms that award the object to buyers on the basis of virtual valuations,
which represent the marginal revenues from trade. The equilibrium DRM of the
monopolist also chooses the winning buyer using the same criteria. Where they
differ, however, is their evaluation of the marginal costs. The profit maximizing
monopolist evaluates marginal cost as the combination of the actual cost and costs
incurred by the information rents. In the other case, however, competition leads
an intermediary to transfer all of its generated profits to the seller. This results
in the intermediaries internalizing the information rents and consequently setting
lower reservation values in equilibrium. This argument works under the IPV case,
because the lack of cross-subsidization brings along the incentive compatibility of
these optimal reservation values.
Next consider the ex-ante expected surplus comparison. This is an important
measure from an allocative efficiency point of view, because it equals the sum of
ex-ante expected payoffs for all players. Given an equilibrium of the intermedi-
ation game and its payoff equivalent feasible DRM δ, the ex-ante expected total
gains from trade is denoted by W (δ) and is defined as follows:
W (δ) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
vj − c
]
dG(v)dF (c)
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When comparing the ex-ante total surplus generated at the equilibrium in the case
of competition versus monopoly, it is seen that competition strictly increases the
size of the pie. This follows from the fact that the previously stated inequalities
highlighting the allocative efficiency increases hold strictly over a positive measure
of types.
The monotonic relationship between the allocation rules also makes it possible
to compare the agents’ payoffs. Given two expected payoff schedules Us(c) and
U´s(c), the schedule Us(c) Pareto dominates U´s(c) if it is the case that Us(c) ≥ U´s(c)
for all c. The analogous definition holds for the buyers. Then, the following
corollary summarizes the welfare comparison results:
Corollary I.2.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation game under the case of
multiple competing intermediaries versus the case of a single monopolist intermediary
yields:
1. Q∗j(c,v) ≥ QMj (c,v) for all (c,v) ∈ C ×V.
2. W (δ∗) > W (δM).
3. U∗s (c) Pareto dominates U
M
s (c).
4. U∗j (vj) Pareto dominates U
M
j (vj) for all j.
5. UM > U i,∗ = 0.
All agents are better off under competition. The size of the pie is larger and al-
locative efficiency is improved. The monopolist intermediary receives positive ex-
pected profits while under competition each intermediary receives zero expected
profits.
I.5.2 Competition versus Social Planner
Competition improves welfare in terms of allocative efficiency, however it does not
implement first-best allocation which would require the object to be awarded to
the highest valuation buyer whenever it is higher than the cost of the seller. There
are two sources of ex-post inefficiencies; not allocating the good to a buyer who
has higher valuation than the cost due to the reservation values and not allocating
the good to the highest valuation buyer due to evaluating the “winning buyer”
on the basis of virtual valuations.20 It is well known that there is no feasible
20The second point is not an issue if the buyers have symmetric distributions, as the virtual
valuations are derived using the same distributions.
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mechanism that achieves ex-post efficiency in these trade situations.21 As Krishna
and Perry (1998) alternatively states, the VCG mechanisms in these scenarios run
strict losses. Given the first-best outcomes are infeasible, the second-best outcomes
are considered as a benchmark.
Maximizing Ex-ante Surplus
The second-best outcomes are characterized as those outcomes that are imple-
mented by a benevolent social planner who aims to maximize ex-ante total sur-
plus. Consider the intermediation game with a single seller, n-many buyers and
m-many intermediaries where m can be any integer. Hence all cases are cov-
ered; monopolist intermediary and competing intermediaries.22 By the revelation
principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to the social planner
announcing a feasible DRM and the players reporting their types truthfully.23
Definition I.3.
A constrained-efficient DRM is a feasible DRM that maximizes the ex-ante expected
gains from trade.
Before describing the constrained-efficient DRM, some useful notation will be
introduced. For any parameter α ∈ [0, 1], let the α-weighted virtual valuations be
defined by:
ψs(c, α) = c+ α
F (c)
f(c)
ψj(vj, α) = vj − α 1−Gj(vj)gj(vj) ∀j
Given the monotone hazard rate properties, the following observations hold for
all c, v, α ∈ [0, 1]:
∂ψs(c,α)
∂c
= 1 + α d
dc
F (c)
f(c)
> 0 ∂cs(c,α)
∂α
= F (c)
f(c)
> 0
∂ψj(vj ,α)
∂vj
= 1− α d
dvj
1−Gj(vj)
gj(vj)
> 0
∂ψj(vj ;α)
∂α
= −1−Gj(vj)
gj(vj)
< 0
Proposition I.4.
The constrained-efficient DRM, denoted by δE is characterized by the following:
21For example Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown the impossibility for the case of
bilateral trade. Williams (1999) establishes the same results for more general trade situations with
multiple buyers and sellers.
22Following results also hold when there are no intermediaries.
23As in the case of multiple intermediaries, it is only the agents who have private information
and thus report types.
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1. There exists a unique allocation rule QE = (QE1 , . . . , Q
E
n ) where for any vector
of truthful type reports, each term QEj is equal to:
QEj (c,v) =
1 if ψj(vj, α) ≥ max
{
ψs(c, α),max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk, α)}
}
0 o/w
∀j
(I.5)
where α is a constant that satisfies α ∈ (0, 1).
2. Agents’ expected payoffs at corresponding endpoints satisfy UEs (1) = U
E
j (0) = 0
for all j.
3. The expected payoffs to intermediaries satisfy U i,E = 0 for all i.
The proof closely follows Theorem 2 from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983),
where the authors derive the constrained-efficient DRM in the context of bilateral
trade. The following corollary can be stated:
Corollary I.3.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation game with multiple inter-
mediaries to the social planner’s second-best outcomes implies that:
1. W (δE) > W (δ∗).
2. U i,∗ = U i,E = 0 for all i.
3.
∫ 1
0
U∗s (c)dF (c) >
∫ 1
0
UEs (c)dF (c).
4.
∑n
j=1
∫ 1
0
UEj (vj)dGj(vj) >
∑n
j=1
∫ 1
0
U∗j (vj)dGj(vj).
When comparing the equilibrium outcomes from social planner and the equi-
librium of intermediation game with competing intermediaries, it can be seen
that in both cases the intermediaries receive zero expected profits. Secondly,
W (δE) > W (δ∗) which follows from the fact that the social planner maximizes
the ex-ante total surplus by implementing allocation rule QE that is different than
Q∗. In other words, the social planner increases the total expected gains from
trade. By a similar argument, it can be deduced that the seller’s ex-ante expected
payoff is higher under competition than under a social planner. In turn this means
that the buyers are collectively better off under the social planner, because the
intermediaries make zero expected profits and the total gains from trade is strictly
higher.
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A comparison of allocative efficiency proves to be difficult for the general case.
The main problem is that the constrained-efficient allocation rule QE is defined
with parameter α, which depends on the underlying distributions and has no ana-
lytic solution. Nevertheless, an initial inspection suggests that in the constrained-
efficient allocation rule QE, the object is awarded to the highest α-weighted virtual
valuation buyer subject to reservation values rEj (c)’s which are the unique solu-
tions to ψj
(
rEj (c), α
)
= ψs(c, α) for all c. Since the parameter satisfies α ∈ (0, 1), it
follows that rEj (0) < r
∗
j (0). Furthermore, for every j there exists some interior cost
c¯j such that rEj (c¯j) = 1 > r
∗
j (c¯j). Hence the relationship between the sets of reser-
vation values r∗j (c)’s and r
E
j (c)’s are nonmonotonic. Another complication is that
the “winning” buyer has the highest α-weighted virtual valuation under the social
planner while it is the highest virtual valuation buyer24 under the equilibrium of
the intermediation game with competing intermediaries, and these winners may
be two different buyers.
To illustrate the complications, consider a vector of types (c,v). If c is low
enough, it might be the case that constrained-efficient allocation transacts the
good to a buyer improving allocative efficiency relative to the equilibrium alloca-
tion rule under competition. However, for higher c it could be the case that Q∗
awards to a buyer who indeed has the highest true valuation while the QE awards
it some other buyer, in turn harming allocative efficiency. In order to provide a
more detailed discussion of the welfare comparisons, I will concentrate on the
case of symmetric distributions for the buyers.
Homogeneous Buyers
In the rest of this section, assume that Gj = G for all j. Then the virtual valuations
for all buyers are the same, which shall be denoted by ψb(vj). Similarly, the α-
weighted virtual valuation for some constant α ∈ (0, 1) is denoted by ψb(vj, α).
Under symmetric buyers, the equilibrium allocation rules Q∗ and QE have very
simple interpretations. Both award the object to the highest value buyer subject
to the reservation values r∗(c) and rE(c) which are not buyer specific and are the
unique solutions to:25
ψb
(
r∗(c)
)
= c, ψb
(
rE(c), α
)
= min{ψs(c, α), 1} for all c
24Equivalently α = 1.
25The allocation rule QM from the monopolist’s optimal DRM also awards to the highest valua-
tion buyer subject to its reservation value rM (c) which solve ψ
(
rM (c)
)
= min{ψs(c), 1} for every
c.
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Observe that both sets of reservation values are increasing functions. Furthermore,
rE(0) < r∗(0) and there exists some interior cost c¯E such that rE(c¯E) = 1 > r∗(c¯E).
Therefore, the reservation values cross once at some interior value cˆ at which point
rE(cˆ) = r∗(cˆ). Then given any vector of types (c,v), the trade probabilities for all
j satisfy Q∗j(c,v) ≤ QEj (c,v) for any c ≤ cˆ and Q∗j(c,v) ≥ QEj (c,v) for any c ≥ cˆ.
It is important to note that the results from Corollary I.3 hold. Then any dis-
crepancy in the allocation rules arise solely from the differences in the reservation
values, and therefore interpretation of the surplus differences under symmetric
buyers is straight forward. The social planner sets a lower reservation value for
low cost seller types which increases the allocative efficiency and expected sur-
pluses. On the other hand the reservation value for the high cost seller types are
increased, which exerts the opposite effect on efficiency. Hence from an interim
perspective, changes in the expected surplus are uncertain. However, when the
ex-ante surplus is considered, it can be seen that these adjustments increase ex-
pected gains from trade. From an ex-ante perspective, the seller is made worse
of in expectation. However the gains in buyers’ ex-ante expected payoffs com-
pensate those losses and yield the overall efficiency improvement. The following
corollary elaborates on the differences in the agents’ expected payoffs arising from
the changes in the reservation values:
Corollary I.4.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation game with multiple inter-
mediaries with the social planner’s second-best outcomes under symmetric distribu-
tion for the buyers yields the following:
1. U∗s (c) Pareto dominates U
E
s (c) iff average of seller’s trade probabilities is higher
under δ∗:
U∗s (c) ≥ UEs (c) ∀c ⇔
∫ 1
0
q∗s(c)dc ≥
∫ 1
0
qEs (c)dc (I.6)
2. UEj (vj) Pareto dominates U
∗
j (vj) iff average of buyer j’s trade probabilities is
higher under δE:
UEj (vj) ≥ U∗j (vj) ∀vj ⇔
∫ 1
0
qEj (vj)dvj ≥
∫ 1
0
q∗j (vj)dvj (I.7)
Corollary I.4 highlights the changes in the expected payoffs of the agents. The
losses in seller’s expected payoffs under the social planner could be to the extreme
that the seller’s payoff schedule is Pareto dominated by the schedule from the
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equilibrium of the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries. A necessary
and sufficient condition is provided, which relates the reservation value alterations
by the social planner with the resulting changes in expected trade probabilities
across the different types of seller. It has been shown that high cost types trade less
often, while opposite is true for the low cost types. If on average the increments are
less than the reductions in the trade probabilities,26 then seller-optimal DRM yields
a Pareto dominating payoff schedule for the seller. An analogous condition holds
for each buyer, but from the other perspective as the social planner’s constrained-
efficient DRM improves the ex-ante expected payoff of the buyers.
I.6 Conclusion
A model of competition among intermediaries in a trade situation has been an-
alyzed. I showed that the equilibrium exists and that all equilibria exhibit the
same unique outcomes. Namely, the intermediaries make 0 expected profits and
the agents’ expected payoffs are equivalent to those that are accrued under the
informed seller’s revenue maximizing auction.
I also characterized the unique equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation
game with a single monopolist intermediary. Comparing welfare from an alloca-
tive efficiency point of view, I showed that the outcomes under the case of compe-
tition are unambiguously better than those under the monopoly. In particular, the
allocative efficiency is weakly increased for every possible type realization which
leads to a higher ex-ante total surplus and Pareto improvements in the agents’
expected payoff schedules.
Characterizing the second-best outcomes from the social planner’s ex-ante sur-
plus maximization problem, I compared them with the equilibrium outcomes from
the intermediation game in the case of competition. The analysis highlighted that
in the general case of heterogeneous distributions for the buyers, the planner’s
equilibrium achieves higher total surplus by implementing an allocation rule that
differs both in the reservation values and the evaluation of the winning buyer. Re-
stricting attention to the case of homogeneous buyers where the discrepancies in
allocation are attributed solely to differences in the reservation values, I showed
that the efficiency improvement is achieved by trading more often for low cost
types at the expense of more restricted trade for high cost types.
There are several directions for future research. Firstly, I concentrated on in-
26Note that the condition looks at the arithmetic average of the expected trade probabilities,
which is different than the ex-ante expected trade probability.
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dependent private valuations. However, it would be interesting to consider cor-
related valuations and common values at the other extreme. Secondly, I assumed
that all intermediaries are equally uninformed about the private information of
the agents. It would be interesting to see if similar results are attained when one
or some of the intermediaries have superior knowledge about agents’ private in-
formation than others. Such a setup could be interpreted as experience on the
market that comes with incumbency. Hence, one may also discuss robustness of
these outcomes to entry of new, inexperienced intermediaries.
Finally the environment contained a single indivisible object. It would also be
interesting to consider scenarios where the seller has more objects for sale. In
the IPV framework, if the seller is required to “single-home”,27 then similar results
may be expected. Allowing the seller to multi-home, on the other hand, could
potentially alter the proof methods and hence requires further investigation.
27The seller has to choose a single intermediary to mediate the sale of all her goods.
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CHAPTER II
Benefits of Intermediation under Asymmetric
Information
II.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of intermediation in bilateral trade
problems where the parties have the ability to bargain directly with each other
bypassing the use of an intermediary. In particular, the emphasis will be on the
impact of intermediation on allocative efficiency as measured by expected gains
generated from trade. The question of focus can thus be stated as follows:
Can the presence of an intermediary lead to outcomes that are strictly more effi-
cient than the outcomes that are attainable in its absence?
In order to answer this question, I consider a bargaining situation between a
seller and a buyer over the allocation of a single indivisible good. In this bilateral
trade problem, I assume that the private information of each bargaining party
about their valuation for the object are drawn from binary type spaces. However, I
allow for interdepence between the valuations. Namely, the buyer’s valuations are
assumed to be higher whenever the seller has a higher valuation for the object.
Hence this situation may be interpreted as a simplified bargaining scenario with
two-sided asymmetric information subject to a lemon problem à la Akerlof (1970).
In Section II.2, I analyze the informed seller’s signaling game, denoted by Γ,
where the two parties can trade at take-it-or-leave-it (henceforth TIOLI) price of-
fers that are announced by the seller. I characterize the set of pure strategy sequen-
tial equilibria of this game in Propositions II.1,II.2 and II.3. I find that there are
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multiple equilibrium outcomes for any parameter configuration.1 In anticipation
of the subsequent analysis, I select and summarize the most efficient equilibria in
Corollary II.2. It is important to note that, I show there are a range of parameter
values, where there is inefficient underselling even in the most efficient equilibria.
Lastly, in Corollary II.3 I characterize the equilibria that yield the highest expected
payoffs to the seller.
Next, in Section II.3, I turn the attention to a variant of the previous game with
an additional player; a third-party intermediary who only knows the prior prob-
abilities of the agents’ types, but not their realizations. In this game, denoted by
Γi, the intermediary designs a menu of price pairs, where each pair describes the
transfer to be made to the seller and the price charged to the buyer, respectively.
The seller, observing the menu decides whether to trade via the intermediary or to
choose the outside option of direct trade, where he can make a TIOLI offer to the
buyer.2
Signaling elements prevail in the game Γi with intermediary, which in turn
leads to multiplicities similar to the previous game Γ. However, the main aim
in this section is to establish a result on the existence of desired equilibria as
opposed to a full characterization. Namely, as previously mentioned, I aim to
see whether there may exist an equilibrium of Γi that is strictly more efficient
than the most efficient equilibrium of Γ. Furthermore, if there are more efficient
equilibria, then I also want to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions
for their existence. In this spirit, I restrict the rest of the analysis to the cases
where there is inefficient underselling in the informed seller’s signaling game Γ as
characterized in Corollary II.2, and examine the existence of efficient intermediated
equilibria in Γi, which satisfy strict allocative efficiency improvement property.
Let me digress and discuss an important feature of the game Γi. In this paper,
analysis focuses on a bilateral trade problem, where the parties have the ability to
bargain on their own in a direct manner without intermediation, albeit on seller’s
terms (seller makes TIOLI offers). This ability in turn enables the seller to guaran-
tee himself minimum expected payoffs that depend on his type. The intermediary,
on the other hand, tries to maximize its profits while having to respect the seller’s
endogenously determined and type-dependent outside options. Hence this situa-
tion may be interpreted as the intermediary competing with the seller.
The intermediary’s competition with the seller is an important aspect of the
1This is a common feature in dynamic Bayesian games of incomplete information with signaling
generally. For example consider the multiplicities of equilibrium outcomes in Spence (1973).
2For the rest of the paper, I use the male pronoun for the seller, the female pronoun for the
buyer, and the neuter pronoun for the intermediary.
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setup in this paper, which makes the analysis interesting from two angles. Firstly,
the literature on bilateral trade has not paid any attention to analyzing the im-
pact of competition on intermediation. To that extent, Chapter I of this thesis has
considered the impact of competition that arises when there are multiple interme-
diaries who try to facilitate trade. Referring to that type of competition as being
external, the current paper considers internal competition that is posed by one of
the bargaining parties. Other than novelty, it is also the relevance of the setup that
makes the analysis interesting. Considering situations where matching or search
technologies do not have an impact on the bargaining situation, e.g. because the
bargaining parties know the identities of each other, then it is reasonable to as-
sume that they have the ability to negotiate with each other directly.
I first establish in Lemma II.6, that in any desired equilibrium, trade has to
go through the intermediary as the seller types would choose the intermediary
rather than engaging in direct trade outside option. I show this by arguing that,
if at least one seller type chooses outside option to trade directly, then the strict
efficiency improvement requires either the intermediary or the buyer to make strict
losses, which contradicts the efficient intermediated equilibrium assumption. This
observation suggests that the intermediary plays an active role in the efficiency
improvements.
The main result of the paper is presented in Theorem II.1, where I provide a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of efficient intermediated equi-
libria of Γi. The necessity part of the proof follows from nonnegativity of the sum
of expected payoffs for the intermediary and the buyer in an equilibrium, while
for the sufficiency part I pursue a constructive proof by showing the existence of
an efficient intermediated equilibrium under the described condition.
There are several points to highlight with regards to the importance of the
result in Theorem II.1. Firstly, due to the way I define the efficient intermediated
equilibria, the efficiency improvements occur in ex-post sense. In other words, for
all type pairs the implemented trade probabilities in the efficient intermediated
equilibrium of Γi are weakly greater than their counterparts under the equilibria
of the game Γ.
Secondly, the efficiency improvements arise in the presence of the intermedi-
ary, which in turn suggests that there are benefits to be gained from intermedia-
tion. The existing explanations about the importance and benefits of intermedia-
tion include quality certification, expertise provision, providing matching or other
infrastructures that facilitate trade.3 In this paper, the intermediary is the least
3See for example Spulber (1999) and Salanie (2011) for an overview on the roles of interme-
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informed player in the game Γi and the agents have the ability to directly trade
with each other. Therefore, the explanations related to expertise provision, certi-
fication, or acting as a platform to match the two sides do not apply. Alternatively,
in this setup the intermediary overtakes the role of a coordination point for mon-
etary transactions (cross-subsidization) and information flow (separation of seller
types), which in turn improves the trade outcomes.
Lastly, the efficiency is strictly improved by a profit maximizing intermediary.
The more interesting part in this observation is the fact that even though the in-
termediary is a strategic player who is acting in its self-interest, its presence could
lead to these improved outcomes. Therefore, it is shown that ex-post efficiency im-
provements in the market may be attained without the need for the intervention
of a benevolent social planner.
It is worth noting that timing plays an important role in the aforementioned
results. To be more precise, in the informed seller’s price announcement game
without an intermediary, the buyer observes the TIOLI offers and evaluates her
beliefs about the seller. Consequently, the seller faces ex-post constraints on his
price offers. Along with the signaling difficulties arising from the lemon problem,
this creates the inefficient underselling in equilibria. In the game Γi, on the other
hand, the intermediary alleviates these efficiency losses by breaking its interim
budget balance on one type, which is covered by the interim profits it makes from
the other type; i.e. by cross-subsidizing.4
Finally, in Section II.4, I discuss several extensions to the analysis from the
previous sections. Firstly, I analyze the impact of the out-of-equilibrium subgame
outcomes of the direct trade outside option. Namely, I repeat the analysis for
the case where in the direct trade outside option subgame the agents play the
highest expected payoff yielding equilibria of Γ. I provide a revised necessary and
sufficient condition for efficient intermediated equilibria to exist. The condition
becomes more restrictive, as the outside option payoffs for the seller increase,
making it less profitable for the intermediary to facilitate trade and consequently
more difficult to achieve the efficiency improvements. Nevertheless, this shows the
robustness of the previous result from Theorem II.1. Namely, that the efficiency
improvements exist even in the most difficult case, when it is assumed that the
seller receives the best possible expected payoffs in the direct trade outside option.
A second extension I consider is the special case of independent private values
diaries.
4Alternatively, if the seller had the ability to design and commit to prices ex-ante, then there
could not be an equilibrium that is strictly more efficient in the presence of an intermediary. This
is a key result covered in Chapter III of this thesis.
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(henceforth IPV), or equivalently where the valuations for the objects do not ex-
hibit any interdependence. I first revisit characterizing the equilibrium outcomes
of Γ and show that the equilibrium outcomes are uniquely defined under the IPV
case. However, the rest of the analysis leads to a negative conclusion. Namely I
find that in the IPV case, the game Γi has no efficient intermediated equilibria.5,6
In the last Subsection II.4.3, I discuss another important point. Dropping the
direct trade ability in the outside option subgame, I consider the intermediary’s op-
timal mechanism design problem in Bayesian implementation, à la Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983). This is a standard screening problem that has been thor-
oughly addressed in optimal mechanism design literature. Applying the findings
from the literature to the setup at hand, I characterize the intermediary’s profit
maximizing bargaining protocol. I show that there are parameter cases where this
optimal mechanism implements strictly more efficient trade than the most effi-
cient equilibrium of Γ, which is in line with the results from Jullien and Mariotti
(2006). However, I point out that the condition from Theorem II.1 in this paper
is not only different, but also easier to be satisfied. There are two main reasons
for the differences between the two conditions. The intermediary’s optimal mech-
anism is designed to be implemented in interim (Bayesian) sense for both agents,
which is not the case for the intermediary’s mechanism in the game Γi, i.e. menu
of prices announced. The second reason relates to the absence of direct trade out-
side option and consequently the competition element in the optimal mechanism
design problem. Although the competition creates additional constraints for the
intermediary, it also curbs the monopolistic distortions. It turns out that the latter
effect dominates, as the intermediary is more effective in efficiency improvements
in the game Γi compared to the outcomes from the standard screening problem.
II.1.1 Related Literature
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to model competition between
an intermediary and a bargaining party in bilateral trade.
5This result is in line with those from Maskin and Tirole (1990), where the authors consider
principal-agent relationships under private values. More specifically, in the case of quasi-linear
preferences, Proposition 11 establishes that the three-stage mechanism selection game has unique
equilibrium outcomes that are equivalent to the unconstrained Pareto optimum outcomes. Extend-
ing to the current model sheds light on the uniqueness of equilibria outcomes in Γ, and the inability
of the intermediary to improve efficiency.
6In fact, the work from Maskin and Tirole (1990) does not directly apply for the seller’s optimal
mechanism problem in bilateral trade scenarios, because several assumptions are violated such as
finiteness of types or sorting condition. Nevertheless, analogous results regarding Pareto optimality
of the informed seller’s revenue maximizing contract under quasilinear preferences and the IPV
case have been shown in Yilankaya (1999).
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The closest paper is Jullien and Mariotti (2006), where the authors consider
an auction market with one seller and two buyers over the allocation of a single
indivisible good that is subject to a lemon problem. Authors first analyze a game
where the seller announces reserve prices and then holds a second price auction.
They characterize the unique separating equilibrium outcomes of the informed
seller’s signaling game. Then, they consider an uninformed monopolist interme-
diary’s optimal trading mechanism. Comparing the unique separating equilibrium
of the signaling game to the equilibrium of the intermediary’s screening game,
authors show that the expected gains from trade may be larger under monopoly
broker. Although the results about benefits from intermediation are similar, the
setups are different. Namely, in this paper the intermediary faces competition
from the seller due to the possibility of direct trade without the intermediary. The
authors in Jullien and Mariotti (2006), however, consider the intermediary’s op-
timal mechanism design problem in the standard Bayesian implementation sense.
Therefore, the conditions under which the welfare comparisons favor the interme-
diary against the decentralized markets differ in the two papers.7
There are various strands in the literature that this work relates to. Firstly,
the paper builds around the bilateral trade problem, about which a plethora of
articles have been written. Starting with the seminal contributions of Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983), there are numerous papers written on efficient bilateral
mechanisms, including, but not limited to Williams (1987), Krishna and Perry
(1998), and Williams (1999). Similarly Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson
(1981) solve for the revenue maximizing optimal mechanisms.
Insofar as the TIOLI price announcement designs by the informed seller are
concerned, this paper is related to the informed principal’s mechanism design
problem. Myerson (1983) introduces the concept of mechanism-selection by an
informed principal and formulates the notion of inscrutable mechanisms. An-
other seminal paper is Maskin and Tirole (1990) where the authors consider a
mechanism-selection game played over three stages (proposal, accept/reject, ex-
ecute) in private value environments. Other notable contributions to informed
principal’s problem in private values environment include Skreta (2011) and Mylo-
vanov and Tröger (2013). There have also been articles that concentrate on the
informed principal in bilateral trade problems. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) pro-
vides an ex-ante optimal mechanism’s characterization, while Yilankaya (1999)
and Tisljar (2003) consider the interim optimal mechanisms. A lot of these articles
7As mentioned above, a more detailed anaylsis of the comparisons between the results of this
paper and Jullien and Mariotti (2006) can be found in Section II.4.3.
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mentioned show the optimality of TIOLI price offers, such as Riley and Zeckhauser
(1983) and Williams (1987).
The interdependence of valuations plays an important role in the analysis. To
that extent, the literature has diverged on the coverage of informed principal’s
problem under common values. The seminal contribution is by Maskin and Tirole
(1992), where the authors consider, similar to their companion paper Maskin and
Tirole (1990), a mechanism-selection game player over three stages (proposal, ac-
cept/reject, execute), but this time in common values. It is shown that in these en-
vironments, the informed principal can guarantee himself what the authors name
as the “RSW” allocation outcomes, where the mnemonic term "RSW" allocation
refers to the zero-profit separating allocations that plays an important role in the
competitive screening models from insurance markets analyzed in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977).
Finally, the seller’s ability to engage in direct trade complicates the intermedi-
ary’s price menu design problem, as the design has to respect these type-dependent
outside options of the seller. To that extent, there exists a subliterature that con-
centrates on mechanism design problems with type-dependent outside options
and endogenous participation decisions, starting with the analysis of countervail-
ing incentives in Lewis and Sappington (1989). The papers Jehiel et al. (1996)
and Jehiel et al. (1999) consider type-dependent negative externalities between
buyers in trade problems. Jullien (2000) considers the optimal contract of the
principal when agent’s reservation utilities depend on her type. The author iden-
tifies the conditions for the contract to be bunching and separating, as well as the
cases when it induces full participation of the agent. Lastly, Figueroa and Skreta
(2009) and Figueroa and Skreta (2011) also consider revenue maximizing alloca-
tion mechanisms when buyer’s outside options depend on their private informa-
tion, and show the crucial dependence of the optimal allocations on the shape of
the outside options. The main distinction in this setup with those aforementioned
papers is that here, the outside options are determined by the equilibrium of a
signaling game, and thus are endogenously chosen by the seller.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II.2, I describe
the setup and analyze the signaling game in the absence of an intermediary. In
Section II.3, I analyze the game with the presence of an intermediary. Lastly,
in Section II.4, I discuss several extensions and provide a couple of numerical
examples to illustrate the established results. All proofs are in the appendix.
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II.2 Trading Game Without an Intermediary
II.2.1 Model
There are two risk-neutral agents, one seller and one buyer, denoted by s and b,
respectively. The seller owns a single unit of an indivisible good which the buyer
would like to buy.
The seller privately knows his valuation (henceforth cost for brevity) for this
object. The seller’s cost is referred as his type and is denoted it by ts. It is assumed
that ts can take one of two values in {l, h} where 0 ≤ l < h and l is realized
with probability p ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, the buyer privately knows her type tb which
can be low (L) or high (H) where 0 < L < H and the probability of L type is
q ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, the buyer’s valuation for the object, denoted by
v(ts, tb), depends both on her and the seller’s private information and is assumed
to satisfy:
v(ts, tb) =
tb if ts = ltb + λtb if ts = h
for some parameters λL, λH ≥ 0. Hence, valuation of each buyer type increases
by a constant λtb whenever the seller is of high type. It is possible to interpret this
assumption as an extension of the standard lemons market with two-sided asym-
metric information where the seller’s cost represents the quality of the object and
λtb represents the premium of owning a higher quality object for the corresponding
type of the buyer.8
The expected valuations conditional on buyer’s type are given by E(v|tb) =
tb + λtb(1− p) for both tb ∈ {L,H}. For the rest of the paper, it is assumed that the
parameters satisfy the following:
Assumption II.1.
[A1] l < v(l, L) < v(l, H) and v(h, L) < h < v(h,H).
[A2] E(v|H) > h.
Assumption II.1 has a couple of important implications. Firstly, due to [A1]
there are uncertain gains from trade in this bilateral trade scenario, which implies
that the seller has to screen the buyer. Secondly, the assumption allows me to
without loss of generality normalize the parameters (apart from λtb ’s) so that low
type of the seller equals l = 0. Finally, there also is a nontrivial signaling problem
8Note that λL = λH = 0 is the special case of independent private valuations (IPV).
56
for the seller as h < E(v|H). A high cost seller would like to signal his type to
the high type buyer. Due to [A2], however, there exists prices at which high cost
seller would be willing to trade with the high type buyer, if buyer believes the
likelihood of the seller being high type is sufficiently large.9 This in turn gives
more incentives for the low cost seller type to mimic the high cost type, further
strengthening the signaling problem.
The trading game without an intermediary, denoted by Γ, can be described as
follows. First, the seller puts the object for sale by announcing take-it-or-leave-
it (TIOLI) price. Next, upon observing the price, buyer forms beliefs about the
seller’s type, and then decides whether to accept or reject to trade at that price.
II.2.2 Strategies, Beliefs and Payoffs
At the first stage of the game, the seller, after observing his type, announces a
TIOLI offer denoted by m. Without loss of generality, attention is restricted to
offers in the compact space [0, H + λH ]. Hence a pure strategy for the seller is
given by the mapping m : {l, h} → [0, H + λH ]. It will be convenient to use the
shorthand notations ml and mh for the respective strategies of the two types of the
seller.
In the second stage, the buyer, knowing her type, observes the price announce-
ment m and decides whether to trade or not at that price, denoted by d ∈ {A,R}.
Hence a pure strategy for the buyer is given by the mapping d : {L,H} × [0, H +
λH ]→ {A,R}. Similarly, for any price announcement m ∈ [0, H + λH ], denote the
strategies of the respective buyer types by dL(m) and dH(m).
Next I define the beliefs. Both types of the seller believe that the buyer can be
of type L with probability q. On the other hand, the buyer forms beliefs pi(l|tb,m)
about the likelihood of facing a type l seller knowing her own type tb and seller’s
announced price m. Abusing notation, I will denote these beliefs by piL(m) and
piH(m).
Now, the payoffs can be defined. Given a price announcement m by the seller
9Note that beliefs close to the priors would be sufficiently high.
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and the buyer’s decision d, the payoffs to the agents are equal to:
Utb(m, d) = U(m, d|tb) =
tb + λtb
(
1− pitb(m)
)−m if d = A
0 if d = R
for tb ∈ {L,H}
Uts(m, d) = U(m, d|ts) =
m− ts if d = A0 if d = R for ts ∈ {l, h}
Define the expected probability of tradeQ(m) = qI
(
dL(m) = A
)
+(1−q)I(dH(m) =
A
)
. Then the expected payoff of the seller from announcing m at the first stage is
equal to:
Uts(m) = U(m|ts) = (m− ts)Q(m) for ts ∈ {l, h}
II.2.3 Characterization of Equilibria
In the game Γ, a pure strategy sequential equilibrium, or equilibrium for short,
is the collection of strategies {(m∗l ,m∗h), (d∗L, d∗H)} and beliefs (pi∗L, pi∗H) where the
strategies satisfy sequential rationality and the beliefs are consistent. More specif-
ically, the strategies have to satisfy:
Utb(m, d
∗
tb
) ≥ Utb(m, d) ∀m, d and tb
Uts(m
∗
ts) ≥ Uts(m) ∀m and ts
Consistency of the beliefs require that the beliefs are defined according to the
Bayes’ rule at the prices chosen on equilibrium; pi∗tb(m) =
pI(m=m∗l )∑
ts
P(ts)I(m=m∗ts )
for m ∈
{m∗l ,m∗h} and both buyer types. At out-of-equilibrium prices m ∈ [0, H + λH ] \
{m∗l ,m∗h}, the beliefs are equal to the limits of the belief sequences generated by a
chosen sequence of convergent totally mixed strategy sequences.
Before the set of equilibria are characterized, start with a couple of useful
preliminary results.
Lemma II.1.
In any equilibrium of the game Γ, the beliefs satisfy pi∗L(m) = pi
∗
H(m) = pi
∗(m) for all
m.
Lemma II.1 suggests that both types of the buyer hold the same beliefs on and
off the equilibrium paths. This result arises from the fact that the types ts and tb are
independently distributed, and hence buyer’s private information has no impact in
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her consistent belief assignments. An immediate consequence of Lemma II.1 is the
following corollary.
Corollary II.1.
Given an equilibrium of Γ, if at some price m the low type buyer accepts the offer,
then so does the high type buyer.
Corollary II.1 simply follows from the sequential rationality of the buyer’s
optimal strategy. Finally, I provide the following lemma related to the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs and behavior of the buyer which are crucial for the characteri-
zation of equilibria in this game.
Lemma II.2.
In any equilibrium, it is without loss of generality to assume that following any devi-
ation price announcement m′ 6= m∗ts, the buyer types believe that the seller is of low
type; pi∗(m′) = 1. Furthermore, the optimal strategy d∗tb(m
′) for each buyer type at
out-of-equilibrium prices is to accept the offer whenever m′ ≤ tb and reject otherwise.
The game Γ is essentially a signaling game. Hence the equilibrium conditions
are highly reliant on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs and strategies of the message
receiver, i.e. the buyer. Lemma II.2 is very useful for the rest of the section, as
it provides a clear structure for the out-of-equilibrium scenarios. Now I will char-
acterize the equilibria of Γ. There may be two kinds of pure strategy sequential
equilibria; pooling or separating. I will start by characterizing the set of pooling
equilibria.
Pooling Equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium, both types of the seller announce the same price, hence
m∗l = m
∗
h = m
P .10 Consequently, the buyer’s beliefs on the equilibrium price are
not updated from the prior probabilities yielding piP (mP ) = p. Below I characterize
the set of pooling equilibria:
Proposition II.1.
There exists a pooling equilibrium where only the high type buyer trades at price mP
satisfying max{ L
1−q , h,H} ≤ mP ≤ E(v|H), whenever
q ≤ E(v|H)− L
E(v|H) = q
P (II.1)
10I use the superscript P to refer to a pooling equilibrium.
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Several remarks are in order. Firstly, only the high type buyer trading sug-
gests that these equilibria are allocatively inefficient, as there is no trade between
the low types of the agents, even though the low type buyer values the object
more when the seller is low cost. Secondly, the threshold probability qP below
which there exists a pooling equilibrium is strictly between 0 and 1. The condition
suggests that there is a pooling equilibrium whenever the probability of low type
buyer is sufficiently small or the high type buyer is sufficiently high. The intuition
arises from standard screening incentives of the low cost seller; that when the
probability of high type buyer is large enough, l type seller prefers to trade exclu-
sively with H type buyers. The difference here, however, is that by pooling with
the high cost seller, low cost seller benefits from the buyer’s valuation premium,
which creates additional incentives for the low cost seller to pool with the high
cost seller. As a result, the threshold qP is larger than what it would be, if there
were no premiums from consuming object sold by h-type.11
In a pooling equilibrium, each seller type ts receives expected payoffs that
are equal to Uts(mP ) = (mP − ts)(1 − q). It will be useful to define UPts as the
highest expected payoff to the seller types from a pooling equilibrium which equals
UPts = (E(v|H)− ts)(1− q).
Separating Equilibria
Next consider separating equilibria where the equilibrium prices are different, i.e.
m∗l 6= m∗h, which suggests that the buyer correctly identifies the seller types, i.e.
pi∗(m∗l ) = 1 and pi
∗(m∗h) = 0. Before characterizing these equilibria, the following
preliminary result is established.
Lemma II.3.
In any separating equilibrium, the low type seller trades strictly more often than the
high type seller. Consequently the low type seller announces a price that is strictly less
than the high type seller.
The result follows from the sequential rationality constraints for the seller types
under separation. An important implication of Lemma II.3 is that there are three
possible cases that a buyer can play in a separating equilibrium; both buyer types
accept the low price but only high type buyer accepts the high price, both buyer
types only accept the low price, or only the high type buyer accepts the low price
and low type rejects both prices. Observe that in the latter two case, the high
11If λH = 0 so E(v|H) = H, then the threshold for pooling would be H−LH . Similarly, if the buyer
knew the seller’s type, then seller would screen out low type buyers whenever q < H−LH .
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type seller does not trade in equilibrium. The first case will be considered sep-
arately from the latter two cases, and based on allocative efficiency properties
these cases will be referred to as the efficient and inefficient separating equilibria,
respectively.12
Efficient Separating Equilibria: In these equilibria, the low type seller trades
with both buyer types and the high type seller trades only with the high type
buyer. Under assumption [A1], these trades achieve first best outcomes in terms of
allocative efficiency. The following result characterizes Se, the efficient separating
equilibria:
Proposition II.2.
There exists an efficient separating equilibrium where the low cost seller trades with
both types of buyer at price mSel = L, while the high cost seller trades only with
the high type buyer at price mSeh satisfying max{h,H} ≤ mSeh ≤ min{ L1−q , H + λH},
whenever
q ≥ max
{
h− L
h
,
H − L
H
}
= qS
e
(II.2)
Observe that if qSe ≤ q ≤ H+λH−L
H+λH
, then the maximum price for the high type
seller is capped at L
1−q which is less than H + λH . This is due to the incentive
compatibility constraints of the seller for the separation to occur, because any
higher price for the high cost seller would violate the sequential rationality of low
cost seller’s price announcement.
Inefficient Separating Equilibria: Lemma II.3 established three possible cases
for separating equilibria, one of which are the efficient separating equilibria Se
described above. The other two cases fall under the category of inefficient sepa-
rating equilibria Si, because in both of those remaining cases the high type seller
does not trade in equilibrium. These cases arise when the high type seller’s price
makes the high type buyer (who is the only eligible buyer type to generate gains
from trade with the high type seller) indifferent between trading or not and she
breaks her indifference in favor of no trade. In order for such equilibria to exist
however, it has to be the case that the high type seller should not be able to trade
for any beliefs of the buyer. However, when h > H it is profitable for the high type
seller to trade with the high type buyer, even if she thinks that the seller is of low
type. Therefore these equilibria exist if and only if h ≥ H. The following result
characterizes Si:
12It will be convenient to use superscripts Se and Si for the efficient and inefficient separating
equilibria, respectively.
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Proposition II.3.
The inefficient separating equilibrium exist if and only if h ≥ H. In these equilibria,
the high cost seller announces mSih = H + λH and does not trade as both buyer types
reject the offer. The equilibrium price announcement of the low cost seller and the
decisions of the buyer types, on the other hand, are summarized below:
(mS
i
l , d
Si
L (m
Si
l ), d
Si
H (m
Si
l )) =
(L,A,A) if q ≥ qS
i
= H−L
H
(H,R,A) if q ≤ qSi
(II.3)
Observe that whenever h ≥ H, then there always exists an inefficient sepa-
rating equilibrium for all probabilities q. On the other hand, the magnitude of
q impacts low cost seller’s price announcement and consequently his equilibrium
trade probabilities. Namely, if q is low enough then the low cost seller would
rather trade only with the high type buyer.
Summarizing Equilibria: As established in the previous three propositions, there
are multiple equilibria of the game Γ for any given parameter configuration. The
following two figures summarize the characterization results.
q
Se
P0 qSe = H−L
H q
P = E(v|H)−LE(v|H) 1
Figure II.1: When H > h
q
Si S
e
P0 qSe = h−L
h q
P = E(v|H)−LE(v|H) 1
Figure II.2: When H ≤ h
Figures II.1 and II.2 summarize the pure strategy equilibria of Γ under different
parameter configurations. One can observe that no matter what the relative values
h and H are, there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in this game. Another
observation is that there are ranges of parameters where multiple equilibria exist.
The focus in the subsequent sections will be on efficiency properties of equilib-
ria, where efficiency is measured in terms of expected gains from trade generated
in equilibrium. In that regard, it will be useful to establish the following corollary,
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which characterizes the most efficient equilibria of the informed seller’s signaling
game Γ:
Corollary II.2.
The most efficient equilibria of Γ are:
i) H > h ⇒
Se if q ≥ qS
e
= H−L
H
P o/w
ii) H ≤ h ⇒

Se if q ≥ qSe = h−L
h
Si (with mSil = L) if
h−L
h
> q ≥ min{h−L
h
, (1−p)(H+λH−h)
(1−p)(H+λH−h)+pL
}
P o/w
Observe that when H ≤ h, there might be an intermediate range of values of q
for which the inefficient equilibrium with low cost seller trading with both buyer
types at price mSil = L is more efficient than the pooling equilibrium. This range
exists whenever:
p > pS
i
=
H + λH − h
H + λH − L (II.4)
The main point to take away from Corollary II.2 is that whenever q < qSe, even
the most efficient equilibrium suffers from inefficient underselling. The frictions
arising from asymmetric information leads the seller to leave informational rents
to the buyer. This in turn creates distortions in equilibrium allocations, resulting
in the inefficient equilibria P or Si. The following figures summarize the configu-
rations for the most efficient equilibria described in Corollary II.2:
q
SeP
0 qSe = H−L
H
1
Figure II.3: When H > h
q
Si SeP
0 (1−p)(H+λH−h)
(1−p)(H+λH−h)+pL q
Se = h−L
h
1
Figure II.4: When H ≤ h
Note that for the case whereH ≤ h, the existence of the range over which equi-
librium Si is the most efficient depends on the parameters; namely on p satisfying
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p > pS
i, i.e. the inequality from (II.4). In Figure II.4, the depicted case assumes
the inequality is satisfied and thus the range exists. Otherwise, the range over
which Si is the most efficient would disappear and the graph visually would be
similar to the one in Figure II.3, except for the threshold of q equaling qSe = h−L
h
.
Finally, the following corollary characterizes the equilibria that generates the
highest expected payoffs to the seller types:
Corollary II.3.
The equilibria of Γ that yield the highest expected payoffs to the respective seller types,
along with the expected payoffs are:
i) q ≤ qP ⇒ P w/ prices mP = E(v|H)
payoffs
UPl = E(v|H)(1− q)UPh = [E(v|H)− h](1− q)
ii) q ≥ qP ⇒ Se w/ prices
mS
e
l = L
mS
e
h = min
{
L
1−q , H + λH
}
payoffs
US
e
l = L
US
e
h = [min{ L1−q , (H + λH)} − h](1− q)
The following Figure II.5 summarizes the configurations described in Corol-
lary II.3 for the equilibria that yield the highest expected payoffs to the seller
types:13
q
SeP
0 qP = E(v|H)−LE(v|H) 1
Figure II.5: For all values of H and h satisfying Assumption II.1
Note that, when q ≥ qP and the best payoffs are attained under Se, the high
type seller’s expected payoff depends on the magnitude of q. This observation
is related to the comment made following Proposition II.2. Namely that if qP ≤
q ≤ H+λH−L
H+λH
, then USeh = L − h(1 − q) because mSeh = L1−q ≤ H + λH , whereas if
q > H+λH−L
H+λH
, then USe = [H + λH − h](1− q).
13Note that the characterization of equilibria outcomes in Corollary II.3 satisfy the definition of
IE∗ (interim efficient) allocation from Maskin and Tirole (1992) where buyer’s beliefs are equal to
the priors p.
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II.3 Trading Game with an Intermediary
II.3.1 Model
This section introduces an uninformed risk-neutral intermediary, denoted by i,
who tries to maximize expected profits while trying to facilitate trade between the
seller and the buyer. The primitives related to the bargaining situation between the
seller and the buyer are maintained as in the previous section, however the players
(s, b and i) are assumed to engage in the trading game with an intermediary,
denoted by Γi, played over three stages.
In the first stage, the intermediary i announces a menu of price pairs, denoted
by Mi = {(mis(j),mib(j)}Jj=1, where a price pair mi(j) = (mis(j),mib(j)) represents
the prices to be transferred to and from the seller and buyer, respectively if the
object is to be traded.
In the second stage the seller moves, where after observing the menu of price
pairs, he first decides his entry strategy, denoted by e. The entry actions can either
be to use the intermediary, i.e. e = i, or to trade with the buyer directly as his
outside option, i.e. e = o. In both subgames following his entry decision, the
seller updates his beliefs regarding the buyer’s types. If he decides to use the
intermediary, then he chooses one of the price pairs from the announced menu
Mi, denoted by action ci ∈ {1, . . . , J}. If, on the other hand, he decides to choose
the outside option of trading directly, then he announces a TIOLI price, denoted
by action mo ∈ [0, H + λH ].
In the third and final stage, the buyer moves. If in the previous stage, the
seller’s entry decision was in favor of the intermediary, then she observes the
menu of prices and the seller’s choice of price pair, updates her beliefs regard-
ing the seller types and decides whether to accept or reject trading according to
the proposed price pair, where her decision is denoted by di ∈ {A,R}. Otherwise,
in the direct trade outside option subgame, the buyer observes the announced
TIOLI price, updates her beliefs and decides whether to accept or reject trading at
the proposed offer, where analogously her decision is denoted by do ∈ {A,R}.
II.3.2 Strategies, Beliefs and Payoffs
Consider the strategies of the players, starting with the intermediary. Firstly, ob-
serve that as there are only two types of the seller, it is without loss of general-
ity to restrict attention to the intermediary announcing two price pairs, or that
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J = 2. Secondly, as in the previous section, restrict attention to the intermediary
announcing prices coming from the compact space [0, H+λH ]. Lastly, it is assumed
that the intermediary does not announce menus that would generate strictly neg-
ative expected payoffs whenever chosen.14 More specifically, denoting a menu of
price pairs by Mi =
{(
mis(1),m
i
b(1)
)
,
(
mis(2),m
i
b(2)
)}
, consider the space of menus
Mi = {Mi ∈ [0, H + λH ]4|max{mib(1)−mis(1),mib(2)−mis(2)} ≥ 0}. Observe that
this space of menus excludes those menus of price pairs where mib(j) < m
i
s(j) for
both pairs, i.e. the intermediary makes strict losses on both price pairs. Thus a
pure strategy for the intermediary is to choose a menu of price pairs Mi ∈Mi.
At the beginning of second stage, after observing Mi, each type of the seller
chooses his entry strategy, which is defined by the mapping e : {l, h} × Mi →
{i, o}. These strategies are denoted by el(Mi) and eh(Mi) for the respective types.
Following the entry decision, in the subgame e = i, the seller chooses one of
the price pairs. This strategy is defined by the mapping ci : {l, h} ×Mi → {1, 2}.
Similarly, define the shorthand notations cil(M
i) and cih(M
i) for the respective price
pair choices of the seller types. Finally, in the other subgame e = o, the seller
makes a TIOLI offer where the strategy is defined bymo : {l, h}×Mi → [0, H+λH ].
Again, mol (M
i) and moh(M
i) are used as shorthand notations.
The buyer in the third stage chooses to accept or reject the standing offers in
the respective subgames. If e = i, then her strategy is defined by the mapping
di : {L,H} × Mi × {1, 2} → {A,R}. These strategies are denoted by diL(Mi, j)
and diH(M
i, j) for j ∈ {1, 2} for the respective buyer types. In the subgame e = o,
the buyer’s strategy is defined by the mapping do : {L,H}× [0, H + λH ]→ {A,R},
along with the shorthand notations doL(m
o) and doH(m
o), respectively.
At the beginning of the game, the intermediary’s beliefs regarding the seller
and buyer types are equal to the priors. Similarly, at the beginning of the second
stage, the seller’s beliefs regarding buyer’s types when making the entry decision
are equal to the priors. In each subgame e ∈ {i, o}, both seller types form beliefs
pi(L|ts, e,Mi) for any given price pairs Mi. Abusing notation, these beliefs are
denoted by piets(M
i) for each combination of entry decision e and seller type ts.
Similarly, the buyer forms beliefs regarding the seller’s types in each of the sub-
games. In the subgame where the intermediary is chosen, the beliefs are denoted
by pi(l|tb, i,Mi, ci). Abusing notation, these beliefs are denoted by piitb(Mi, ci) for
each type of the buyer. In the other subgame, the buyer’s beliefs are pi(l|tb, o,mo),
which again is shortened to piotb(m
o).
Now, the payoffs can be defined. I start with the payoffs from the subgame
14Note that such menus are weakly dominated.
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following entry decision e = i. Given an announcement of price pair menu Mi
by the intermediary, seller’s entry decision e = i and price pair choice ci ∈ {1, 2},
along with the buyer’s decision di ∈ {A,R}, the payoffs to the seller, buyer and
the intermediary are equal to, respectively:
U itb(M
i, ci, di) = Utb(M
i, i, ci, di) =
tb +
(
1− piitb(Mi, ci)
)
λtb −mib(ci) if di = A
0 o/w
U its(M
i, ci, di) = Uts(M
i, i, ci, di) =
mis(ci)− ts if di = A0 o/w
V i(Mi, ci, di) = V (Mi, i, ci, di) =
mib(ci)−mis(ci) if di = A0 o/w
Let the expected trade probability be denoted byQi(mib(c
i)) = piits(M
i)I
(
diL(M
i, ci) =
A
)
+
(
1− piits(Mi)
)
I
(
diH(M
i, ci) = A
)
. Then the expected payoff to the seller from
choosing price pair ci ∈ {1, 2} is equal to:
U its(M
i, ci) = Uts(M
i, i, ci) =
[
mis(c
i)− ts
]
Qi(mib(c
i))
In the other subgame following entry decision e = o, for any given actions Mi, mo
and do, the payoffs to the three players are equal to:
U otb(M
i,mo, do) = Utb(M
i, o,mo, do) =
tb +
(
1− piotb(mo)
)
λtb −mo if do = A
0 o/w
U ots(M
i,mo, do) = Uts(M
i, o,mo, do) =
mo − ts if do = A0 o/w
V o(Mi,mo, do) = V (Mi, o,mo, do) = 0
Again, defining the expected trade probability Qo(mo) = piots(M
i)I
(
doL(m
o) = A
)
+(
1−piots(Mi)
)
I
(
doH(m
o) = A
)
, the expected payoff to the seller from choosing price
mo on the direct trade outside option is equal to:
U ots(M
i,mo) = Uts(M
i, o,mo) =
[
mo − ts
]
Qo(mo)
At the beginning of the second stage, the seller’s expected payoff from making
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entry decision e ∈ {i, o} is given by:
Uts(M
i, e) = U its(M
i, ci)I(e = i) + U ots(M
i,mo)I(e = o)
Finally, the expected payoff to the intermediary from announcing menu Mi at the
beginning of the first stage is equal to:
V (Mi) =
∑
ts
P(ts)I
(
ets(M
i = i)
)[
I
(
cits(M
i) = j
)[∑
tb
P(tb)V i(Mi, j, ditb(M
i, j))
]]
II.3.3 Equilibria
In the game Γi with an intermediary, a pure strategy sequential equilibrium (equi-
librium) is a collection of strategies {Mˆi, (eˆl, eˆh, cˆil, cˆih, mˆol , mˆoh), (dˆiL, dˆiH , dˆoL, dˆoH)} and
beliefs {(pˆiil , pˆiih, pˆiol , pˆioh), (pˆiiL, pˆiiH , pˆioL, pˆioH)}, where the strategies satisfy sequential ra-
tionality and the beliefs are consistent. More specifically, strategies for the buyer
satisfy:
U itb(M
i, ci, dˆitb(M
i, ci)) ≥ U itb(Mi, ci, di) ∀Mi, ci, di, and tb
U otb(M
i,mo, dˆotb(m
o)) ≥ U otb(Mi,mo, do) ∀Mi,mo, do, and tb
Given these optimal strategies, the seller in the second stage has to choose strate-
gies that satisfy:
U its(M
i, cˆits(M
i)) ≥ U its(Mi, ci) ∀Mi, ci, and ts
U ots(M
i, mˆots(M
i)) ≥ U ots(Mi,mo) ∀Mi,mo, and ts
Uts(M
i, eˆts(M
i)) ≥ Uts(Mi, e) ∀Mi, e, and ts
Finally, the intermediary announces a menu of price pairs that satisfy:
V (Mˆi) ≥ V (Mi) ∀Mi
The beliefs, on the other hand, are defined by using Bayes’ rule at information
sets that are reached with positive probability on the equilibrium. Otherwise, they
are determined by taking the limit of a sequence of beliefs that are generated
from a chosen sequence of totally mixed strategies converging to the equilibrium
strategies.
It will be convenient to define the following shorthand notations for the follow-
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ing equilibrium objects. Given any equilibrium, for each seller type ts, let mˆs[ts]
and mˆb[ts] be the prices chosen on the equilibrium path which are equal to:
mˆs[ts] =
mˆots(Mˆi) if eˆts(Mˆi) = imˆis(cˆits(Mˆi)) if eˆts(Mˆi) = o
mˆb[ts] =
mˆots(Mˆi) if eˆts(Mˆi) = imˆib(cˆits(Mˆi)) if eˆts(Mˆi) = o
Then the implemented trade probabilities can be denoted by Qˆ[ts, tb] for any type
pair (ts, tb) on the equilibrium path, which are defined as:
Qˆ[ts, tb] = I
(
dˆtb(mˆb[ts]) = A
)
Extending further, for each seller type ts define the expected equilibrium trade
probabilities Qˆ(mˆb[ts]) = qQˆ[ts, L] + (1− q)Qˆ[ts, H].
Finally, define the following shorthand notations for the expected payoffs to
the seller types. The expected payoff from subgame e = o is denoted by Uˆ ots =
U ots(Mˆ
i, mˆots(Mˆ
i)), while from subgame e = i is denoted by Uˆ its = U
i
ts(Mˆ
i, cˆits(Mˆ
i)).
The expected payoff of the seller type in the equilibrium is denoted by Uˆts =
Uts(Mˆ
i, eˆts(Mˆ
i)). Observe that Uˆts = (mˆs[ts]− ts)Qˆ(mˆb[ts]).
I first provide some preliminary observations about the equilibria of the game
Γi, which will be useful in the rest of the analysis. First result relates to the beliefs
in any equilibrium.
Lemma II.4.
In any equilibrium of Γi;
1. The seller’s beliefs satisfy pˆiets(M
i) = q for all e and ts.
2. The buyer’s beliefs, on the other hand, are the same across her two types in each
subgame; i.e. pˆiitb(M
i, ci) = pˆii(Mi, ci) for all Mi and ci in subgame e = i, and
pˆiotb(m
o) = pˆio(mo) for all mo in subgame e = o.
The result follows from the fact that the types of the seller and buyer are in-
dependently distributed. The next result relates to the seller’s expected payoffs in
any equilibrium.
Lemma II.5.
In any equilibrium of Γi;
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1. The expected payoff Uˆ ots from direct trade outside option subgame (i.e. e = o)
satisfies the following:
Uˆ ots = U
o
ts(Mˆ
i, mˆots(Mˆ
i)) = max
mo
{U ots(Mi,mo)} ∀Mi
Furthermore, the expected payoffs from the outside option subgame necessarily
satisfy:
Uˆ ol ≥ max{L,H(1− q)}
Uˆ oh ≥ max{(H − h)(1− q), 0}
2. Similarly, the equilibrium expected payoffs for each seller type satisfy the fol-
lowing:
Uˆl ≥ max{Uˆ ol , Uˆh + hQˆ(mˆb[h])}
Uˆh ≥ max{Uˆ oh, Uˆl − hQˆ(mˆb[l])}
Both parts of Lemma II.5 follow from the optimality of seller’s equilibrium
strategies. An important implication of the first part of Lemma II.5 is that, each
seller type ts receives the same expected payoff Uˆ ots from the subgame e = o no
matter what menu Mi the intermediary offers. The lower bounds on the expected
payoffs for the direct trade outside option subgame are attained by evaluating
the expected payoffs under the worst beliefs of the buyer where she puts full
probability to the seller being of low type, i.e. pio(mo) = 1. The second part
suggests that each seller type should be receiving at least the maximum of their
outside option they receive from directly trading and their payoff from mimicking
the other type on the overall equilibrium paths. These observations will play an
important role in the subsequent analysis of the next subsection.
II.3.4 Efficient Intermediated Equilibria
In this subsection, the main result of the paper is provided. The main interest rests
in answering the following questions:
1. Are there any equilibria of Γi with an intermediary that is strictly more efficient
than the most efficient equilibrium of the game Γ without an intermediary?
2. If so, under what conditions are these more efficient equilibria attained?
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In order to answer the above questions, I concentrate on those parameter val-
ues where the most efficient equilibrium of Γ can be improved upon. Proposi-
tion II.2 established that whenever q ≥ qSe = max{H−L
H
, h−L
h
}, there exists an
efficient separating equilibrium. Since in an efficient separating equilibrium the
first best allocation rule is implemented, an allocative efficiency improvement is
not possible. Hence I focus on the cases where q < qSe.
Assumption II.2.
[A3] For the rest of the paper, assume that q < qSe = max{H−L
H
, h−L
h
}.
Corollary II.2 showed that, in the most efficient equilibria of Γ under Assump-
tion II.2, either only the low type seller trades with both buyer types (inefficient
separating equilibrium Si with mSil = L) or only the high type buyer trades with
both seller types (pooling equilibrium P ). Hence, if an equilibrium of Γi is strictly
more efficient than the most efficient equilibria of Γ when q < qSe, then it has to
implement trade in all seller-buyer type realizations except for the case where the
seller has type h and buyer has type L. In light of these observations, the following
provides a definition of the equilibria to be analyzed:
Definition II.1.
An efficient intermediated equilibrium is an equilibrium of Γi in which the im-
plemented trades on the equilibrium satisfy Qˆ[l, L] = Qˆ[l, H] = Qˆ[h,H] = 1 while
Qˆ[h, L] = 0.
In light of this definition, the main question can be rephrased as follows:
Given Assumption II.2 is satisfied, does there exist an efficient intermediated equi-
librium of Γi? If so, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of such equilibria?
Before answering these questions, the following lemma is provided:
Lemma II.6.
In an efficient intermediated equilibrium, if it exists, both seller types have to neces-
sarily choose the intermediary; i.e. eˆl(Mˆi) = eˆh(Mˆi) = i.
Lemma II.6 suggests that any allocative efficiency improvement relative to the
most efficient equilibrium of Γ has to arise due to the presence of the intermediary.
Furthermore, the intermediary plays an active role in coordinating trades of the
two seller types, as both types choose the intermediary in any such equilibrium.
This result, in a way, legitimizes the name choice for the specific equilibrium of
analysis.
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Next, a necessary condition for the existence of efficient intermediated equilib-
ria is provided.
Proposition II.4.
An efficient intermediated equilibrium exists only if the following necessary condition
holds:
pL+ (1− p)(1− q)(H + λH − h) ≥ pUˆl + (1− p)Uˆh (II.5)
Observe that the left-hand side term is equal to the ex-ante expected gains
from trade, while the right-hand side equals to the ex-ante expected payoff to
the seller. The difference of the two sides simply yields the sum of the ex-ante
expected payoffs to the intermediary and the buyer. Since each of those payoffs
have to be nonnegative, Proposition II.4 follows immediately.
Now the main result of the paper can be stated.
Theorem II.1.
An efficient intermediated equilibrium of Γi exists if and only if:
p
L
1− q + (1− p)(H + λH) ≥ max{H, h} (II.6)
The necessity part of the proof for Theorem II.1 follows from Proposition II.4.
For the sufficiency part, I prove the existence of an equilibrium whenever condition
(II.6) is satisfied.
The intuition behind why the intermediary is able to achieve these efficiency
improvements lies in cross-subsidization. Namely, whenever condition (II.6) is
satisfied, the intermediary makes large enough gains from the trade between the
high type seller and the high type buyer to sufficiently compensate the losses it
makes on the low type seller’s trades. The losses arise due to the ability of the
seller to trade directly with the buyer in his outside option, and this ability, in turn,
creates competition against the intermediary which is referred to as the “internal
competition”.
To understand the last point better, remember that the seller types can always
guarantee themselves expected payoffs of Uˆ ots which have lower bounds as de-
scribed in Lemma II.5. These lower bounds on the equilibrium expected payoffs
have to be respected by the intermediary. Combining the impact of this “internal
competition” along with the incentive compatibility constraints, it can be seen that
in any equilibrium Uˆl ≥ max{H(1−q), h(1−q)}. On the other hand, for the desired
trade probabilities to be exercised, the low type seller’s equilibrium price mˆb[l] for
the buyer should be at most L. By Assumption II.2, L < max{H(1 − q), h(1 − q)}
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which means that the intermediary has to make expected losses over facilitating
the trade of the low type seller.
Theorem II.1 suggests that the presence of an intermediary leads to a strict
allocative efficiency improvement in the trade outcomes. There are a few points
to be made with regards to the importance of the result.
Firstly, the efficiency is improved in ex-post sense. In other words, for all type
pairs, the implemented trade probabilities are weakly higher than their counter-
parts under the equilibria of game Γ. Furthermore, where the trade probability is
strictly higher, the buyer values the object more than the seller, hence the efficiency
improvement.15
Secondly, the efficiency improvements are carried out by the intermediary, who
is the least informed player in the game Γi. Similarly, the agents having the abil-
ity to trade directly implies that the intermediary is not providing matchmaking
technology. Thus, the analysis provides a different motivation for the benefits of
intermediation, other than the explanations related to expertise provision and cer-
tification, or acting as a platform to match the two sides. Alternatively, it is shown
that, in this setup the intermediary overtakes the role of a coordination point for
monetary transactions (cross-subsidization) and information flow (separation of
seller types), which in turn improves the trade outcomes.
Lastly, the efficiency is strictly improved by a profit maximizing intermediary.
The more interesting part in this observation is the fact that, even though the
intermediary is a strategic player who is acting in its self-interest, its presence
could lead to these improved outcomes. In other words, findings highlight the
possibility of ex-post efficiency improvements in the market without the need for
the intervention of a benevolent social planner.
II.4 Discussion
In this section, I elaborate on the results from the previous section by discussing
some alternative cases. At the end of the section, I also provide a couple of numeric
examples to illustrate the points covered in the analysis.
15Given the binary type setup, the efficient intermediated equilibria actually implement the first
best allocation that achieves ex-post efficiency.
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II.4.1 Seller’s Optimal Prices In the Direct Trade Outside Op-
tion
In the previous section, Lemma II.6 established that an equilibrium of Γi that is
strictly more efficient than the most efficient equilibrium of Γ has to have trades
going through the intermediary. Therefore, in any efficient intermediated equi-
libria, direct trading at the outside option subgame remains out-of-equilibrium.
The main result in Theorem II.1 established existence of efficient intermediated
equilibria if and only if Condition (II.6) is satisfied, however it did not impose any
restrictions on the outcomes of the out-of-equilibrium outside option subgame.
Apart from Lemma II.5, which defines the lower bounds for the expected pay-
offs of each seller type from the outside option subgame equilibria, there are no
restrictions on how large these expected payoffs can be.16
It was shown in Corollary II.3, that the highest expected payoff yielding equi-
libria of Γ are the efficient separating equilibrium when q ≥ qP = E(v|H)−LE(v|H) and the
pooling equilibrium with price mP = E(v|H) when q ≤ qP . Since qP > qSe, under
Assumption II.2, the pooling equilibrium is the highest payoff yielding equilibrium
of the game Γ.
Now consider the game Γi, where the seller and the buyer play the pool-
ing equilibrium with the optimal pooling prices in the direct trade outside op-
tion subgame, and repeat the analysis for the existence of efficient intermediated
equilibrium. The seller’s optimal outside option prices and the associated out-of-
equilibrium payoffs provide a good robustness check for the previous existence
result from Theorem II.1. Furthermore, it can be argued whether there exists a
strictly more efficient equilibrium with the presence of an intermediary not only
relative to the most efficient equilibria of Γ, but also relative to the seller’s highest
expected payoff yielding equilibria of Γ. The following proposition provides the
necessary and sufficient condition:
Proposition II.5.
An efficient intermediated equilibrium, where in the direct trade outside option sub-
game both seller types trade the object with the high type buyer at the pooling equi-
16As a matter of fact, in the constructive proof for the sufficiency part of Theorem II.1, these
lower bounds are used as the expected payoffs for the direct trade outside option subgame equilib-
ria. This was required for providing the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the
efficient intermediated equilibria. As the analysis in this subsection suggests, however, higher ex-
pected payoffs from the outside option subgame provide tougher restraints, which in turn constrain
the parameter scenarios for existence of efficient intermediated equilibria.
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librium price of mˆol = mˆ
o
h = E(v|H), exists if and only if:
h >
L
1− q ≥ H (II.7)
There are several remarks to be made. Firstly, condition (II.7) requires h > H.
To see why, remember that Assumption II.2 requires q < qSe = max{H−L
H
, h−L
h
},
or equivalently put L
1−q < max{H, h}, which is equal to H whenever H ≥ h.
Since H > L
1−q ≥ H is inconsistent, the efficient intermediated equilibria exists
only in the cases where h > H. The range of q values for existence are given by
H−L
H
≤ q < h−L
h
, where the right-most term is equal to qSe in this parameter case.
Rearranging the terms yields condition (II.7) shown above.
Secondly, compared to the condition (II.6) in Theorem II.1, it can be seen that
condition (II.7) is more restrictive, i.e. as the former condition is implied by the
latter. To see why, assume that h > L
1−q ≥ H, in which case it holds that:
p L
1−q + (1− p)(H + λH) ≥ pH + (1− p)(H + λH) = E(v|H) > h = max{H, h}
where the last inequality follows from [A2] in the initial Assumption II.1. This
is not surprising, because as the direct trade outside option subgame equilibrium
prices increase, they make the outside option payoffs of the seller types stronger.
In turn, it becomes more difficult to maintain an equilibrium where both seller
types choose the intermediary, because it becomes less profitable for the interme-
diary to facilitate the trade. Hence, higher outside option equilibrium prices can
be interpreted as the intermediary facing a more intensified internal competition
posed by the seller.
Thirdly, observe that in any efficient intermediated equilibrium characterized
by Proposition II.5, both the seller and the buyer’s payoffs are Pareto dominant
compared to their counterparts from the direct trade outside option subgame
equilibrium, or equivalently the expected payoffs from the pooling equilibrium
of Γ with price mP = E(v|H). The Pareto improvement for the seller is imme-
diate from the sequential rationality of entry choice in the game Γi. To see why
the buyer types are also weakly better off, observe that in the pooling equilib-
rium of Γ with the highest possible price, the buyer’s expected payoffs are equal
to UPL = U
P
H = 0. Low type buyer receives 0, because she does not trade while the
high type buyer pays precisely her expected value of the object. In the efficient
intermediated equilibrium, on the other hand, the implemented trade probabili-
ties require that the prices the buyer pays in equilibrium satisfy mˆb[l] ≤ L for low
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type seller’s equilibrium menu option and mˆb[h] ≤ H + λH for the high type seller
menu option. These suggest that in an efficient intermediated equilibrium, the
buyer types receive expected payoffs that are at least:
UˆL = p(L− mˆb[l]) ≥ 0 UˆH = p(H − mˆb[l]) + (1− p)(H + λH − mˆb[h]) > 0
The Pareto improvement property suggests the robustness of the efficient inter-
mediated equilibria in these cases. In particular, the strict allocative efficiency
improvement does not come at the expense of making the buyer side worse off.
On the contrary the additional gains from trade accrued are allocated between the
seller, the buyer and the intermediary in a way that every type of both the seller
and the buyer are made weakly better off.
Lastly, Proposition II.5 highlights that the result of Theorem II.1 is not an ar-
tifact of constructing the equilibrium with the lowest possible out-of-equilibrium
outside option subgame payoffs. On the contrary, it is shown that indeed there
are cases where, it is possible to have strict improvement of allocative efficiency
with the presence of an intermediary, even relative to the highest expected payoff
yielding equilibria of the game Γ. This in turn represents a strong robustness check
in favor of the benefits of intermediation.
II.4.2 Independent Private Values
So far it was assumed that the valuations of the seller and the buyer display in-
terdependence. Namely for both types of the buyer, her valuation for the object
increases by some constant λtb, whenever the seller is of high type. A natural
case to consider is the extreme situation where λL = λH = 0. This is precisely
the case of independent private values (IPV), as the buyer’s valuations satisfy
v(l, L) = v(h, L) = L and v(l, H) = v(h,H) = H. Note that, Assumption II.1
in this case boils down to having the four parameters satisfying the following or-
dering l = 0 < L < h < H.
The analysis in Section II.2 remains valid, however the conditions need to ad-
justed to reflect the case λL = λH = 0. In light of the adjustments, the equilibria
of Γ under the IPV case can be characterized as follows:
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Lemma II.7.
In the IPV case, the equilibria of Γ are:
i) P ⇒ mP = H whenever q ≤ H−L
H
ii) Se ⇒ mSel = L, mS
e
h = H whenever q ≥ H−LH
Observe that the equilibrium characterization of Γ is a lot simpler under the
IPV case. Firstly, there are no multiplicities at any given parameters. Secondly, the
inefficient separating equilibria no longer exist. Furthermore, there is only pooling
or efficient separating equilibrium depending on the magnitude of q.
The emphasis is again on the existence of efficient intermediated equilibria.
Hence, restrict attention to the cases where Assumption II.2 is satisfied, i.e. q <
H−L
H
. Note that, by Lemma II.7, the unique equilibria of Γ in those cases are the
pooling equilibria P with mP = H. It turns out that the following impossibility
result can be stated:
Proposition II.6.
In the IPV case, there are no efficient intermediated equilibria of Γi.
Proposition II.6 is a strong negative result. The intuition of the proof relies in
the following argument. In the IPV case, there is no signaling aspect to the equi-
libria of the direct trade outside option subgame. This is because, buyer’s beliefs
have no impact on the optimal decision to accept or reject different TIOLI offers.
Hence both seller types have a unique optimal price choice, which uniquely pins
down the outside option payoffs. However, I show in the proof of Proposition II.6
that any strict efficiency improvement from these unique outside option subgame
outcomes requires an intermediary to run strict losses. Hence it is not possible to
have an efficient intermediated equilibrium in the IPV case.
An important implication of this impossibility result is that the benefits of in-
termediation arise only when there are interdependencies across the valuations of
the buyer and the seller. This result is in line with Proposition 11 from Maskin and
Tirole (1990).17
II.4.3 Intermediary’s Optimal Mechanism Design
A relevant benchmark to consider for comparison is the optimal mechanism design
problem the intermediary faces á la Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Namely,
the buyer and the seller play a Bayesian game that is designed according to the
17See Footnotes 5 and 6.
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intermediary’s bargaining protocol. The primitives related to the bilateral trade
scenario, such as valuations and type spaces, are kept the same way as before.
However, the game in consideration differs in two important aspects. Firstly, it is
assumed that trade has to go through the intermediary for there is no possibility
of direct trade as their outside option. This means that there is no entry choice to
be made. Secondly, it is also assumed that the buyer and the seller move simulta-
neously in the trading mechanism rather than sequentially. This subsection closely
follows Section 5 of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). By Revelation Princi-
ple,18 it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to the truthful type-telling
equilibria of feasible direct revelation mechanisms (DRM) that satisfy incentive
compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR).
A DRM, denoted by {Q,ms,mb}, consists of an allocation rule Q : {l, h} ×
{L,H} → [0, 1], which determines the probability of the object changing hands
from seller to buyer, and payments rules ms : {l, h} × {L,H} → R and mb :
{l, h} × {L,H} → R, where ms(ts, tb) describes the payment made to the seller by
the intermediary and mb(ts, tb) describes the payment made by the buyer to the
intermediary. Given truthful type reporting, the expected trade probabilities of
each seller and buyer types are defined by Qs(ts) = qQ(ts, L) + (1− q)Q(ts, H) and
Qb(tb) = pQ(l, tb)+(1−p)Q(h, tb), respectively. The expected payments ms(ts) and
mb(tb) for each types of the respective agents are defined analogously. Then, given
the buyer tells her type truthfully, the expected payoff to the seller of type ts from
reporting some type t′s is equal to Us(t
′
s|ts) = ms(t′s) − tsQs(t′s). Similarly, given
the seller tells his type truthfully, the expected payoff to the buyer of type tb from
reporting type t′b is equal to Ub(t
′
b|tb) = [ptbQ(l, t′b)+(1−p)(tb+λtb)Q(h, t′b)]−mb(t′b).
Finally, a DRM is called feasible if and only if it satisfies the following IC and IR
constraints:
Us(ts) ≥ 0 IR for seller
Us(ts) ≥ Us(t′s|ts) IC for seller
Ub(tb) ≥ 0 IR for buyer
Ub(tb) ≥ Ub(t′b|tb) IC for buyer
Intermediary’s expected profits in a truth-telling equilibrium are simply given by
V i = [qmb(L)+(1−q)mb(H)]−[pms(l)+(1−p)ms(h)]. Thus, the intermediary solves
the maximization problem with the objective function V i subject to the IC and IR
constraints from above. Observe that there are a total of 8 inequalities arising
18See for instance Myerson (1979), Myerson (1981).
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from these constraints. One can show that at the optimal mechanism four of the
constraints will bind; the IC constraints for l type seller and H type buyer while
the IR constraints for h type seller and L type buyer. The proofs are omitted, as
they follow from standard arguments. Plugging in these binding constraints into
the objective function, the pointwise maximizer yields the optimal mechanism,
denoted by {Q˜, m˜s, m˜b}. Below is the characterization of the optimal mechanism:
Remark II.1.
The optimal mechanism designed by the intermediary implements the allocation func-
tion:
Q˜(l, L) =
1 if q ≥ H−LH0 o/w Q˜(l, H) = 1
Q˜(h, L) = 0 Q˜(h,H) =
1 if p ≤ H+λH−hH+λH0 o/w
The optimal expected transfers can be summarized as follows:
m˜s(l) = (1− q)hQ˜(h,H) m˜s(h) = (1− q)hQ˜(h,H)
m˜b(L) = pLQ˜(l, L) m˜b(H) = p[H − LQ˜(l, L)] + (1− p)(H + λH)Q˜(h,H)
Consequently, the expected payoffs are:
U˜s(l) =
0 if p > H+λH−hH+λHh(1− q) o/w U˜s(h) = 0
U˜b(L) = 0 U˜b(H) =
p(H − L) if q ≥ H−LH0 o/w
Comparing the most efficient equilibria of the informed seller’s signaling game
Γ under Assumption II.2 with the equilibrium outcomes of the intermediary’s op-
timal mechanism characterized above, it can be seen that the intermediary attains
strictly more efficient outcomes whenever q ≥ H−L
H
and p ≤ H+λH−h
H+λH
. Observe that
the inequalities can be satisfied only when H ≤ h. In the case where H > h, the
conditions yield an empty interval for probability q, i.e. H−L
H
= qS
e
> q ≥ H−L
H
.
In the case where H ≤ h, the strict improvement in the expected gains from
trade is in parallel with the points made in Section 7 in Jullien and Mariotti (2006).
The authors show a sufficient condition under which the monopolist intermedi-
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ary’s equilibrium allocation may generate strictly higher surplus than those ac-
crued under the signaling equilibrium. The specific conditions are not comparable
as the authors consider a setup with continuum of types for both the bargaining
agents, unlike the binary types considered here. However, the analogy between
the results prevail.
It is important to note that, the cases where the intermediary improves out-
comes in the game Γi are more abundant. This point can be illustrated by compar-
ing the condition (II.6) from Theorem II.1 with the conditions mentioned above.
The comparison is obvious when H > h, because the conditions are not satisfied.
In other words, the intermediary can not improve outcomes in the optimal design
problem, whereas the game Γi has efficient intermediated equilibria. If H ≤ h, on
the other hand, rearranging (II.6) yields that the probability parameter p needs to
satisfy p ≤ H+λH−h
H+λH− L1−q
for efficient intermediated equilibrium to exist in Γi. A sim-
ple comparison yields that the upper threshold for p is strictly lower in the case of
intermediary’s optimal design problem solution, which makes the condition more
difficult to be satisfied.
To that extent, it can be seen that although a centralized structure under a
monopolist intermediary may generate strictly higher surplus than the signaling
outcomes, the efficiency improvements are even more frequent when the interme-
diary has to provide the seller at least expected payoffs he could generate from the
direct trade outside option subgame. This is not surprising, because the competi-
tion between the intermediary and the seller’s ability to trade directly mitigates the
intermediary’s distortions arising from market power and leads to more frequent
efficiency improvements.
II.4.4 Examples
Example 1
Consider the bilateral trade scenario where the seller type’s are l = 0 and h = 7,
while the buyer’s types are L = 3 and H = 5. Also assume that the constants
representing the premium in buyer’s valuation whenever the seller is high type
are λL = 3 and λH = 5, or equivalently the buyer’s valuation is doubled whenever
the seller is of high type. The following matrix summarizes the valuations for the
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two bargaining parties:
ts \ tb L H
l = 0 3 5
h = 7 6 10
⇒ p = P(ts = l) = 12 = P(tb = L) = q
Finally, assume that the prior probabilities for the low types are p = q = 1
2
for both
the seller and the buyer.
Observe that, max{H, h} = max{5, 7} = 7 = h. Evaluating condition (II.4)
yields that p = 1
2
> pS
i
= H+λH−h
H+λH−L =
3
7
. Thus by Corollary II.2 the most efficient
equilibria of Γ is Si, where mSil = 3 with low type seller trading with both buyer
types while mSih = 10 with both buyer types rejecting the offers.
19 Clearly, this
equilibrium suffers from inefficient underselling as there is no trade between the
high types of the agents, despite the gains from trade to be made. Equivalently,
it can be seen that the configuration above satisfies Assumption II.2 as q = 1
2
<
qS
e
= max{H−L
H
, h−L
h
} = max{2
5
, 4
7
} = 4
7
.
It is easy to show that condition (II.6) from Theorem II.1 is satisfied:
1
2
3
1/2
+
1
2
10 =
16
2
= 8 > max{5, 7} = 7
Therefore, there exists an efficient intermediated equilibrium of the Γi under the
parameter configuration described above. As an example consider the following
equilibrium path. The intermediary announces Mˆ i = {(3.5, 3), (7, 10)}, both seller
types choose the intermediary followed by the low type choosing menu 1 and the
high type choosing menu 2. The high type buyer accepts both menus while the
low type buyer accepts only when menu 1 is chosen. The expected payoffs for
the high type seller and the buyers are the same as under Si in Γ, while the low
type seller receives Uˆl = 3.5, which is strictly higher than the expected payoff
of 3 under Si of Γ. Lastly, the intermediary makes an expected profit of Vˆ =
1
2
(3− 3.5) + 1
2
1
2
(10− 7) = 1
2
, which is strictly positive.
Evaluating condition (II.7) from Proposition II.5 suggests that h = 7 > L
1−q =
6 > H = 5. Hence, there also exists an efficient intermediated equilibrium
even when in the out-of-equilibrium direct trade outside option subgame, the
agents play the pooling equilibrium that yields the highest expected payoffs for the
seller. More specifically, in the outside option subgame, both seller types announce
mˆo = E(v|H) = 15
2
and they are accepted only by the high type buyer.20 In turn, the
19Note that the high type buyer rejecting is optimal by indifference.
20Note that these strategies represent the seller’s optimal equilibrium in the game Γ as charac-
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equilibrium in the direct trade subgame yields the seller types expected payoffs of
Uˆ ol =
15
4
and Uˆ oh =
1
4
. In this case, an example efficient intermediated equilibrium
has menu Mˆ i = {(15
4
, 3), (15
2
, 10)} announced in equilibrium. Similar to the pre-
vious case, the agents in equilibrium play the same way. Namely that both seller
types choose the intermediary followed by the low type choosing menu 1 and the
high type choosing menu 2. The high type buyer accepts both menus, while the
low type buyer accepts only when menu 1 is chosen. The expected payoffs for all
types of the agents remain the same as those accrued from the direct trade out-
side option subgame (or equivalently the corresponding P of the game Γ). The
intermediary makes an expected profit of Vˆ = 1
2
(3− 15
4
) + 1
2
1
2
(10− 15
2
) = 1
4
> 0.
Finally, note that by Remark II.1 from Subsection II.4.3, the intermediary’s op-
timal mechanism implements trade probabilities that satisfy Q˜(l, L) = Q˜(l, H) = 1
while Q˜(h, L) = Q˜(h,H) = 0. To see why, observe that p = 1
2
> H+λH−h
H+λH
= 3
10
. This
is clearly less efficient than Si, i.e. the most efficient equilibrium of Γ. Therefore,
it follows that the intermediary generates a strict efficiency improvement in the
game Γi, which are not attained in the absence of the internal competition from
the seller.
Example 2
Consider the bilateral trade scenario where the seller type’s are l = 0 and h = 4,
while the buyer’s types are L = 2 and H = 5. Also assume that the constants
representing the premium in buyer’s valuation whenever the seller is high type
are λL = 1 and λH = 2. The following matrix summarizes the valuations for the
two bargaining parties:
ts \ tb L H
l = 0 2 5
h = 4 3 7
⇒ p = P(ts = l) = 12 = P(tb = L) = q
Finally, similar to the previous Example 1, assume that the prior probabilities for
the low types are p = q = 1
2
for both the seller and the buyer.
This time, it holds that max{H, h} = max{5, 4} = 5 = H. Evaluating con-
dition (II.2) yields q = 1
2
< qS
e
= max{H−L
H
, h−L
h
} = max{2
4
, 3
5
} = 3
5
. Thus by
Corollary II.2, the most efficient equilibria of the game Γ is P , where mP = 6 with
only the high type buyer trading. Clearly, this equilibrium suffers from inefficient
underselling as there is no trade between the low types of the agents, despite the
terized in Corollary II.3.
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gains from trade to be made. Note that, again the configuration above satisfies
Assumption II.2, as it was shown above that q < qSe.
By Lemma II.5, in any equilibrium of Γi the outside option subgame equilib-
rium payoffs satisfy Uˆ ol ≥ max{2, 5(1/2)} = 5/2 and Uˆ oh ≥ max{(5 − 4)(1/2), 0} =
1/2. This is because, in the direct trade subgame, both seller types can announce
a TIOLI offer of mo = 5 which will be accepted by the high type buyer, no matter
what beliefs she has.
Again, it is easy to show that condition (II.6) from Theorem II.1 is satisfied:
1
2
2
1/2
+ 1
2
7 = 11
2
> max{5, 4} = 5
Therefore, there exists an efficient intermediated equilibrium of the Γi under the
parameter configuration described above. As an example consider the following
equilibrium. Let both seller types announce mˆol = mˆ
o
h = H = 5 in the out-of-
equilibrium direct trade outside option subgame, which is only accepted by the
high type buyer. Then on the equilibrium path, the intermediary announces Mˆ i =
{(2.5, 2), (5, 7)}, both seller types choose the intermediary followed by the low
type choosing menu 1 and the high type choosing menu 2. The high type buyer
accepts both menus while the low type buyer accepts only when menu 1 is chosen.
The expected payoffs for the agents are the same as in a pooling equilibrium with
mP = 5 of Γ. Lastly, the intermediary makes an expected profit of Vˆ = 1
2
(2−2.5)+
1
2
1
2
(7− 5) = 1
4
> 0.
Condition (II.7) from Proposition II.5 is violated here, as the parameters satisfy
h = 4 < H = 5. Therefore, there can not exist an efficient intermediated equilib-
rium where the outside option subgame equilibrium has both seller types trading
with the high type buyer at prices mˆol = mˆ
o
h = E(v|H) = 6. To see why, observe
that the direct trade outside option subgame equilibrium payoffs at those TIOLI
offers are Uˆ ol = 3 and Uˆ
o
h = 1. In an efficient intermediated equilibrium, the max-
imum amounts the intermediary can charge the buyer are mˆb[l] ≤ 2 for low type
seller’s menu choice and mˆb[h] ≤ 7 for high type seller’s menu choice. Similarly, in
light of the outside option payoffs, the minimum amounts the seller types must be
paid are mˆs[l] ≥ 3 and mˆs[h] ≥ 6. Thus, in an efficient intermediated equilibrium,
the expected profits of the intermediary satisfy Vˆ ≤ 1
2
(2−3) + 1
2
1
2
(7−6) = −1
4
< 0,
which violates equilibrium optimality for the intermediary.
The intermediary’s optimal mechanism can not yield strictly more efficient
trade outcomes. From Remark II.1, it follows that Q˜(l, L) = 0 as q = 1
2
< H−L
H
= 3
5
.
Lastly, consider the IPV case where λL = λH = 0. Then the revised valuation
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matrix is shown below:
ts \ tb L H
l = 0 2 5
h = 4 2 5
⇒ p = P(ts = l) = 12 = P(tb = L) = q
Under the parameter configuration, Lemma II.7 suggests that the unique equilib-
rium of Γ is P where mP = 5 and the expected payoffs are UPl =
5
2
and UPh =
1
2
.
Due to Proposition II.6, there are no efficient intermediated equilibria of the above
game Γi in the IPV case, because the intermediary would run a strict loss. To see
why, observe that the maximum prices charged to the buyer in equilibrium would
be given by mˆb[l] ≤ 2 and mˆb[h] ≤ 5, while the minimum prices paid to the seller
would satisfy mˆs[l] ≤ 2.5 and mˆs[h] ≥ 5. Therefore the expected profits of the in-
termediary satisfy Vˆ ≤ 1
2
(2−2.5)+ 1
2
1
2
(5−5) = −1
4
< 0, which violates equilibrium
condition for the intermediary.
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CHAPTER III
Ex-Ante Contracting and Limits of Intermediation
III.1 Introduction
In this paper, I consider a bargaining situation between a seller and a buyer over
the allocation of a single indivisible object. I restrict attention to the case of quasi-
linear preferences for the bargaining parties, allowing for informational interde-
pendences in valuations. Namely, I allow the buyer’s valuation for the object to
depend both on her and the seller’s private information, which in turn creates
informational externalities.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the equilibrium outcomes of a game where
the seller designs the trading mechanism at ex-ante stage before learning his pri-
vate information, and then the seller and the buyer execute the trading mechanism
at interim stage after both have learned their respective private information.
There are two important features to the game being analyzed; (i) seller has
all the bargaining power, (ii) seller has full commitment. The former assumption
implies that the seller, when designing the contract, will try to maximize his ex-
ante expected payoff. The second feature implies that, the seller can credibly
commit to the mechanism he designs. In other words, he does not change the
rules to the bargaining protocol as defined by the contract, after he learns his
type.
I first characterize the seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism that maximizes his
ex-ante expected payoff. Due to the revelation principle, it is without loss of gener-
ality to restrict attention to the seller designing direct mechanisms and the agents
reporting their types truthfully in equilibrium. I show that there exists a unique
allocation rule as well as payoffs that are accrued in the equilibrium of this ex-ante
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contracting game.
Next, I discuss some properties of this optimal mechanism. I highlight how
the allocation rule differs, when the valuations have no informational interde-
pendence versus when there is interdependence. I also establish existence of the
seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism by construction. Finally, I discuss efficiency of
the ex-ante optimal mechanism for the seller. Using ex-ante incentive efficiency1
from Holmström and Myerson (1983) as the notion of Pareto efficiency, I show
that the seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism is also ex-ante incentive efficient.
Altogether the findings suggest that, the seller’s ex-ante payoff maximizing
contract achieves Pareto optimal outcomes. Furthermore, as it is the seller who
designs the optimal contract, the implementation does not require the presence of
a third-party intermediary. Hence one way to interpret these results is that, they
describe a natural limit to the benefits of intermediation.
III.1.1 Related Literature
This paper relates to the vast literature on mechanism design in (bilateral) trade
problems. The pioneering works in Myerson (1979) and Myerson (1981) initi-
ated the literature on optimal mechanism design that maximizes revenues for the
designer. Another focus area has been efficient mechanism design, where for ex-
ample Krishna and Perry (1998) considers the efficient VCG mechanisms in gen-
eral Bayesian environments. Mechanism design in trade problems for the case
of valuations with informational interdependences have also been anaylzed. For
these environments, Mezzetti (2004) considers efficiency aspects while the com-
panion paper Mezzetti (2007) considers surplus maximization for the seller. Note
that in the latter paper, the seller does not possess any private information. More
specifically in the context of bilateral trade, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) and
Samuelson (1984) analyze seller’s revenue maximization problem while Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) consider efficient mechanisms, all under the indepen-
dent private values realm. In this paper, the emphasis is on the ex-ante expected
payoff maximizing mechanism for the seller, when there are informational inter-
dependences in buyer’s valuation.
The benchmark notion of Pareto-efficiency for the mechanisms in Bayesian
games have been defined in the seminal work of Holmström and Myerson (1983).
1A mechanism is incentive efficient, if it attains second-best outcomes subject to the familiar
feasibility constraints of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. In a Bayesian setting,
however, there exists three stages to evaluate the Pareto relationships; ex-ante, interim and ex-post.
The differences reflect the knowledge of the players’ private information at the time of efficiency
evaluation.
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There have also been various papers that aim to characterize the constrained-
efficient, or equivalently the incentive efficient, mechanisms in the bilateral trade
context. Samuelson (1984), Wilson (1985) and Williams (1987) analyze ex-ante
incentive efficiency in the case of independent private values, while Gresik (1991)
characterizes the ex-ante incentive efficient mechanisms in the general valuations
with informational externalities. For the interim incentive efficient mechanisms,
on the other hand, Gresik (1996) and Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) consider the
case of independent private values while Kucuksenel (2012) addresses the inter-
dependent valuations cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section III.2 I present the
model and the ex-ante contracting game. In Section III.3, the main result on the
characterization of the ex-ante optimal mechanism for the seller is presented. Its
properties are also discussed in that section. All proofs are in the appendix.
III.2 Model
III.2.1 Setup
There are two risk-neutral agents, one seller and one buyer, denoted by s and b,
respectively. The seller owns a single unit of an indivisible good which the buyer
would like to buy. Each agent i ∈ {s, b} privately observes a signal θi ∈ Θi = [0, 1]
where θs and θb are drawn independently from the cumulative distribution func-
tions F (θs) and G(θb), respectively. It is assumed that these distribution functions
are differentiable and are commonly known. In addition, their corresponding
density functions, f(θs) and g(θb), are assumed to be strictly positive everywhere,
satisfying the usual monotone hazard rate properties; F/f is strictly increasing
in θs for the seller and (1 − G)/g is strictly decreasing in θb for the buyer. The
random variables θ = (θs, θb) are private information of the seller and the buyer,
respectively, and hence will be referred to as the types of the respective agents.
The valuation of the seller for the object c(θ) is referred to as his cost for brevity
and satisfies c(θ) = θs. The valuation of the buyer for the object v(θ), on the
other hand, is referred to as her value and satisfies v(θ) = αθs + (1 − α)θb for
some constant α ∈ [0, 1) that is commonly known.2 Observe that the seller’s type
equals his cost, while for the buyer the seller’s private information appears in her
valuation whenever α ∈ (0, 1), i.e. the interdependence of valuations. Note that
when α = 0, the valuations satisfy the special case of independent private values
2I use the male pronoun for the seller, female pronoun for the buyer.
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(henceforth IPV).
III.2.2 Timing of the Trading Game
The seller and the buyer play a Bayesian bargaining game or a trading mechanism
to determine (i) who gets the object and (ii) how much should the buyer pay the
seller. The aim is to analyze the outcomes of this bargaining situation, when the
seller designs the optimal trading mechanism that maximizes his expected payoff
at ex-ante stage, i.e. before he learns his private information. Thus the timing of
the trading game can be summarized as follows:
1. The seller designs a trading mechanism before learning his type.
2. The seller and the buyer observe their private information.
3. They play the trading mechanism.
The seller designing the contract ex-ante before learning his valuation implies
that there is no signaling, and consequently there is no informed seller’s problem.
Due to the Revelation Principle,3 all equilibrium feasible allocations and the asso-
ciated outcomes of an arbitrary trading mechanism can be characterized, without
loss of generality, by restricting attention to the truth-telling equilibria of direct
revelation mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility (henceforth IC) and in-
dividual rationality (henceforth IR) constraints. For completeness, a proof of the
revelation principle in this setup is provided in Appendix C.2.
III.2.3 Feasible Direct Revelation Mechanisms
A direct revelation mechanism (henceforth DRM), denoted by γ = {Q, τ}, consists
of an allocation rule Q : Θs × Θb → [0, 1] and a payment rule τ : Θs × Θb → R.
Given any pair of reported types θ˜ = (θ˜s, θ˜b), the allocation rule Q(θ˜) specifies the
probability of the object changing hands from the seller to the buyer, while the
payment rule τ(θ˜) specifies the monetary transfer from buyer to seller.
Given a DRM γ and any pair of type realization θ, the payoffs to the agents
under truthful type reporting are equal to:
us(θ) = τ(θ)− θsQ(θ)
ub(θ) = [αθs + (1− α)θb]Q(θ)− τ(θ)
3See for example Myerson (1979), Myerson (1981).
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The following expressions define the (interim) expected trade probabilities and
transfers for an agent i with type θi from reporting type θ˜i whenever the other
agent reports their type truthfully:
qs(θ˜s|θs) =
∫ 1
0
Q(θ˜s, θb)dG(θb), qb(θ˜b|θb) =
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θ˜b)dF (θs)
ts(θ˜s|θs) =
∫ 1
0
τ(θ˜s, θb)dG(θb), tb(θ˜b|θb) =
∫ 1
0
τ(θs, θ˜b)dF (θs)
Using the expressions above, the (interim) expected utility for an agent i with type
θi from reporting type θ˜i, whenever the other agent reports their type truthfully,
can be described as follows:
Us(θ˜s|θs) = ts(θ˜s|θs)− θsqs(θ˜s|θs)
Ub(θ˜b|θb) =
∫ 1
0
[αθs + (1− α)θb]Q(θs, θ˜b)dF (θs)− tb(θ˜b|θb)
A DRM satisfies IC if and only if honest type reporting defines a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium. This means that for each agent i ∈ {s, b}, the expected payoffs sat-
isfy Ui(θi) ≡ Ui(θi|θi) ≥ Ui(θ˜i|θi), where θ˜i is an arbitrary type report of agent i.
Similarly, a DRM satisfies IR if and only if the expected payoffs under truthful type
reporting are weakly greater than the respective outside options of the agents,
which are normalized to 0. Therefore, IR is satisfied iff Ui(θi) ≥ 0 for all possible
types of each agent. Finally, a DRM is feasible if and only if it satisfies IC and IR
constraints.
III.2.4 Preliminaries
Before presenting the main results, some preliminary results that are well-known
from the literature on mechanism design are presented. The following remark
summarizes the necessary conditions implied by a feasible DRM.
Remark III.1.
If A DRM γ = {Q, τ} is feasible, then the following must be true:
• The allocation function satisfies monotonicity where,
dqs(θs)
dθs
≤ 0 ∀θs and dqb(θb)
dθb
≥ 0 ∀θb
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• The expected payoffs satisfy:
Us(θs) = Us(1) +
∫ 1
θs
qs(x)dx ∀θs where Us(1) ≥ 0
Ub(θb) = Ub(0) + (1− α)
∫ θb
0
qb(y)dy ∀θb where Ub(0) ≥ 0
The proofs are omitted as they follow from standard results.4 Note that the
expressions for the buyer’s expected payoffs are attained by exploiting the binding
downward IC constraints. This yields the expression for the expected payoffs (up
to the constant Ub(0)) for each type θb, which equals her expected information
rents. Although seller’s private information influences her valuation v(θs, θb), the
independence of the distributions between the private information leaves θb as the
only source of her information rents, which in turn explains the fraction (1 − α)
appearing in the expression for Ub(θb).
Observe that given a feasible DRM γ = {Q, τ}, the outcomes from the truthful
equilibrium can be characterized by only considering the allocation rule Q(θs, θb),
along with the constant expected payoffs for the respective “worst” types, i.e. Us(1)
and Ub(0).
It will be convenient to define the following functions.
ψb(θb;µ) = θb − µ1−G(θb)
g(θb)
and ψs(θs;µ) = θs + µ
F (θs)
(1− α)f(θs)
where µ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant. When µ = 1, the functions ψb(θb; 1) ≡ ψb(θb) and
ψs(θs; 1) ≡ ψs(θs) are the familiar virtual valuations. Thus, the general functions
ψb(θb;µ) and ψs(θs;µ) with parameter µ are referred to as the µ-weighted virtual
valuations. Observe that the monotone hazard rate property implies that both the
µ-weighted virtual valuations are strictly increasing over their entire domains, i.e.
for all θs, θb ∈ [0, 1], as well as for any weight µ ∈ [0, 1].
Lastly, as the virtual valuation function for the buyer ψb(θb; 1) = ψb(θb) is strictly
increasing in θb, its inverse function can also be defined. Let ψ−1b : [− 1g(0) , 1]→ [0, 1]
be the inverse function where ψ−1b (y) = {x|ψb(x) = y}. Observe that ψ−1b (y) is also
strictly increasing over its entire domain.
4Derivations in the context of bilateral trade may be found in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
for the case of IPV and Gresik (1991) for the case of interdependent valuations.
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III.3 Ex-ante Optimal Mechanism for the Seller
The main aim is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the seller’s ex-ante
contracting game. Due to the revelation principle, this amounts to characterizing
the outcomes of the truthful equilibria of feasible DRM’s that maximize the seller’s
ex-ante expected payoff, which are referred to as the ex-ante optimal mechanisms
for the seller. The following result provides the characterization:
Proposition III.1.
The seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism is characterized as follows:
• There exists a unique allocation rule Q∗ where for any pair of truthful type
reports θ = (θs, θb), the trade probabilities equal:
Q∗(θs, θb) =
1 if θb ≥ κ∗(θs) = min{ψ−1b (ψs(θs;µ)), 1}0 o/w (III.1)
where µ = 0 for α = 0 and µ ∈ (0, 1) for α ∈ (0, 1).
• The expected payoffs to the agents at “worst” types satisfy U∗s (1) = U∗b (0) = 0.
Then γ∗ = {Q∗, τ ∗} is an ex-ante optimal mechanism for the seller where;
τ ∗(θs, θb) = Q∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1− α)θb]− (1− α)
∫ θb
0
Q∗(θs, y)dy
+
∫ 1
θs
∫ 1
0
Q∗(x, θb)dG(θb)dx− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dG(θb) (III.2)
A direct proof is provided by solving the optimization program of ex-ante ex-
pected payoff maximization subject to the feasibility constraints (IC and IR) of the
DRM. There are a few points to highlight.
Firstly, the uniqueness of the allocation rule along with the expected payoffs
for the “worst” types imply that the equilibrium outcomes of seller’s ex-ante op-
timal mechanism are unique. Namely, the interim expected transfers and trade
probabilities are uniquely defined. This in turn also suggests that the seller and
the buyer receive a unique interim expected payoff schedule.
Secondly, observe that the optimal allocation rule is different for when α = 0,
i.e. the IPV case, versus when α ∈ (0, 1), i.e. the informational interdependent
valuations case. Although in both cases, the optimal allocation rule is determinis-
tic, in the sense that there is no randomization or Q∗(θs, θb) ∈ {0, 1} for all (θs, θb),
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the cutoff values for the buyer’s private information differ. This arises because, the
parameters µ differ.5
In the former case of IPV, observe that ψs(θs; 0) = θs. This, in turn implies
that ψ−1b (ψs(θs; 0)) = ψ
−1
b (θs). Because ψ
−1
b (θs) ≤ 1 for all θs ≤ 1,6 it holds that
κ∗(θs) = ψ−1b (θs). Therefore, the optimal allocation rule implemented in the case
of IPV is equivalent to those allocations that would be implemented if the private
information of the seller were commonly known, which is a result that has been
previously highlighted in the literature.7
In the other case of informational interdependence, the value of the parameter
µ is strictly between 0 and 1. Unfortunately, there is no analytic solution for the
exact value of the Lagrangian multipler λ, and consequently the parameter µ.
However, it can be seen that in these cases ψs(θs;µ) = 1 at some intermediate
value θ¯µs ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, this implies ψ−1b (ψs(θ¯µs ;µ)) = 1. Hence, the cutoff
function satisfies κ∗(θs) =
ψ−1b (ψs(θs;µ)) if θs ≤ θ¯µs1 o/w .
Last point relates to the implementation of these uniquely characterized out-
comes. In the second part of Proposition III.1, an example of ex-ante optimal
mechanism for the seller is provided. The important implication is that, the out-
comes of seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism can be attained without the interme-
diation of a third party. In other words, there is no need to have an intermediary
to coordinate the monetary transfers, because the construction of the transfer rule
defined in (III.2) guarantees that the payments between the seller and the buyer
balance each other for every possible type pair realization.
III.3.1 Pareto Optimality of Seller’s Ex-ante Optimal Mechanism
An important inquiry relates to the efficiency properties of the seller’s ex-ante
optimal mechanism. In these environments, it has been shown that there is no
feasible mechanism that implements the ex-post efficient allocation rule8 due to
the informational frictions arising from asymmetric information.9 In that regard,
5This parameter appears from the optimization problem and is equal to µ = λ1+λ where λ is a
Lagrange-multiplier for the seller’s IR constraint, i.e. Us(1) ≥ 0.
6In fact ψ−1b (θs) = 1 only when θs = 1 and otherwise is strictly less than 1 for any θs < 1.
7See for instance Yilankaya (1999).
8Ex-post efficient allocation rule is given by Qe(θs, θb) =
{
1 if v(θ) ≥ c(θ) ⇔ θb ≥ θs
0 o/w
, where
the simplified condition follows from plugging in the specific valuation functions.
9See for instance Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) for IPV and Gresik (1991) for the case of
general interdependent valuations.
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the aim of this subsection is to see whether the ex-ante optimal mechanism for the
seller yield second-best outcomes that achieve Pareto efficiency.
In the context of a Bayesian game, the benchmark notion of Pareto efficiency
is incentive efficiency as defined in Holmström and Myerson (1983). According to
the definition of the authors, a feasible DRM satisfies incentive efficiency if and
only if there is no other feasible DRM that makes some type of an agent better
off without making the other types (for all agents) worse off. The authors also
highlight that, there are three stages to evaluate such a dominance relationship;
ex-ante, interim and ex-post. The interest of this paper lies in the first notion, that
is ex-ante incentive efficiency, which requires that there be no other feasible DRM
that ex-ante Pareto dominates the payoffs for the agents.
Let W (γ) be the social welfare function where:
W (γ) = w
∫ 1
0
Us(θs)dF (θs) + (1− w)
∫ 1
0
Ub(θb)dG(θb) (III.3)
where w ∈ [0, 1] is a welfare weight parameter. Then a feasible DRM γe is ex-
ante incentive efficient if and only if it maximizes W (γ) among the class of feasible
DRM’s, i.e. subject to the IC and IR (feasibility) constraints. Observe that ex-ante
incentive efficiency is the strongest notion as it implies interim incentive efficiency,
which in turn implies ex-post incentive efficiency.
In light of this definition, the following result holds.
Proposition III.2.
Ex-ante optimal mechanism for the seller is ex-ante incentive efficient.
The result simply follows from the equality between the optimization programs
for the seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism problem and the ex-ante incentive effi-
cient mechanisms. For the latter optimization program, the welfare weights w may
vary between 0 and 1. In the extreme case when w = 1, the welfare function is
equivalent to the seller’s ex-ante expected utility. Since both programs are solving
the same objective functions subject to the feasibility constraints, they yield the
same optimization programs and consequently, the same solutions.
This implies that the seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism achieves second-best
outcomes. Thus, it would not be possible to Pareto improve the outcomes. Hence,
ex-ante commitment enables the bargaining parties to reach (constrained) effi-
cient outcomes. In turn, these results highlight a case where the intermediation
can not yield Pareto improvements. In other words, the analysis identifies a natu-
ral limit to the benefits of intermediation.
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Finally, in light of the similarities in the setup, it is worth comparing the result
with the findings from Chapter II. Previously, it was shown in Proposition II.6 that,
when the buyer’s valuations satisfied the IPV framework, then the presence of
an intermediary would never lead to a strict improvement in allocative efficiency.
In other words, the informed seller’s optimal TIOLI offers attain second-best out-
comes, which can not be Pareto improved. In the IPV framework, Yilankaya (1999)
establishes the equivalence between the informed seller’s interim-optimal mecha-
nism and his ex-ante optimal mechanism. Since Proposition III.2 establishes the
Pareto optimality of the ex-ante optimal mechanism for the seller, it also validates
the aforementioned result for the special case of IPV from the previous chapter.
In the case of interdependent valuations, Theorem II.1 establishes that an in-
termediary can lead to Pareto improvements in allocative efficiency if and only if
condition (II.6) is satisfied. At the core of the intuition is the following: When the
informed seller tries to maximize its revenues by making TIOLI offers, the presence
of lemon problem arising from informational externalities (i.e. the valuation in-
terdepence) leads to inefficient underselling. An intermediary may alleviate these
inefficiencies by means of cross-subsidization, even if the intermediary aims to
maximize its expected profits. Here, on the other hand, it is shown that, when the
seller has the ability to commit and design the terms of trade ex-ante, the inter-
mediary can no longer provide efficiency improvements. This is simply because
the parties can reach second-best outcomes by the seller designing a Pareto opti-
mal mechanism equipped with a payment rule such as the one described in (III.2)
that is more sophisticated than simple TIOLI offers. This, in turn, suggests that
the ability to ex-ante contract is a strong remedy to Pareto inefficiencies and an
impediment to intermediation providing any added value.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter I
A.1 Useful Results
A.1.1 Mapping General Messages to Type Reports
In several proofs of the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries, initial steps are
taken by considering direct mechanisms, where the message spaces for the agents are re-
stricted to their respective type spaces. However, such mechanisms need to be represented
in a way that they accommodate general message spaces. In order to address this issue, I
define the following mappings φs : M is → C and φj : M ij → Vj where latter is defined for
all buyers j:
φs(m
i
s) =
mis if mis = c′ ∈ [0, 1]1 o/w φj(mij) =
mij if mij = v′j ∈ [0, 1]0 o/w (A.1)
For all intermediaries i, these mappings are defined identically where each takes the
corresponding agent’s message and maps it into their respective type space. Given any
vector of messages (mis,m
i
b), denote the vector of message mappings by φ(m
i
s,m
i
b) =(
φs(m
i
s), φ1(m
i
1), . . . , φn(m
i
n)
)
. Then, taking composition of a general mechanism with
the mappings yields a direct mechanism. Hence, in the proofs general mechanisms may
be defined retrospectively from a described direct mechanism.
A.1.2 Seller’s Equilibrium Beliefs
In the intermediation game with multiple intermediaries, I look for sequential equilibria.
Below is an observation that is used in several proofs.
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Lemma A.1.
Given an equilibrium Eˆ of the intermediation game, seller’s beliefs βˆs satisfy:
βˆs(v|c, i,γ) = g(v) ∀c ∈ C, ∀i ∈ I, and ∀γ ∈ Γm
Proof of Lemma A.1. For an equilibrium Eˆ , I will derive the seller’s consistent beliefs. Given
equilibrium strategies ηˆ and γˆ , consider a sequence of totally mixed strategies {ηh, γh}∞h=1
where ηh ∈ ∆I and γi,h ∈ ∆Γ for each i, and lim
h→∞
(γ1,h, . . . , γm,h, ηh) = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆm, ηˆ).
Let γh = (γ1,h, . . . , γm,h) denote the shorthand for the sequences of totally mixed strate-
gies for all intermediaries. Also let βhs (v|c, i,γ) denote the seller’s beliefs at information set
(c, i,γ) when the totally mixed strategies (ηh, γh) are played. Lastly, let P(v, c, i,γ |ηh, γh)
denote the probability of the information node (v, c, i,γ) being reached under the totally
mixed strategies (ηh, γh). Then the consistent beliefs in any equilibrium are equal to:
βˆs(v|c, i,γ) = lim
h→∞
βhs (v|c, i,γ)
= lim
h→∞
P(v, c, i,γ |ηh, γh)∫
v P(v, c, i,γ |ηh, γh)dv
= lim
h→∞
g(v)P(c, i,γ |ηh, γh)∫
v g(v)P(c, i,γ |ηh, γh)dv
= lim
h→∞
g(v)∫
v g(v)dv
P(c, i,γ |ηh, γh)
P(c, i,γ |ηh, γh) = g(v)
Observe that from second to third line, the joint density function g(v) is taken out of the
information node probabilities. This is due to the independence of the type distributions.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma I.1. Let Eˆ be an equilibrium of the intermediation game with multiple
intermediaries. Consider the DRM δ = (Q¯, τ¯ ) which, for a given vector of type reports
(c′,v′), implements the outcomes constructed as follows:
Q¯j(c
′,v′) =
∑
i∈I
Qˆij
(
µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib(v
′, γˆi)
)
I
(
ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i
)
τ¯j(c
′,v′) =
∑
i∈I
τˆ ij
(
µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib(v
′, γˆi)
)
I
(
ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i
)
τ¯s(c
′,v′) =
∑
i∈I
τˆ is
(
µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib(v
′, γˆi)
)
I
(
ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i
)
τ¯ i(c′,v′) =
 n∑
j=1
τˆ ij
(
µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib(v
′, γˆi)
)− τˆ is(µˆis(c′, γˆ), µˆib(v′, γˆi))
 I(ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i)
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Assuming the agents report their types truthfully, the expected trade probabilities and
transfers for the players can be defined as follows:
q¯j(vj) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
Q¯j(c, vj ,v−j)dG−j(v−j)dF (c)
q¯s(c) =
∫
v
 n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
 dG(v)
t¯j(vj) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
τ¯j(c, vj ,v−j)dG−j(v−j)dF (c)
t¯s(c) =
∫
v
τ¯s(c,v)dG(v)
t¯i =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
τ¯ i(c,v)dG(v)dF (c)
I want to show that δ as described above is a feasible DRM and its truthful type-telling
equilibrium is payoff equivalent to Eˆ .
Given Eˆ of the original game, it will be convenient to abuse notation to define the
expected payoff to the seller with type c at subgame s.i who deviates and announces
mis = µˆ
i
s(c
′, γˆ) as follows:
Uˆ is(c
′|c) = Us
(
γˆ , i, µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib|c) = Us
(
γˆ , i,mis, µˆ
i
b|c)
Similarly, define the corresponding shorthand notation for the expected payoff to buyer j
with type vj at subgame j.i who deviates and announces mij = µˆ
i
j(v
′
j , γˆi):
Uˆ ij(v
′
j |vj) = Uj
(
γˆ , i, µˆis, µˆ
i
j(v
′
j , γˆi), µˆ
i
−j |vj) = Uj
(
γˆ , i, µˆis,m
i
j , µˆ
i
−j |vj)
Observe that Uˆ is(c) and Uˆ
i
j(vj)’s are the expected payoffs prescribed by the equilibrium
strategies for the corresponding agents’ types from subgames s.i and j.i’s, respectively.
Furthermore, the agents’ expected payoffs from equilibrium can be written as Uˆs(c) =∑
i∈I Uˆ
i
s(c)I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
and Uˆj(vj) =
∑
i∈I Uˆ
i
j(vj)
[ ∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
]
.
Going back to the DRM, assume that the buyers report types truthfully. Then by chang-
ing order of integration and summation, the expected payoff for a seller of type c from
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reporting c′ can be expressed as follows:
U¯s(c
′|c) = t¯s(c′)− q¯s(c′)c
=
∫
v
∑
i∈I
Us
(
γˆ , i, µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib(v, γˆi)
)
I
(
ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i
) dG(v)
=
∑
i∈I
[∫
v
Us
(
γˆ , i, µˆis(c
′, γˆ), µˆib(v, γˆi)
)
dG(v)
]
I
(
ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i
)
=
∑
i∈I
Uˆ is(c
′|c)I(ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i)
Before considering the corresponding expected payoffs for the buyers, remember that
if an equilibrium mechanism γˆi is reached with positive probability, i.e.
∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) =
i
)
dF (c) > 0, then each buyer j has equilibrium beliefs βˆij
(
c,v−j , γ−i)|vj , γˆi
)
given by:
βˆij
(
c,v−j , γ−i|vj , γˆi
)
=

I
(
ηˆ(c,γˆ)=i
)
f(c)∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(x,γˆ)=i
)
dF (x)
g−j(v−j) if γ−i = γˆ−i
0 o/w
Then for any subgame that is reached with positive probability, the following rearranging
holds:
Uˆ ij(v
′
j |vj) =
∫
Uj
(
γˆi, γ−i, i, µˆs.i(c, γˆi, γ−i), µˆij(v
′, γˆi), µˆi−j(v−j , γˆ
i)
)
βˆij
(
c,v−j , γ−i)|vj , γˆi
)
d(c,v−j , γ−i)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
Uj
(
γˆ , i, µˆis(c, γˆ), µˆ
i
j(v
′, γˆi), µˆi−j(v−j , γˆ
i)
)
dG−j(v−j)
I
(
ηˆ(c,γˆ)=i
)
dF (c)∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(x,γˆ)=i
)
dF (x)
Otherwise γˆi is not reached with positive probability, or
∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c) = 0. In
that case the following equalities hold:
0 = Uˆ ij(v
′
j |vj)
[ ∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
]
Then this observation can be used to expand the expected payoffs to buyers in the DRM.
Assume that buyer j with type vj reports v′j , while the seller and all other buyers report
types truthfully. Then, by changing order of integration and summation, his expected
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payoff can be written as follows:
U¯j(v
′
j |vj) = q¯j(v′j)vj − t¯j(v′j)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
∑
i∈I
Uj
(
γˆ , i, µˆis(c, γˆ), µˆ
i
j(v
′, γˆi), µˆi−j(v−j , γˆ
i)
)
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dG−j(v−j)dF (c)
=
∑
i∈I
Uˆ ij(v
′
j |vj)
[∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
]
From previous equalities, it is immediate to see that the agents’ equilibrium payoffs from Eˆ
are equivalent to those from the DRM under truthful type reporting; i.e. U¯s(c) = Uˆs(c) for
all c and U¯j(vj) = Uˆj(vj) for all j and vj . In order to verify that the DRM under truthful
type reporting yields expected payoffs to the intermediaries that are same as under the
original equilibrium, consider the following:
U¯ i = t¯i
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v
 n∑
j=1
τˆ ij
(
µˆis(c, γˆ), µˆ
i
b(v, γˆ
i)
)− τˆ is(µˆis(c, γˆ), µˆib(v, γˆi))
 I(ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i)dG(v)dF (c)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v
U i
(
γˆ , i, µˆis(c, γˆ), µˆ
i
b(v, γˆ
i)
)
dG(v)I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
= Uˆ i
This establishes the payoff equivalence of δ under truthful type reporting. Next, I need
to show that δ is a feasible DRM, hence satisfies IR, IC, RES and BB. It is immediate to
see that IR is satisfied since the equilibrium payoffs Uˆs(c), Uˆj(vj) and Uˆ i’s are all weakly
greater than the outside option payoff of 0. Allocation rule Q¯ satisfies RES, because it is
constructed as a convex combination of the allocation rules Qˆi where each satisfies RES.
BB is also satisfied as it can simply be shown by changing the order of summations across
intermediaries and buyers.
Only IC remains to be shown. Starting with the seller, observe that the equilibrium of
the original game implies that seller’s communication strategy µˆis(c, γˆ) is optimal at every
subgame s.i for every type c. In other words, it holds that:
Uˆ is(c) = Us(γˆ , i, µˆ
i
s(c, γˆ), µˆ
i
b|c) ≥ Us(γˆ , i,mis, µˆib|c) ∀mis ∈M is
Hence Uˆ is(c) ≥ Uˆ is(c′|c) where deviation message considered is mis = µˆis(c′, γˆ). Further-
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more, combining with the optimality of the seller’s entry choice yields:
U¯s(c) = Uˆs(c) = max
i∈I
{
Uˆ is(c)
}
=
∑
i∈I
Uˆ is(c)I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
≥
∑
i∈I
Uˆ is(c)I
(
ηˆi(c
′, γˆ) = i
) ≥∑
i∈I
Uˆ is(c
′|c)I(ηˆ(c′, γˆ) = i) = U¯s(c′|c)
Next consider the IC for the buyers. Observe that, due to the decomposition of U¯j(v′j |vj),
optimality of truthful type-reporting should be argued only for expected payoffs Uˆ ij(v
′
j |vj)
from subgames that are reached with positive probability. In that regard, the equilibrium
of the original game implies that buyer’s communication strategy µˆij(vj , γˆ
i) is optimal for
every type vj at such subgames. In other words, it holds that:
Uˆ ij(vj) = U
i
j(γˆ , i, µˆ
i
s, µˆ
i
j(vj , γˆ
i), µˆi−j |vj) ≥ U ij(γˆ , i, µˆis,mij , µˆi−j |vj) ∀mij ∈M ij
Hence Uˆ ij(vj) ≥ Uˆ ij(v′j |vj) where deviation message considered is mij = µˆij(v′j , γˆi). Then it
follows that:
U¯j(vj) = Uˆj(vj) =
∑
i∈I
Uˆ ij(vj)
[∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
]
≥
∑
i∈I
Uˆ ij(v
′
j |vj)
[∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γˆ) = i
)
dF (c)
]
= U¯j(v
′
j |vj)
Proof of Proposition I.1. The seller-optimal DRM solves the following program P1:
P1→ max
{Q¯,τ¯ }
{∫ 1
0
U¯s(c)dF (c)
}
subject to
IR : U¯s(c), U¯j(vj), U¯ i ≥ 0 ∀c, ∀j and vj , ∀i
IC : U¯s(c) ≥ U¯s(c′|c), and U¯j(vj) ≥ U¯j(v′j |vj) ∀c, c′, ∀j and vj , v′j
RES : 0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
∑n
j=1 Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
BB :
∑n
j=1
[∫ 1
0 t¯j(vj)dGj(vj)
]
− ∫ 10 t¯s(c)dF (c)−∑mi=1 t¯i = 0
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From Remark I.1, a feasible DRM δ has to satisfy the following necessary conditions:
U¯s(1) ≥ 0, U¯s(c) = U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx,
dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
U¯j(0) ≥ 0, U¯j(vj) = U¯j(0) +
∫ vj
0
q¯j(yj)dyj ,
dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
U¯s(1) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c)−
n∑
j=1
U¯j(0)−
∑
i∈I
t¯i
Plugging in the expected payoff for U¯s(c) the objective function becomes:∫ 1
0
U¯s(c)dF (c) =
∫ 1
0
[
U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx
]
dF (c)
= U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)dG(v)F (c)dc
Firstly, observe that U¯j(0) = 0 optimally for every j, as otherwise one can decrease U¯j(0)
and increase U¯s(1) by the same amount and improve the objective function’s value. Simi-
larly, t¯i = 0 optimally for every i, as otherwise U¯s(1) could be increased without violating
the conditions, thereby improving the value of the objective function. Note that, these are
in line with Proposition I.1 where U∗j (0) = 0 and U
i,∗ = 0.
Simplifications suggest that U¯s(1) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
[∑n
j=1 Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
] ]
dG(v)dF (c).
Plugging into P1 yields the following simplified problem, P1′:
P1′ → max
Q¯

∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)dF (c)

subject to
dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
U¯s(1) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c) ≥ 0
Ignoring the monotonicity and seller’s simplified IR constraints momentarily, the linearity
of the objective function in the choice variable along with the RES constraints suggest that
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the pointwise maximizer is a simple step function given by:
Q∗j (c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj) ≥ max
{
c,max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk)}
}
0 o/w
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
This is precisely the same allocation function as (I.1) from Proposition I.1. Next, I check
that the pointwise maximizer Q∗ satisfies the conditions of the simplified problem. RES is
satisfied, because for any given vector of type reports (c,v), at most one Q∗j (c,v) equals
1. Also observe that for any reported vector of types the trade probability Q∗j (c,v) is
weakly increasing in vj and weakly decreasing in c for every j. Each trade probability
being weakly decreasing in c suggests that Q∗s(c,v) is also weakly decreasing in c, as it is
equal to the sum of Q∗j ’s across all j. Hence the monotonicity constraints are also satisfied.
Finally, consider the seller’s IR constraint. I want to show that U∗s (1) = 0 as stated in the
proposition. By rearranging terms, the following is attained:
U∗s (1) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q∗j (c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
[
Q∗j (c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]− ∫ 1
c
Q∗j (x,v)dx
]
dG(v)
 dF (c)
Noting that ψj(vj) < 1 for all vj < 1, consider the subtracted integral term from above:
∫ 1
c
Q∗j (x,v)dx =
0 if Q∗j (c,v) = 0ψj(vj)− c if Q∗j (c,v) = 1
Hence plugging in above observation yields U∗s (1) = 0. Finally, note that for δ∗ the revenue
generated from agents R(δ∗) is also equal to U∗s (1). This again verifies the earlier point
that U i,∗ = ti,∗ = 0 for all i.
Proof of Corollary I.1. Consider the following program P2:
P2→ max
{Q¯,τ¯ }
∑
i∈I
U¯ i +
∫ 1
0
U¯s(c)dF (c)

subject to
IR : U¯s(c), U¯j(vj), U¯ i ≥ 0 ∀c, ∀j and vj , ∀i
IC : U¯s(c) ≥ U¯s(c′|c), and U¯j(vj) ≥ U¯j(v′j |vj) ∀c, c′, ∀j and vj , v′j
RES : 0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
∑n
j=1 Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
BB :
∑n
j=1
[∫ 1
0 t¯j(vj)dGj(vj)
]
− ∫ 10 t¯s(c)dF (c)−∑mi=1 U¯ i = 0
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Plugging in the expected payoff for U¯s(c) and U¯ i’s implied by the necessary conditions of
a feasible DRM from Remark I.1, the objective function becomes:
∑
i∈I
U¯ i +
∫ 1
0
U¯s(c)dF (c) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)[ψj(vj)− c]dG(v)dF (c)−
n∑
j=1
U¯j(0)
Observe that U¯j(0) = 0 optimally for every j, as otherwise one can decrease U¯j(0) without
violating IR of buyer j and increase the value of the objective function. The simplifications
yield:
P2′ → max
Q¯

∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)dF (c)

subject to
dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
U¯ i ≥ 0 ∀i
U¯s(1) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c)−
∑
i∈I
U¯ i ≥ 0
Observe that P2′ is the same problem as in P1′ with slightly different IR constraints.
Remember that the solution of P1′ satisfies U¯ i = U¯s(1) = 0. Hence here the same solution,
namely δ∗, solves P2′ and consequently P2.
Assume that some feasible DRM δ¯ has a truthful type-telling equilibrium where U¯s(c) ≥
U∗s (c) for all c. Then δ∗ solving P2 suggests that for all feasible DRM δ¯, the following holds:
∑
i∈I
U i,∗ +
∫ 1
0
U∗s (c)dF (c) =
∫ 1
0
U∗s (c)dF (c) ≥
∑
i∈I
U¯ i +
∫ 1
0
U¯s(c)dF (c)
Since U¯s(c) ≥ U∗s (c) for all c, it follows that
∑
i∈I U¯
i ≤ 0. Feasibility of δ¯ then suggests
U¯ i = 0 for all i. Finally, plugging in U¯ i = 0 to the above inequality yields
∫ 1
0 U
∗
s (c)dF (c) ≥∫ 1
0 U¯s(c)dF (c). Hence, it follows that the condition U¯s(c) ≥ U∗s (c) for all c is satisfied only
if the inequalities hold with equalities.
Proof of Theorem I.1. I prove the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes in two steps.
Step 1: I show that at any equilibrium Eˆ:
1. Uˆ i = 0 for all i.
2. Uˆj(0) = 0 for all j.
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3. Qˆ is such that for every j there exists reservation values rj(c) that are weakly in-
creasing in c and the probability of trade Qˆj is given by:
Qˆj(c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj) > max
k 6=j
ψk(vk) and vj > rj(c)
0 o/w
Proof. Let Eˆ be an equilibrium of the intermediation game and δ¯ be the feasible DRM that
has a payoff equivalent truthful type-telling equilibrium. Firstly, remember that the sum
of intermediaries’ expected payoffs is equal to the revenue generated from the agents due
to the BB:
R(δ¯) =
∑
i∈I
U¯ i =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U¯s(c)
 dF (c)− n∑
j=1
U¯j(0)
Secondly at the truthful type-telling equilibrium of δ¯ for all c, it holds that U¯s(c) =
U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c q¯s(x)dx where U¯s(1) ≥ 0. Denote by κ(c) the unique solution that satisfies
n∏
j=1
Gj(ψ
−1
j (κ(c))) = 1 − q¯s(c) for every c. Observe that the right hand side is the prob-
ability of the seller keeping the object, while the left hand side can be interpreted as the
cumulative probability of each buyer having valuation less than ψ−1j (κ(c)).
By monotone hazard property ψ−1j (x) is strictly increasing in x. Similarly, Gj(vj) is
strictly increasing as the distribution is assumed to have positive density over whole sup-
port. Since q¯s(c) is weakly decreasing in c, it implies that κ(c) is weakly increasing in c.
Now define the following allocation rule Q˜ where each trade probability is defined as:
Q˜j(c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj) > max
k 6=j
ψk(vk) and vj > ψ−1j (κ(c))
0 o/w
Observe that by construction of κ(c)’s, it holds that q˜s(c) = q¯s(c) for all c. Hence, if
U˜s(1) = U¯s(1), then U˜s(c) = U¯s(c) for all c, as well. Furthermore, consider a feasible DRM
δ˜ with allocation rule Q˜ as described above. Let U˜s(1) = U¯s(1) and U˜j(0) = 0 for all j.
Then the revenue generated from agents in δ˜ is given by:
R(δ˜) =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q˜j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U˜s(c)
 dF (c)
Clearly R(δ˜) ≥ R(δ¯), because q˜s(c) = q¯s(c) and U˜s(c) = U¯s(c) for all c, while Q˜j(c,v) puts
full probability to highest virtual valuation buyer.
Now assume that Eˆ violates at least one of the three conditions listed above. Then, for
the payoff equivalent feasible DRM δ¯ it means that either U¯ i > 0 for some i, or U¯j(0) > 0
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for some j, or Q¯ is different than Q˜ over some positive measure of agent types (or any
combination of those three). In any of those cases, it holds that R(δ˜) > 0.
I will show that in this situation, there exists at least one intermediary who has a
strictly profitable deviation mechanism. In particular, since there are at least two interme-
diaries, there is certainly one intermediary whose equilibrium payoff satisfies Uˆ i ≤ R(δ˜)/2.
Hence it is enough to show that the expected profits from deviation are strictly more than
R(δ˜)/2.
In order to describe the deviation mechanism, first consider the direct mechanism γ´
with allocation rule Q´ and transfer rule τ´ , where for any vector of type reports (c′,v′):
Q´j(c
′,v′) =

(1− 2) + n
(
v′j + (1− c′)
)
if ψj(v′j) ≥ max
{
κ(c′),max
k 6=j
{ψk(v′k)}
}

n
(
v′j + (1− c′)
)
o/w
∀j
τ´j(c
′,v′) = Q´j(c′,v′)v′j −
∫ v′j
0
Q´j(c
′, yj ,v−j)dyj ∀j
τ´s(c
′,v′) = Q´s(c′,v′)c′ +
∫ 1
c′
Q´s(x,v
′)dx+ U´s(1)
where  ∈ (0, 12) is a constant, U´s(1) is a nonnegative constant (expected payoff for worst
type of the seller), and κ(c) is the weakly increasing function described earlier from q¯s(c)’s.
Observe firstly that by construction Q´j(c′,v′) ∈ [0, 1] and Qs(c′,v′) =
∑n
j=1Qj(c
′,v′) ≤ 1
for every possible vector (c′,v′) ∈ C × V. These suggest that Q´ satisfies RES. Secondly
given any vector of type reports, for all j the trade probability Q´j(c′,v′) is strictly mono-
tonic (decreasing) in c′ and strictly monotonic (increasing) in v′j .
Now I want to construct the deviation mechanism for intermediary i using γ´. I adjust γ´
into a general mechanism by using the mappingsφ = (φs, φ1, . . . , φn) defined in (A.1) from
Appendix A.1.1. Given any vector of messages (mis,m
i
b), denote the vector of message
mappings byφ(mis,m
i
b) =
(
φs(m
i
s), φ1(m
i
1), . . . , φn(m
i
n)
)
. Define the deviation mechanism
γˇi = (Qˇi, τˇ i) by taking the composition of the direct mechanism γ´ and message mapping
φ. In particular for any vector of messages (mis,m
i
b), the mechanism γˇ
i has outcome
functions defined as follows:
Qˇij(m
i
s,m
i
b) = Q´j
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= Q´j(c
′,v′) ∀j
τˇ ij(m
i
s,m
i
b) = τ´j
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= τ´j(c
′,v′) ∀j
τˇ is(m
i
s,m
i
b) = τ´s
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= τ´s(c
′,v′)
where φ(mis,m
i
b) = (c
′,v′) ∈ C × V. In the remainder of the proof, I will show that
for a correct choice of , deviation to announcing mechanism γˇi instead of γˆi yields a
strictly higher expected profits for intermediary i. To be more specific, deviation profits
will be strictly more than R(δ˜)/2 and hence contradict the initial assumption that Eˆ were
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an equilibrium of the intermediation game.
For the moment assume that some intermediary i unilaterally deviates and announces
γˇi while the rest continue announcing the assumed equilibrium mechanisms γˆ−i. I claim
that it is strictly dominant for both agents to report their true types if they are at the
subgame following entry to intermediary i. In other words, µˆis(c, γˇ
i, γˆ−i) = c for all c and
µˆij(vj , γˇ
i) = vj for all j and vj .
Let me start by looking at buyer j’s optimal communication strategy. In order to argue
that it is strictly dominant for every buyer to report his type vj truthfully, the following
needs to hold for every vj:
Uˇj(γˇ
i, γˆ−i, i,mis, vj ,m
i
−j |vj) > Uˇj(γˇi, γˆ−i, i,mis,mij ,mi−j |vj) ∀mis,mij ,mi−j
Namely, the ex-post realized payoff of buyer j with type vj must be strictly better than any
other payoff he gets by sending any other message no matter what message the seller and
other buyers send. Denote the message mapping by (c′,v′) = φ(mis,mib). If the vector of
messages sent is (mis,m
i
b), then the ex-post realized payoff for buyer j with type vj :
Uˇj(γˇ
i,γˆ−i, i,mis,m
i
b|vj)
= Qˇij(m
i
s,m
i
b)vj − τˇ ij(mis,mib)
= Q´j(c
′,v′)(vj − v′j) +
∫ v′j
0
Q´j(c
′, yj ,v−j)dyj
=

(1− 2)(vj − κ(c′))+ n(1− c′)vj
+ nv
′
j
(
vj − v
′
j
2
)
if ψj(v′j) > max
{
κ(c′),max
k 6=j
{ψk(v′k)}
}

n(1− c′)vj + nv′j
(
vj − v
′
j
2
)
o/w
In order to find the payoff maximizing message, I look at the first order condition which
yields v′j = vj . Since the second derivative is equal to −/n < 0, the candidate optimum
is the unique maximizer. Hence for all buyers it is strictly dominant to report their type vj
truthfully. Equivalently put µˆij(vj , γˇ
i) = vj or every vj type buyer reports his type truthfully
no matter what his (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs βˆij
(
c,v−j , γ−i)|vj , γˇi
)
are. Note that, this
is the case, even though the deviation mechanism γˇi is not a direct mechanism.
Next looking at the seller’s ex-post payoffs, strict dominance of truthful type reporting
for every c requires the following inequality to hold:
Uˇs(γˇ
i, γˆ−i, i, c,mib|c) > Uˇs(γˇi, γˆ−i, i,mis,mib|c) ∀mis,mib
Again denoting by (c′,v′) = φ(mis,mib), for any vector of sent messages (m
i
s,m
i
b), the
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ex-post realized payoff for a c type seller is equal to:
Uˇs(γˇ
i,γˆ−i, i,mis,m
i
b|c)
= τˇ is(m
i
s,m
i
b)− Qˇis(mis,mib)c′
= U´s(1) + Q´s(c
′,v′)(c′ − c) +
∫ 1
c′
Q´s(x,v
′)dx
=

U´s(1) + (1− 2)
(
κ−1(ψk(v′k))− c
)
+ n
[∑n
j=1 v
′
j
]
(1− c) + (1− c′)(1+c′2 − c) if ψk(v′k) > κ(c′)
U´s(1) +

n
[∑n
j=1 v
′
j
]
(1− c) + (1− c′)(1+c′2 − c) o/w
where ψk(v′k) is the highest virtual valuation among all buyers and the inverse of weakly
increasing κ(c) is defined as κ−1(ψk(v′k)) = inf{x : κ(x) = ψk(v′k)}. Similar to before,
in order to find the payoff maximizing message, I look at the first order condition which
yields c′ = c. Since the second derivative is equal to − < 0, the candidate optimum is the
unique maximizer. Hence for all seller types, it is strictly dominant to report c truthfully,
or µˆis(c, γˇ
i, γˆ−i) = c no matter what the buyers report.
I have shown that whenever i announces the deviation mechanism γˇi, it is strictly
dominant for all agents to report their types truthfully in the subgame where i is chosen
by the seller. Furthermore, since their realized payoffs are nonnegative for all possible
reports, so are their expected payoffs from the subgame.
Next, consider the seller’s entry decision upon observing the mechanism profile {γˇi, γˆ−i}.
Firstly observe that for every c, the expected payoff Us(γˇi, γˆ−i, k, µˆks , µˆ
k
b |c) for any interme-
diary k 6= i is at most Uˆs(c). To see why, note that as all the other intermediaries continue
announcing γˆk, for any buyer j his communication strategy remains to be µˆkj (vj , γˆ
k) at any
subgame j.k for k 6= i. Hence the expected payoff Us(γˇi, γˆ−i, k, µˆks , µˆkb |c) can not be more
than Us(γˆ , k, µˆks , µˆ
k
b |c) for any c, as otherwise it would violate the optimality of seller’s
assumed equilibrium communication strategy µˆks(c, γˆ). Similarly, the optimality of seller’s
equilibrium entry strategy implies that Uˆs(c) = Us(γˆ , ηˆ, µˆks , µˆ
k
b |c) ≥ Us(γˆ , k, µˆks , µˆkb |c). It is
worth stressing that the information structure in the model eliminates the common agency
problem and in turn these important inequalities hold. Then, it follows that for all c and
k 6= i:
U¯s(c) = Uˆs(c) ≥ Us(γˆ , k, µˆks , µˆkb |c) ≥ Us(γˇi, γˆ−i, k, µˆks , µˆkb |c)
Abusing notation, denote by Uˇ is(c) the expected payoff from choosing ifollowing the
deviation mechanism γˇi announcement. Hence, Uˇ is(c) = Us(γˇ
i, γˆ−i, i, µˆis, µˆ
i
b|c). Given
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µˆij(vj , γˇ
i) = vj for all j and vj , the expected payoff Uˇ is(c) is equal to:
Uˇ is(c) =
∫
v
[
τˇ is(c,v)− Qˇs(c,v)c
]
dG(v)
=
∫ 1
c
∫
v
Q´s(x,v)dG(v)dx+ U´s(1)
=
∫ 1
c
∫
v
(1− 2)Q˜s(x,v) + n∑
j=1

n
[
vj + (1− x)
] dG(v)dx+ U´s(1)
= (1− 2)
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx+ 
[
(1− c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n
+
(1− c)2
2
]
+ U´s(1)
where E(vj) =
∫ 1
0 vjdGj(vj). Observe that from second to third line, I exploited the
construction of Q´ and substituted in Q˜. This manipulation is possible, because Q˜ equals
to 1 precisely in the cases where the term (1 − 2) appears in Q´. In that regard, the first
term of the last line simply follows from the equality of q˜s(c) = q¯s(c). The middle term
in the last line is a simplified version of the middle term (multiplied by n) from the third
line. Letting U´s(1) = U¯s(1) + 2 yields that for every c ∈ [0, 1]:
Uˇ is(c) = (1− 2)
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx+ 
[
(1− c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n +
(1−c)2
2
]
+ U´s(1)
= U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx+ 
[
2− 2
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx+ (1− c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n +
(1−c)2
2
]
> U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx = U¯s(c) = U˜s(c) = Uˆs(c)
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that both  and the large summation inside
square brackets are strictly positive for all c. The equality from the last line follows from
the payoff equivalence of δ¯. Given the strict inequality, it can be seen that if i deviates and
offers γˇi, then all the seller types would choose i.
Finally, evaluate the expected profits generated by γˇi. Given ηˆ(c, γˇi, γˆ−i) = i for all c
and the agents report types truthfully, the expected profits of intermediary i are given by:
Uˇ i =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
 n∑
j=1
τˇ ij(c,v)− τˇ is(c,v)
 dG(v)dF (c)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q´ij(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− Uˇ is(c)
 dF (c)
= (1− 2)
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q˜j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U˜s(c)
 dF (c)− ∆
= (1− 2)R(δ˜)− ∆
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where the term ∆ is the following constant:
∆ =
∫ 1
0
[ [
2 + 2U¯ s(1) +
(1−c)∑nj=1 E(vj)
n +
(1−c)2
2
]
−
n∑
j=1
∫
v
[
vj+1−c
n
] [
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)
]
dF (c) < 8
I want to show that Uˇ i is strictly more than R(δ˜)2 . Evaluating the inequality:
Uˇ i ≥ (1− 2)R(δ˜)− ∆ > (1− 2)R(δ˜)− 8 > R(δ˜)2
⇒  < R(δ˜)
4R(δ˜)+16
Hence, if  = R(δ˜)
8R(δ˜)+32
> 0, then there exists some intermediary i such that deviating to γˇi
is strictly profitable, which in turn contradicts the equilibrium assumption.
This concludes Step 1. Hence it has been shown that in any equilibrium, the intermedi-
aries make zero expected profits. Furthermore, worts type of buyers receive zero expected
payoffs and there exists a reservation value rj(c) = ψ−1j (κ(c)) such that the allocation
rule awards the object to the highest virtual valuation whenever his valuation is above the
corresponding reservation value. For a full equilibrium outcome characterization, all that
needs to be done is to define these reservation values and highest cost seller’s expected
payoff.
Step 2: I show that at any equilibrium Eˆ , the unique set of reservation values used in
the allocation rule are given by rj(c) = ψ−1j (c). This implies that Uˆs(1) = 0.
Hence in any equilibrium Eˆ , the unique payoff equivalent feasible DRM is the seller-
optimal δ∗.
Proof. In order to show that for any equilibrium the payoff equivalent DRM is equal to
δ∗, I pursue a proof by contradiction. Hence, assume that there exists an equilibrium Eˆ
where the payoff equivalent direct mechanism δ¯ satisfies the results from Step 1, yet the
reservation value schedules r¯j(c) are different than r∗j (c) = ψ
−1
j (c). Then the expected
trade probability of the seller under δ¯ equals q¯s(c) = 1 −
n∏
j=1
Gj(r¯j(c)). Since Gj ’s are
strictly increasing, a different reservation value schedule yields a different expected trade
probability schedule and consequently expected payoff schedule; U¯s(c) is different than
U∗s (c). Note that it can not be the case that U¯s(c) ≥ U∗s (c) for all c, as otherwise by
Corollary I.1 it would have to be the case that U¯s(c) = U∗s (c) for all c. In light of this, since
δ¯ is not the seller-optimal DRM, then there exists some positive measure of seller types for
which U¯s(c) < U∗s (c).
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Because both U¯s(c) and U∗s (c) for all c are absolutely continuous and bounded payoff
schedules, the following maximum can be defined. Let c´ = argmaxc{U∗s (c) − U¯s(c)} and
∆ = U∗s (c´) − U¯s(c´). Observe that ∆ > 0 and c´ < 1. Then define two types 0 ≤ c < c¯ < 1
where U∗s (c) − U¯s(c) ≥ ∆2 for all c ∈ [c, c¯]. The existence of the interval follows from the
continuity of the two payoff schedules. Clearly c´ ∈ [c, c¯]. Also note that, by feasibility
(more specifically IR) of δ¯, the expected payoff for worst type seller satisfies U¯s(1) ≥ 0,
which in turn implies that c¯ < 1 since U∗s (1)− U¯s(1) = −U¯s(1) ≤ 0 < ∆2 .
Now for every j, define the reservation values r´j(c) =
r∗(c+ α) if c ≤ 1− α1 o/w where
α is a small positive constant and r∗j (c) = ψ
−1
j (c) for every c represents the optimal
reservation value schedules from δ∗. Noting that r∗j (c) is strictly increasing in c and
0 < r∗j (0) < r
∗
j (1) = 1, here by construction the adjusted reservation value schedule
r´j(c) is also strictly increasing over c ∈ [0, 1−α) and is flat at r´j(c) = 1 for all c ∈ [1−α, 1].
In order to describe the deviation mechanism, first consider the direct mechanism γ´
with allocation rule Q´ and transfer rule τ´ , where for any vector of type reports (c′,v′):
Q´j(c
′,v′) =

(1− ) + nv′j if ψj(v′j) > maxk 6=j ψk(v
′
k) and v
′
j > r´j(c)

nv
′
j o/w
τ´j(c
′,v′) = Q´j(c′,v′)v′j −
∫ v′j
0
Q´j(c
′, yj ,v−j)dyj
τ´s(c
′,v′) = Q´s(c′,v′)c′ +
∫ 1
c′
Q´s(x,v
′)dx
where  is a small positive constant and r´j(c) is the adjusted reservation value defined
above. Firstly by construction Q´j(c′,v′) ∈ [0, 1] and Qs(c′,v′) =
∑n
j=1Qj(c
′,v′) ≤ 1
for every possible vector (c′,v′) ∈ C × V. These suggest that Q´ satisfies RES. Secondly
given any vector of type reports, for all j the trade probability Q´j(c′,v′) is monotonic
(decreasing) in c′ and strictly monotonic (increasing) in v′j .
Now I want to construct the deviation mechanism for intermediary i using γ´. However,
I need to accommodate the general message space. Again taking advantage of the agents’
message mappings φ the same way as in Step 1, define the deviation mechanism γ˘i =
(Q˘i, τ˘ i) by taking the composition of the direct mechanism γ´ and message mapping φ. In
particular for any vector of messages (mis,m
i
b), the mechanism γ˘
i has outcome functions
defined as follows:
Q˘ij(m
i
s,m
i
b) = Q´j
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= Q´j(c
′,v′) ∀j
τ˘ ij(m
i
s,m
i
b) = τ´j
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= τ´j(c
′,v′) ∀j
τ˘ is(m
i
s,m
i
b) = τ´s
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= τ´s(c
′,v′)
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where φ(mis,m
i
b) = (c
′,v′) ∈ C ×V. In the remainder of the proof, I will show that for
particular choices of  and α, deviation to announcing mechanism γ˘i instead of γˆi yields
strictly positive expected profits for intermediary i. This yields a contradiction with the
initial assumption that Eˆ were an equilibrium of the intermediation game.
For the moment assume that some intermediary i unilaterally deviates and announces
γ˘i while the rest of the intermediaries continue announcing the assumed equilibrium
mechanisms γˆ−i. I will first examine the agents’ optimal communication strategies at the
subgame following entry to intermediary i when the profile of mechanisms is {γ˘i, γˆ−i}.
Start by looking at buyer j’s optimal communication strategy. I claim that for all j at
subgame j.i upon observing γ˘i, it is strictly dominant for the buyer to report his true type.
In other words, µˆij(vj , γ˘
i) = vj for all vj . To verify this claim I need to show that for every
vj the following (strict) inequality holds:
Uˇj(γ˘
i, γˆ−i, i,mis, vj ,m
i
−j |vj) > Uˇj(γ˘i, γˆ−i, i,mis,mij ,mi−j |vj) ∀mis,mij ,mi−j
Namely, the ex-post realized payoff of a vj type for buyer j must be strictly better than any
other payoff he gets by sending any other message no matter what message the seller and
other buyers send. Again denoting by (c′,v′) = φ(mis,mib), the ex-post realized payoff for
a vj type of buyer j whenever the vector of messages sent is equal to (mis,m
i
b):
Uˇj(γˇ
i,γˆ−i, i,mis,m
i
b|vj)
= Qˇij(m
i
s,m
i
b)vj − τˇ ij(mis,mib)
= Q´j(c
′,v′)(vj − v′j) +
∫ v′j
0
Q´j(c
′, yj ,v−j)dyj
=

(1− )(vj − κ(c′))+ nv′j(vj − v′j2 ) if ψj(v′j) > max{ψj(r´j(c′)),maxk 6=j {ψk(v′k)}}

nv
′
j
(
vj − v
′
j
2
)
o/w
In order to find the payoff maximizing message, look at the first order condition which
yields v′j = vj . Since the second derivative is equal to −/n < 0, the candidate optimum
is the unique maximizer. Hence for all buyers it is strictly dominant to report their type vj
truthfully. Equivalently put µˆij(vj , γˇ
i) = vj or every vj type buyer reports his type truthfully
no matter what his (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs βˆij
(
c,v−j , γ−i)|vj , γˇi
)
are.
Next consider the seller’s optimal communication strategy. The seller understands
that the buyers report their types truthfully by virtue of strict dominance. Then letting
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c′ = φs(mis), the expected trade probabilities q˘is(mis) for every c equals:
q˘is(m
i
s) = q´s(c
′) =
∫ 1
0
Q´s(c
′,v)dG(v)
= (1− )
[
1−
∫ r´1(c′)
0
. . .
∫ r´n(c′)
0
dG1(v1) . . . dGn(vn)
]
+

n
n∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
vjdGj(vj)
= (1− )
[
1−
n∏
j=1
Gj
(
r´j(c
′)
)]
+ 
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n
where E(vj) =
∫ 1
0 vjdGj(vj) ∈ (0, 1). Remember that for every j, the adjusted reservation
value schedule r´j(c) is strictly increasing for all c ∈ [0, 1−α) and is flat over the remaining
types [1 − α, 1]. Then it follows that q´s(c′) is strictly decreasing over the range c′ ∈ [1 −
α), while it is flat over the remaining range. Abusing notation, denote by U˘ is(m
i
s|c) the
expected payoff for the seller with cost c from reporting mis:
U˘ is(m
i
s|c) = Us(γ˘i, γˆ−i, i,mis, µˆib|c)
=
∫
v
[
τ˘ is(m
i
s,v)− Q˘is(mis,v)c
]
dG(v)
=
∫
v
[
Q´s(c
′,v)(c′ − c) +
∫ 1
c′
Q´s(x,v)dx
]
dG(v)
= q´s(c
′)(c′ − c) +
∫ 1
c′
q´s(x)dx
The first order condition from the expected payoff maximization problem a c type seller
faces yields that for c < 1− α reporting the unique maximizer is to report type truthfully.
To see why, observe that the second order condition at the only candidate optimum is
equal to dq´s(c
′)
dc′ |c′=c which is strictly negative when c ∈ [0, 1 − α). For any c ∈ [1 − α, 1],
on the other hand, it is optimal to report any message mis ∈M is \ [0, 1− α) which yields a
constant payoff of (1−c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n . In light of this, evaluated at the subgame equilibrium
communication strategies, the expected payoff to a c type seller is equal to:
U˘ is(c) =
(1− c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n + (1− )U∗s (c+ α) if c ≤ 1− α
(1− c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n o/w
where the equality follows from exploiting r´j(c) = r∗j (c + α) for c ≤ 1 − α and applying
integration by substitution as shown below:∫ 1−α
c
[
1−
n∏
j=1
Gj
(
r´j(x)
)]
dx =
∫ 1−α
c
[
1−
n∏
j=1
Gj
(
r∗j (x+ α)
)]
dx
=
∫ 1−α
c
q∗s(x+ α)dx =
∫ 1
c+α
q∗s(y)dy = U
∗
s (c+ α)
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For the moment assume that some c type seller where c < 1− α participates in γ˘i. Define
the expected profit i makes conditional on (attracting) such a c type, denoted by abusing
notation as U˘ i(c|0 ≤ c < 1− α):
U˘ i(c|0 ≤ c < 1− α)
=
∫
v
[ n∑
j=1
τ˘ ij
(
µˆis(c, γ˘
i, γˆ−i), µˆib(v, γ˘
i)
)− τ˘ is(µˆis(c, γ˘i, γˆ−i), µˆib(v, γ˘i))]dG(v)
=
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q´j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U˘ is(c)
=
∫
v
n∑
j=1
[
(1− )Q∗j (c+ α,v) + nvj
] [
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U˘ is(c)
= (1− )
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q∗j (c+ α,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U∗s (c+ α)

+ n
n∑
j=1
∫
v
vj
[
ψj(vj)− 1
]
dG(v)
= (1− )αq∗s(c+ α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strictly positive
−
∫
v
∑n
j=1 vj
[
1− ψj(vj)
]
n
dG(v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
where going from penultimate to the last line, I simplified the first component by substi-
tuting in the equality U∗s (c) =
∫
v
∑n
j=1Q
∗
j (c,v)[ψj(vj) − c]dG(v), which holds for all c as
it is a property of δ∗ as shown in the Proof of Proposition I.1. It is important to note that
for c < 1−α, it holds that r∗(c+α) < 1 and thus q∗s(c+α) > 0 guaranteeing that the first
term in the last line is strictly positive.
Alternatively, consider some seller with type c ∈ [1− α, 1] participating in γ˘i. Then for
any equilibrium message m˘is = µˆ
i
s(c, γ˘
i, γˆ−i) ∈ M is \ [0, 1 − α) she sends, the allocation
outcomes equal Q˘is(m˘
i
s, v) =

∑n
j=1 vj
n with probability 1. Hence the expected profit i
makes conditional on (attracting) such a c type seller is equal to:
U˘ i(c|1− α ≤ c ≤ 1)
=
∫
v
[ n∑
j=1
τ˘ ij
(
µˆis(c, γ˘
i, γˆ−i), µˆib(v, γ˘
i)
)− τ˘ is(µˆis(c, γ˘i, γˆ−i), µˆib(v, γ˘i))]dG(v)
=
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q´j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− c
]
dG(v)− U˘ is(c)
= − n
n∑
j=1
∫
v
vj
[
1− ψj(vj)
]
dG(v) ≥ −
Inequalities above imply that, the potential losses γ˘i makes from attracting any seller type
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are bounded below by −. Furthermore, depending on α and ’s values, the mechanism
might make expected profits by attracting seller with types c < 1− α.
Now consider the optimal entry decisions of the seller types. If the following inequali-
ties hold, then ηˆ(c, γ˘i, γˆ−i) = i for all c ∈ [c, c¯]:
U˘ is(c) = (1−)U∗s (c+α)+(1−c)
∑n
j=1 E(vj)
n > (1−)U∗s (c+α) ≥ U∗s (c)−∆2 ≥ U¯s(c) (A.2)
First (strict) inequality follows from  > 0, E(vj) > 0 for all j and c ≤ c¯ < 1. The last
inequality follows from the definition of the interval [c, c¯]. It only remains to describe the
conditions under which the middle (weak) inequality is satisfied. Note that it is immediate
to see that middle inequality requires α to be small enough, in particular, α < 1− c¯.
It is established that U∗s (c) is decreasing in c. Hence (1 − )U∗s (c + α) < U∗s (c + α) <
U∗s (c) for c ≤ c¯ < 1−α. Now consider the first derivative with respect to c of the following
difference:
d
dc
[
(1− )U∗s (c+ α)− U∗s (c)
]
= q∗s(c)− (1− )q∗s(c+ α) > 0 ∀c ∈ [c, c¯]
Hence the expected payoff difference between (1 − )U∗s (c + α) and U∗s (c) gets smaller
(closer to 0) as c gets larger. In other words, over the interval [c, c¯], the gap is largest in
magnitude at c. Then this means that the inequality on the left-hand side below guarantees
the desired (weak) inequality from above to be satisfied:
−∆2 ≤ (1− )U∗s (c+ α)− U∗s (c) ⇒ −∆2 ≤ (1− )U∗s (c+ α)− U∗s (c) ∀c ∈ [c, c¯]
Hence the following inequality needs to be satisfied:
∆
2 − [U∗s (c)− U∗s (c+ α)] ≥ U∗s (c+ α) (A.3)
In order to have a well defined inequality, the left-hand side in (A.3) must be strictly
positive. Then observe the following:
U∗s (c)− U∗s (c+ α) =
∫ c+α
c
q∗s(c)dc ≤ αq∗s(c)
Hence if the rightmost term above is at most ∆4 (any value strictly between (0,
∆
2 ) suffices),
then the left-hand side becomes strictly positive. Define α∗ as the following:
α∗ = min
{
1− c¯
2
,
∆
4q∗s(c)
}
Observe that by construction α∗ is strictly positive. Furthermore c¯ < 1 − α∗. Now from
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inequality (A.3), it follows that if  satisfies the following:
0 <  ≤
∆
2 −
[
U∗s (c)− U∗s (c+ α∗)
]
U∗s (c+ α∗)
then inequalities in (A.2) are satisfied. Hence, for all types c ∈ [c, c¯], it will be strictly
optimal to participate in γ˘i. Note that the entry strategy for c ∈ [0, 1] \ [c, c¯] were not
specified. Yet as shown below, attracting c ∈ [c, c¯] is enough to show the strict profitability
of the deviation mechanism γ˘i.
Consider the total expected profits U˘ i intermediary i makes from deviation, using the
previously declared notation U˘ i(c|0 ≤ c ≤ 1− α∗) and U˘ i(c|1− α∗ ≤ c ≤ 1) to denote the
expected profits conditional on attracting those corresponding types:
U˘ i =
∫ 1−α∗
0
U˘ i(c|c ≤ 1− α∗)I(ηˆ(c, γ˘i, γˆ−i) = i)dF (c)
+
∫ 1
1−α∗
U˘ i(c|1− α∗ ≤ c)I(ηˆ(c, γ˘i, γˆ−i) = i)dF (c)
≥ (1− )α∗
∫ 1−α∗
0
q∗s(c+ α
∗)I
(
ηˆ(c, γ˘i, γˆ−i) = i
)
dF (c)− 
≥ (1− )α∗[F (c¯)− F (c)]q∗s(c¯+ α∗)− 
The last line from above can be rearranged so that it provides an upper bound for . In
particular define  as follows:
∗ = min

∆
2 −
[
U∗s (c)− U∗s (c+ α∗)
]
2U∗s (c+ α∗)
,
α∗
[
F (c¯)− F (c)]q∗s(c¯+ α∗)
2
[
1 + α∗
[
F (c¯)− F (c)]q∗s(c¯+ α∗)]

By construction ∗ > 0. Also, the value of ∗ guarantees that inequality (A.3) is satisfied.
Furthermore, it is also true that given the values of α∗ and ∗, the expected profit from
deviation satisfies U˘ i > 0 which means it is profitable for i to deviate contradicting the
initial assumption of equilibrium.
This concludes Step 2. Hence I have shown that the unique payoff equivalent feasible
DRM is δ∗, which establishes the uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes in the intermediation
game with multiple intermediaries.
Proof of Proposition I.2. Consider the following direct mechanism γ˜i = (Q˜i, τ˜ i) for inter-
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mediary i where the agents’ messages are restricted to their type spaces:
Q˜ij(c
′,v′) = Q∗j (c
′,v′)
τ˜ ij(c
′,v′) = Q∗j (c
′,v′)v′j −
∫ v′j
0
Q∗j (c
′, yj ,v′−j)dyj
τ˜ is(c
′,v′) =
n∑
j=1
τ˜ ij(c
′,v′)
Define the general mechanism γˆi = (Qˆi, τˆ i) by taking the composition of the direct mech-
anism γ˜ with the message mappings φ as defined in A.1. In particular for any vector of
messages (mis,m
i
b), the mechanism γˆ
i has outcome functions defined as follows:
Qˆij(m
i
s,m
i
b) = Q˜
i
j
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= Q˜ij(c
′,v′) ∀j
τˆ ij(m
i
s,m
i
b) = τ˜
i
j
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= τ˜ ij(c
′,v′) ∀j
τˆ is(m
i
s,m
i
b) = τ˜
i
s
(
φ(mis,m
i
b)
)
= τ˜ is(c
′,v′)
where φ(mis,m
i
b) = (c
′,v′) ∈ C × V. Then the following assessment is an equilibrium.
Every intermediary i announces γˆi as defined above. The remaining strategies and beliefs
are defined as follows:
ηˆ(c,γ) =
1 if γ = γˆi∗ o/w ∀c
µˆis(c,γ) =
c if γi = γˆimˆis o/w ∀c, i
µˆij(vj , γ
i) =
vj if γi = γˆimˆij o/w ∀j, vj , i
βˆis(v|c,γ) = g(v) ∀c, i, γ
βˆij(c,v−j , γ
−i|vj , γi) =

I
(
ηˆ(c,γi,γˆ−i)=i
)
f(c)∫ 1
0 I
(
ηˆ(c,γi,γˆ−i)=i
)
dF (c)
g−j(v−j) if γ−i = γˆ−i and P(i|γi, γˆ−i) > 0
f(c)g−j(v−j) if γ−i = γˆ−i and P(i|γi, γˆ−i) = 0
0 if γ−i 6= γˆ−i
∀j, vj , γi, i
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where i∗ = min
i
{
i|i ∈ argmax
k∈I
{Us(γ, k, µˆks , µˆkb |c)}
} ∀c, γ
mˆij ∈ argmax
mij∈M ij
{
Uj(γ, i, µˆ
i
s,m
i
j , µˆ
i
−j |vj)
} ∀j, vj , i, γi 6= γˆi
mˆis ∈ argmax
mis∈M is
{
Us(γ, i,m
i
s, µˆ
i
b|c)
} ∀c, i, γi 6= γˆi
P(i|γi, γˆ−i) =
∫ 1
0
I
(
ηˆ(c, γi, γˆ−i) = i
)
dF (c)
I first verify the sequential rationality of the strategies for the agents given the described
beliefs. By construction of γˆi’s, it is weakly dominant for buyers to report types truthfully.
As Q∗ is an incentive compatible allocation, it is also optimal for the seller to report her
type truthfully whenever the buyers report truthfully. These verify the optimality of agents’
communication strategies when γi = γˆi. For the other cases, the strategy profiles prescribe
mˆis and mˆ
i
j ’s which satisfy rationality by definition.
Next consider the optimality of seller’s entry strategy ηˆ(c,γ). Start with the inter-
mediaries announcing the equilibrium profile of mechanisms γˆ . Given the truthful type
reporting at all subgames following entry to intermediary i, the expected payoff to the
seller satisfies Us(γˆ , i, µˆis, µˆ
i
b|c) = U∗s (c) for all c and i. Hence every type of the seller is in-
different between the intermediaries, and it is optimal for all types to choose intermediary
i = 1. Alternatively, when an out-of-equilibrium mechanism profile γ 6= γˆ is considered,
then equilibrium entry strategy prescribes choosing ηˆ(c,γ) = i∗. By construction of i∗, the
following is satisfied:
Us(γ, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb|c) = Us(γ, i∗, µˆi
∗
s , µˆ
i∗
b |c) = max
i∈I
{
Us(γ, i, µˆ
i
s, µˆ
i
b|c)
}
≥ Us(γ, i, µˆis, µˆib|c) ∀i
This establishes the optimality of entry strategies for all announced mechanism profiles,
as the inequality holds for all i, c, and γ . Lastly, I will show that for every intermediary i,
it is optimal to announce γˆi. In other words, for all i and every γi ∈ Γ, the equilibrium
expected profits satisfy the following inequality:
0 = Uˆ i = U i(γˆ, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb) ≥ U i(γi, γˆ−i, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb)
I prove that above inequality is satisfied by contradiction. Assume that there exists some
intermediary i, who unilaterally deviates and announces some γ´i 6= γˆi, which yields ex-
pected profits U i(γ´i, γˆ−i, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb) > 0. As γ´i yields strictly positive profits, it has to be
the case that
∫ 1
0 I(ηˆ(c, γ´
i, γˆ−i) = i
)
dF (c) > 0 or that some positive measure of seller types
choose i. On the other hand, despite the deviation by intermediary i, agents continue to
play the truthful type reporting equilibrium at all other subgames where some intermedi-
ary k other than i are chosen. Hence the expected payoffs seller types receive from those
subgames are Us(γ´i, γˆ−i, k, µˆks , µˆ
k
b |c) = U∗s (c) for all c and k 6= i. Then optimality of seller’s
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entry requires that any c type seller who chooses i’s deviation mechanism γ´i receives at
least U∗s (c) and all other types who choose k 6= i receive U∗s (c).
Consider the subgame following the deviation mechanism profile γ´ = (γ´i, γˆ−i). The
assumed strategies make up an equilibrium for this out-of-equilibrium subgame. Namely,
the entry strategies ηˆ(c, γ´) and the communication strategies µˆs(c, γ´) and µˆj(vj , γ´) for all
c and vj , along with the beliefs βˆs and βˆs make up an equilibrium. It is possible to invoke
the revelation principle argument for the equilibrium outcomes of this subgame. In other
words, by using the same indexation and composition arguments as in the equilibrium of
the overall game, it is possible to construct a feasible DRM δ¯ with a truthful type-telling
equilibrium that is payoff equivalent with the subgame equilibrium. As a result, the payoffs
in the truthful type-telling equilibrium of δ¯ satisfy:
U¯ i = U i(γ´i, γˆ−i, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb) ∀i
U¯s(c) = Us(γ´
i, γˆ−i, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb|c) ∀c
U¯j(vj) = Uj(γ´
i, γˆ−i, ηˆ, µˆs, µˆb|vj) ∀j, vj
The profitable deviation assumption implies that U¯ i > 0. It was established in the previous
points that U¯s(c) ≥ U∗s (c) for all c. However by Corollary I.1 it needs to be the case that
U¯ i = 0 which yields a contradiction. Hence no intermediary has a profitable deviation.
Lastly, consistency of the beliefs must be verified. Lemma A.1 from Appendix A.1.2
establishes that the beliefs βˆs defined above are the consistent beliefs for any equilibrium.
Below establishes consistency of the described beliefs for the buyers. Given the equilibrium
strategies ηˆ and γˆ consider a sequence of totally mixed strategies {ηh, γh}∞h=1 where ηh ∈
∆I and γi,h ∈ ∆Γ for each i, and lim
h→∞
(γ1,h, . . . , γm,h, ηh) = (γˆ1, . . . , γˆm, ηˆ). Let γh =
(γ1,h, . . . , γm,h) denote the shorthand for the sequences of totally mixed strategies for
all intermediaries. Similarly, for any i let γ−i,h = (γ1,h, . . . , γi−1,h, γi+1,h, . . . , γm,h) be the
shorthand notation for the sequences of totally mixed strategies of all intermediaries other
than i. Also let βhj (c,v−j , γ
−i|vj , i, γi) denote buyer j’s beliefs at information set (vj , i, γi)
when the totally mixed strategies (ηh, γh) are played. Lastly, let P(v, c, i,γ |ηh, γh) denote
the probability of the information node (v, c, i,γ) being reached under the totally mixed
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strategies (ηh, γh). Then the consistent beliefs are given by:
βˆij(c,v−j , γ
−i|vj , γi) = βˆj(c,v−j , γ−i|vj , i, γi)
= lim
h→∞
βhj (c,v−j , γ
−i|vj , i, γi)
= lim
h→∞
P(v, c, i,γ |ηh, γh)∫
v−j
∫
γ−i
∫
c P(v, c, i,γ |ηh, γh)dcdγ−idv−j
= g−j(v−j) lim
h→∞
P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)∫
γ−i
∫
c P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)dcdγ−i
Note that, from penultimate to the last line, the joint probability distribution of all other
buyers are taken out due to the independence of type distributions. Also, the probability
of γi,h = γi drops out, because no matter what probability the realized mechanism γi is
played with in the totally mixed strategy γi,h, buyer j observes γi and cancels out of the
limit as it appears both in the numerator and the denominator.
Consider the fraction that for which the limit will be taken:
P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)∫
γ−i
∫
c P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)dcdγ−i
=
f(c)P
(
ηh(c, γi, γ−i) = i
)
P
(
γ−i,h = γ−i
)
P
(
γ−i,h = γˆ−i
) ∫
c f(c)P
(
ηh(c, γi, γˆ−i) = i
)
dc
+
∫
γ−i 6=γˆ−i
∫
c f(c)P
(
ηh(c, γi, γ−i) = i
)
P
(
γ−i,h = γ−i
)
dcdγ−i
(A.4)
Now consider the totally mixed strategies to define the following probabilities:
P
(
ηh(c, γi, γ−i) = i
)
=
1− h if ηˆ(c, γi, γ−i) = ih
m−1 o/w
P(γi,h = γi) =
1− 2h if γi = γˆi2h
[2K]n+1
if γi 6= γˆi
Observe that, both totally mixed strategies uniformly randomize over the out-of-equilibrium
strategies within their respective strategy spaces. On the other hand, it is also important
to observe that γi,h converges to γˆi infinitely faster than ηh(c, γi, γ−i) converges to ηˆ.
Finally denote by P(i|γi, γˆ−i) = ∫ 10 f(c)I(ηˆ(c, γi, γˆ−i) = i)dc, the overall expected
probability of the intermediary i being chosen in the out-of-equilibrium subgame where
only i has deviated.
A closer look at expression in (A.4) suggests that for any mechanism γi, if P(i|γi, γˆ−i) >
0, then in the denominator as h gets larger the first term approaches P(i|γi, γˆ−i) (which is
strictly positive) while the second term approaches 0. Thus, limits can be taken. Evaluat-
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ing the limits in that case yields:
lim
h→∞
P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)∫
γ−i
∫
c P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)dcdγ−i
=

0 if γ−i 6= γˆ−i
f(c)I(ηˆ(c,γi,γˆ−i)=i)∫ 1
0 f(c)I
(
ηˆ(c,γi,γˆ−i)=i
)
dc
if γ−i = γˆ−i
In the other case where P(i|γi, γˆ−i) = 0, observe that the first term in the denominator
equals [1−2h]m−1 hm−1 . Then, carrying the h/(m−1) term to the numerator, the following
can be observed:
lim
h→∞
P
(
ηh(c, γi, γ−i) = i
)
P
(
γ−i,h = γ−i
)
h/(m− 1) =
 limh→∞[1− 
2h]m−1 = 1 if γ−i = γˆ−i
0 if γ−i 6= γˆ−i
The second case follows, because P
(
γ−i,h = γ−i
)
has at least one multiplicative term
equaling 
2h
[2K]n+1
. This means that, even after the simplifying cancellations, h remains,
which in turn brings the limit to 0. Then, in the case where P(i|γi, γˆ−i) = 0, the limits of
the fraction are equal to:
lim
h→∞
P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)∫
γ−i
∫
c P(c, i,γ−i|ηh, γh)dcdγ−i
=

0 if γ−i 6= γˆ−i
f(c)I(ηˆ(c,γi,γˆ−i)=i)∫ 1
0 f(c)I
(
ηˆ(c,γi,γˆ−i)=i
)
dc
if γ−i = γˆ−i
Combining these limits under the different cases with g−j(v−j) yields the consistent be-
liefs, which are equivalent to the description of the equilibrium assessment.
Proof of Proposition I.3. Under a single monopolist intermediary, a feasible DRM δ satisfy-
ing BB implies that intermediary’s expected payoff is equal to R(δ). Thus it is unnecessary
to define transfers to the intermediary. Then the monopolist intermediary’s problem can
be described as follows:
P3→ max
{Q¯,τ¯s,τ¯ b}
{
U¯
}
IR : U¯s(c), U¯j(vj), U¯ ≥ 0 ∀c, ∀j and vj
IC : U¯s(c) ≥ U¯s(c′|c), and U¯j(vj) ≥ U¯j(v′j |vj) ∀c, c′, ∀j and vj , v′j
RES : 0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
∑n
j=1 Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
BB : U¯ =
∑n
j=1
[∫ 1
0 t¯j(vj)dGj(vj)
]
− ∫ 10 t¯s(c)dF (c)
Using the necessary conditions of a feasible DRM from Remark I.1, the objective function
becomes:
U¯ =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c)−
n∑
j=1
U¯j(0)− U¯s(1)
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Observe that at the solution, UMj (0) = U
M
s (1) = 0 optimally, as otherwise decreasing ei-
ther would strictly improve the objective function’s value without violating the constraints.
Note that these are in line with Proposition I.3. Then, plugging these into P3 yields the
following simplified problem P3′:
P3′ → max
Q¯

∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c)

subject to
dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c) ≥ 0
Ignoring the monotonicity and intermediary’s IR constraints momentarily, the linearity of
the objective function in the choice variable suggests that in light of RES constraints the
pointwise maximizer is a simple step function given by:
QMj (c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj) ≥ max
{
ψs(c),max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk)}
}
0 o/w
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
This is precisely the same allocation function as in (I.4). Lastly, I check that the pointwise
maximizer QM satisfies the simplified conditions. RES is satisfied because for any given
vector of type reports (c,v), at most one QMj (c,v) equals 1 and so is Q
M
s (c,v). Also
observe that ψs(c) is strictly increasing in c and ψj(vj)’s are strictly increasing in vj ’s.
Thus for any reported vector of types, for each j the trade probabilities QMj (c,v) are
weakly increasing in vj and weakly decreasing in c. Each trade probability being weakly
decreasing in c suggests that QMs (c,v) is also weakly decreasing in c as it is equal to the
sum of QMj ’s across all j. Hence the monotonicity constraints are also satisfied. Finally,
consider the intermediary’s IR constraint. For all c < 1 there exists a positive measure of
buyer types with ψj(vj) > ψs(c). As the allocation rule QM implements trade only when
the highest virtual valuation is above the virtual cost, the expected profits are strictly
positive, satisfying intermediary’s IR.
Proof of Corollary I.2. Q∗j (c,v) ≥ QMj (c,v) for all (c,v), because r∗j (c) ≤ rMj (c) for all j
and c. However c ≤ r∗j (c) ≤ rMj (c) for all c. This implies that the total surplus under δ∗
is higher as it implements more efficient trade. Observe that the inequality from the trade
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probabilities imply the Pareto dominance relationship for the agents. Consider buyer j’s
expected payoffs:
U∗j (vj) =
∫ vj
0
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
Q∗j (c, yj ,v−j)dG−j(v−j)dF (c)dyj
≥
∫ vj
0
∫ 1
0
∫
v−j
QMj (c, yj ,v−j)dG−j(v−j)dF (c)dyj = U
M
j (vj)
Similarly U∗s (c) ≥ UMs (c) for all c. Finally, expected profit to the monopolist intermediary
is strictly positive as shown in Proposition I.3.
Proof of Proposition I.4. I closely follow the Proof of Theorem 2 from Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983). The constrained efficient DRM solves the following program:
P4→ max
{Q¯,τ¯ }

∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
(
vj − c
)
dG(v)dF (c)

subject to
IR : U¯s(c), U¯j(vj), U¯ ≥ 0 ∀c, ∀j and vj
IC : U¯s(c) ≥ U¯s(c′|c), and U¯j(vj) ≥ U¯j(v′j |vj) ∀c, c′, ∀j and vj , v′j
RES : 0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
∑n
j=1 Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
BB : U¯ =
∑n
j=1
[∫ 1
0 t¯j(vj)dGj(vj)
]
− ∫ 10 t¯s(c)dF (c)
From Remark I.1, a feasible DRM δ has to satisfy the following necessary conditions:
U¯s(1) ≥ 0, U¯s(c) = U¯s(1) +
∫ 1
c
q¯s(x)dx,
dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
U¯j(0) ≥ 0, U¯j(vj) = U¯j(0) +
∫ vj
0
q¯j(yj)dyj ,
dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
0 =
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c)−
n∑
j=1
U¯j(0)− U¯s(1)−
∑
i∈I
U¯ i
Firstly, observe that U i,E = UEs (1) = U
E
j (0) = 0 optimally for all i and j. To see why, as-
sume that UEj (0) > 0 for some j. Then the objective function’s value can be increased by
decreasing the worst type buyer’s constant payoff and simultaneously increasing the trade
probability for (c,v) where maxj{vj} > c just enough to maintain the BB. The existence of
such (c,v) pairs are guaranteed due to the fact that ex-post efficiency is not achieved. Sim-
ilar arguments hold for U i,E and UEs (1). Plugging into P4 yields the simplified problem
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P4′:
P4′ → max
Q¯

∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
vj − c
]
dG(v)dF (c)

subject to
dq¯s(c)
dc
≤ 0 ∀c
dq¯j(vj)
dvj
≥ 0 ∀j and vj
0 ≤ Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1, and Q¯s(c,v) =
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v) ≤ 1 ∀c,v
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj(vj)− ψs(c)
]
dG(v)dF (c) = 0
Observe that the unconstrained pointwise maximizer of the objective function in P4′ is
the ex-post efficient allocation. However, the ex-post efficient allocation does not solve
P4′ as it leads the BB to be violated, i.e. the left-hand side of the last constraint is strictly
negative as opposed to 0.1 Ignoring the monotonicity constraints for the moment and
denoting the Lagrange multiplier for the BB constraint by λ, the Lagrangian for the above
problem can be written as the following:
L
(
Q¯;λ
)
=
∫ 1
0
∫
v
∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[(
v − c)+ λ[ψj(vj)− ψs(c)]]dG(v)dF (c)
= (1 + λ)
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q¯j(c,v)
[
ψj
(
v, λ1+λ
)− ψs(c, λ1+λ)]dG(v)dF (c)
The linearity of the Lagrangian function in the choice variable suggests that in light of RES
constraints the pointwise maximizer is a simple step function given by:
QEj (c,v) =

1 if ψj(vj , α) ≥ max
{
ψs(c, α),max
k 6=j
{ψk(vk, α)}
}
0 o/w
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
where α = λ1+λ ∈ (0, 1). This is precisely the same allocation function as (I.5) from
Proposition I.4. Lastly, I check that the pointwise maximizer QE satisfies the conditions.
RES is satisfied because for any given vector of type reports (c,v), at most one QEj (c,v)
equals 1. Also observe that for any reported vector of types the trade probability QEj (c,v)
is weakly increasing in vj and weakly decreasing in c for every j. Each trade probability
being weakly decreasing in c suggests that QEs (c,v) is also weakly decreasing in c as it is
equal to the sum ofQEj ’s across all j. Hence the monotonicity constraints are also satisfied.
1See for example Krishna and Perry (1998) for a proof of the VCG mechanism running an
expected loss, and hence violating BB.
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Finally, the BB constraint is satisfied as the Lagrange multiplier satisfies λ > 0.
Proof of Corollary I.3. The ex-ante expected surplus under social planner is higher as δE
solves the maximization of the surplus subject to feasibility constraints. Similarly, δ∗ solves
the maximization of seller’s ex-ante expected payoffs and hence they are higher. As the
intermediaries receive zero expected profits, the following result attains:∫ 1
0
U∗s (c)dF (c) >
∫ 1
0
UEs (c)dF (c)∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
Q∗j (c,v)
[
vj − c
]
dG(v)dF (c) <
∫ 1
0
∫
v
n∑
j=1
QEj (c,v)
[
vj − c
]
dG(v)dF (c)
⇒
n∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
U∗j (vj)dGj(vj) <
n∑
j=1
∫ 1
0
UEj (vj)dGj(vj)
The last inequality follows from the BB, where sum ex-ante expected of all buyers is equal
to the surplus minus the seller’s ex-ante expected payoff.
Proof of Corollary I.4. Consider the seller’s interim expected payoff schedules U∗s (c) and
UEs (c) for all c from equilibrium outcomes of the intermediation game with competing in-
termediaries and social planner’s surplus maximization, respectively. Firstly it has been es-
tablished that both schedules are absolutely continuous and convex decreasing functions.
Secondly U∗s (c) is strictly decreasing throughout the whole domain while UEs (c) is strictly
decreasing for all c ∈ [0, c¯E). Thirdly, for costs slightly below c = 1, U∗s (c) > UEs (c). Finally,
for costs slightly above c = 0, the derivatives satisfy ddcU
E
s (c) = −
[
1 − [G(rE(c))]n] <
−
[
1 − [G(r∗(c))]n] = ddcU∗s (c) as r∗(c) > rE(c), which implies that UEs (c) decreases at a
faster rate than U∗s (c).
The aim is to evaluate whether U∗s (c) ≥ UEs (c) for all c. Pareto relationship is violated
if and only if there exists an interior type c′ ∈ (0, 1) such that U∗s (c′) = UEs (c′) and for all
c < c′, the payoff schedules satisfy UEs (c) > U∗s (c). All of the previous points combined
imply that the Pareto relationship inequalities for all types hold if and only if there is
no interior type c′ such that U∗s (c′) = UEs (c′). Given the convexity and continuity, the
continuum of inequalities hold if and only if the inequality at the end point c = 0, i.e.
U∗s (0) ≥ UEs (0), is satisfied. Plugging in for the interim expected payoffs from Remark I.1
yields the desired condition as stated in (I.6).
As the reservation values are increasing functions, it is possible define their inverses,
which are denoted by h∗(vj) and hE(vj) and are the unique solutions to:
h∗(vj) = max{ψb(vj), 0}, ψs(hE(vj), α) = max{ψb(vj , α), 0} for all vj
Hence the functions h∗(vj) and hE(vj) represent the maximum cost type for which the
reservation value equals the valuation vj . Then pursuing an analogous argument re-
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garding the convexity and continuity of buyer j’s interim expected payoffs yields that
UEj (vj) ≥ U∗j (vj) for all vj if and only if the inequality at the endpoint vj = 1 is satisfied.
Again, plugging in for the interim expected payoffs from Remark I.1, the condition stated
in (I.7) is attained.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter II
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma II.1. Given an equilibrium, the beliefs on the equilibrium path satisfying
pi∗L(m
∗
ts) = pi
∗
H(m
∗
ts) for both ts follows from the Bayes’ rule. To see why the beliefs are
the same for any m ∈ [0, H +λH ] \ {m∗l ,m∗h}, let mkts consider a sequence of totally mixed
strategies that converge to m∗ts . Then, consistency requires the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
to satisfy pi∗tb(m) = limk→∞
piktb(m) where pi
k
tb
(m) is are equal to;
piktb(m) =
P
(
mkl = m
)
qP(tb)
P
(
mkl = m
)
qP(tb) + P
(
mkh = m
)
(1− q)P(tb)
=
P
(
mkl = m
)
q
P
(
mkl = m
)
q + P
(
mkh = m
)
(1− q)
Hence for both types of the buyer, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs pi∗tb(m) are equal to the
limits of the same sequence of beliefs.
Proof of Corollary II.1. Given an equilibrium, consider some price announcement m ∈
[0, H + λH ] where d∗L(m) = A. By sequential rationality, low type buyer accepts only
when m ≤ L + (1 − pi∗(m))λL. Observe that L + (1 − pi∗(m))λL < H + (1 − pi∗(m))λH
for any belief pi∗(m). Since the high type buyer holds the same beliefs, then it follows that
d∗H(m) = A, as well.
Proof of Lemma II.2. Consider any equilibrium {(m∗l ,m∗h), (d∗L, d∗H), pi∗}. Then, I will show
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that the assessment {(m∗l ,m∗h), (d˜L, d˜H), p˜i}, where
p˜i(m) =
pi∗(m) if m ∈ {m∗l ,m∗h}1 o/w d˜tb(m) =

d∗tb(m
∗
ts) if m ∈ {m∗l ,m∗h}
A if m ≤ tb
R if m > tb
is a payoff equivalent equilibrium. Firstly, the payoff equivalence follows from construc-
tion as the equilibrium-path beliefs and strategies for both buyer types are the same as
in the original equilibrium. Hence, it only remains to be checked that the new profile is
indeed a sequential equilibrium.
The optimality of d∗tb along with the equality between the equilibrium path beliefs, i.e.
p˜i(m∗ts) = pi
∗(m∗ts), suggests that d˜tb(m
∗
ts) is also optimal. Following any price announce-
ment m′ 6= m∗ts , sequential rationality requires buyer’s strategies to satisfy:
d˜tb(m
′) =

A if m′ < tb +
(
1− p˜i(m′))λtb
R if m′ > tb +
(
1− p˜i(m′))λtb
{A,R} if m′ = tb +
(
1− p˜i(m′))λtb
Since the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are p˜i(m′) = 1, then d˜tb(m) is indeed optimal for both
types.
Next, consider the strategies for the seller types. The sequential rationality requires
that for each seller type, the equilibrium expected payoffs satisfy Uts(m
∗
ts) ≥ Uts(m′) =
(m′ − ts)Q˜(m′) for all m′ 6= m∗ts where Q˜(m′) denotes the expected trade probabilities for
deviation prices in the conjectured equilibrium. Given the original profile is an equilib-
rium, it is true that Uts(m
∗
ts) ≥ (m′ − ts)Q∗(m′) for all m′ 6= m∗ts where Q∗(m′) is the cor-
responding expected trade probability for deviation prices. Thus, if it holds that Q∗(m′) ≥
Q˜(m′) for any m′, then sequential rationality would be satisfied. If pi∗(m′) < p˜i(m′) = 1,
then whenever d˜tb(m
′) = A, it is also the case that d∗tb(m
′) = A or that Q˜(m′) ≤ Q∗(m′) as
desired. If pi∗(m′) = p˜i(m′) = 1, then for any m′ > tb it holds that d∗tb(m
′) = d˜tb(m
′) = R,
while for any m′ < tb it holds that d∗tb(m
′) = d˜tb(m
′) = A. Altogether they imply that
Q˜(m′) = Q∗(m′) as required.
The only case left to consider is if m′ = tb with pi∗(tb) = p˜i(tb) = 1 and the original
equilibrium has type tb buyer breaking her tie in favor of rejection, d∗tb(tb) = R whereas
d˜tb(tb) = A. It needs to be shown that sequential rationality condition is still satisfied,
i.e. Uts(m
∗
ts) ≥ Uts(m′) = (m′ − ts)Q˜(m′) = (tb − ts)Q˜(tb). To pursue a contradiction,
assume Uts(m
∗
ts) < (tb − ts)Q˜(tb). Then for m′′ < tb, it holds that Q˜(m′′) ≤ Q∗(m′′),
since d∗tb(m
′′) = A as it was shown above. However by continuity, for m′′ close enough
to tb, it holds that Uts(m
∗
ts) < (m
′′ − ts)Q˜(m′′) ≤ (m′′ − ts)Q∗(m′′) which contradicts the
original equilibrium condition for m∗ts . Thus, it has to be the case that the original equi-
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librium strategies m∗ts for both ts also satisfy sequential rationality under the conjectured
equilibrium.
Finally to see why the beliefs p˜i(m) are consistent, consider the following convergent
sequence of mixed strategies {mkts}∞k=0, where for each seller type ts, prices m 6= m∗ts
are announced uniformly with probability
kts
H+λH
for some ts ∈ (0, 1) and m = m∗ts is
announced with probability 1 − kts . By construction limk→∞m
k
ts = m
∗
ts . Then, there exists a
sequence of beliefs {pik(m)} generated by (mkl ,mkh) where:
pik(m) =

kl p
kl p+P(m
k
h=m)(H+λH)(1−p)
if m 6= m∗l
(1−kl )p
(1−kl )p+P(mkh=m)(1−p)
if m = m∗l
Letting l =  while h = 2 for  ∈ (0, 1), it is straight forward to see that the limits satisy
p˜i(m) = lim
k→∞
pik(m) =
1 if m 6= {m∗l ,m∗h}pi∗(m∗ts) if m = m∗ts .
Proof of Proposition II.1. In a pooling equilibrium, the equilibrium price mP induces the
buyer types to have beliefs piP (mP ) = p, which yields the prior expected value E(v|tb) of
each buyer type as their maximum willingness to pay for the object, respectively. At the
same time, mP has to be larger or equal to h, as otherwise it would not be optimal for the
high cost seller to announce mP . However, as E(v|L) < h, there is no pooling equilibrium
in which low type buyer trades, i.e. dPL (m
P ) = R. On the other hand, there is trade with
the high type buyer or dPH(m
P ) = A, because otherwise both seller types would receive 0
expected payoffs and the low type seller could always deviate to m′ = L/2 > 0 and trade
with both buyer types for any belief. Sequential rationality for the high type buyer to trade
implies that mP ≤ E(v|H).
In light of Lemma II.2, given any deviation pricem′ 6= mP , the buyer believes piP (m′) =
1 and plays the optimal strategy dPtb(m
′) =
A if m′ ≤ tbR o/w . Then, the sequential rational-
ity constraints for the seller types are given by:
Uts(m
P ) ≥ Uts(m′) = (m′ − ts)Q(m′) =

(m′ − ts) if 0 ≤ m′ ≤ L
(m′ − ts)(1− q) if L < m′ ≤ H
0 if H < m′ ≤ H + λH
These inequalities suggest that mP ≥ max{ L1−q , h,H}. Along with the condition mP ≤
E(v|H), the range of pooling equilibrium prices emerges, which is nonempty if and only if
q ≤ E(v|H)−LE(v|H) = qP as provided in condition (II.1).
Proof of Lemma II.3. Consider a separating equilibrium where m∗l 6= m∗h. Then, sequential
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rationality for the seller types require that:
Ul(m
∗
l ) = m
∗
lQ(m
∗
l ) ≥ Ul(m∗h) = m∗hQ(m∗h)
Uh(m
∗
h) = (m
∗
h − h)Q(m∗h) ≥ Uh(m∗l ) = (m∗l − h)Q(m∗l )
 Q(m∗l ) ≥ Q(m∗h)
If Q(m∗l ) = Q(m
∗
h), then the sequential rationality constraints imply that m
∗
l = m
∗
h,
contradicting the separating equilibrium assumption. Hence, it has to be the case that
Q(m∗l ) > Q(m
∗
h) in any separating equilibrium.
To see why the second part of the lemma, i.e. m∗l < m
∗
h, holds assume that m
∗
l ≥ m∗h.
Then, as the beliefs satisfy pi∗(m∗l ) = 1 and pi
∗(m∗h) = 0, it would follow that Q(m
∗
h) ≥
Q(m∗l ) contradicting the first part.
Proof of Proposition II.2. In an efficient separating equilibrium, it holds that dS
e
L (m
Se
l ) =
dS
e
H (m
Se
l ) = A, which suggests m
Se ≤ L by sequential rationality of buyer’s decision under
the separating equilibrium beliefs piS
e
(mS
e
l ) = 1. On the other hand, it is also true that
dS
e
L (m
Se
h ) = R, while d
Se
H (m
Se
h ) = A, which requires that L+λL ≤ mS
e
h ≤ H+λH . Observe
that high type seller would be willing to sell the object for at least h. As h > L + λL,
the high cost seller’s equilibrium price range can be revised as h ≤ mSeh ≤ H + λH .
In light of these observations, the equilibrium expected payoffs for the seller types are
Ul(m
Se
l ) = m
Se
l and Uh(m
Se
h ) = (m
Se
h − h)(1− q).
In light of Lemma II.2, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs at any deviation price m′ 6= mSets
for either seller type satisfies piS
e
(m′) = 1 and buyer plays dSetb (m
′) =
A if m′ ≤ tbR o/w .
Then the sequential rationality constraints for the seller types are given by:
Uts(m
Se
ts ) ≥ Uts(m′) = (m′ − ts)Q(m′) =

(m′ − ts) if 0 ≤ m′ ≤ L
(m′ − ts)(1− q) if L < m′ ≤ H
0 if H < m′ ≤ H + λH
For the low type seller, the inequalities require that mS
e
l ≥ L. Combined the with earlier
constraint, the low type seller’s equilibrium price is sandwiched at mS
e
l = L. In turn,
plugging in the equilibrium price for the low seller type yields the inequality that L ≥
H(1− q). For the high type seller, the inequalities require that mSeh ≥ H.
Lastly, the equilibrium prices also have to satisfy sequential rationality against each
other, i.e. incentive compatibility constraints. Evaluated at mS
e
l = L, constraints re-
quire mS
e
h ≤ L1−q . Combining all these constraints suggests that, in an efficient separat-
ing equilibrium the high type seller announces a price satisfying max{h,H} ≤ mSeh ≤
min{ L1−q , H + λH}.
The valuationH+λH is assumed to be larger than h by assumption [A1]. Similarly, the
valuation is larger than H as λH ≥ 0. Hence, the range of prices are nonempty whenever
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L
1−q ≥ max{h,H}. Rearranging the terms yields the condition provided in (II.2).
Proof of Proposition II.3. Inefficient separating equilibria are characterized as those, where
only the low cost seller trades while the high cost seller does not trade. In other words,
there exists prices mS
i
l < m
Si
h such that d
Si
tb
(mS
i
h ) = R for both tb, while d
Si
tb
(mS
i
l ) = A for
either H type or for both L and H type buyers.
First, I prove that such equilibria exist if and only h ≥ H. To see the necessity, prove
the contrapositive, i.e. if H > h then there is no Si. In order to pursue a contradiction,
assume there exists an inefficient separating equilibrium under the condition. As the high
cost seller does not trade, his equilibrium expected payoff is Uh(mS
i
h ) = 0. However, if he
deviates and announces m′ = H+h2 ∈ (h,H), then the high type buyer accepts m′ for any
belief she has, i.e. dS
i
H (m
′) = A. Because m′ > h, the deviation yields an expected payoff
of Uh(m′) = (m′ − h)(1− q) > 0, yielding the contradiction.
For the sufficiency part, consider the following equilibrium. By Lemma II.2, the equilib-
rium beliefs satisfy piS
i
(mS
i
h ) = 0 and pi
Si(m) = 1 for all m 6= mSih . Sequential rationality
of the buyer’s decision requires that mS
i
h = H + λH , as otherwise the high type buyer
would optimally play dS
i
H (m
Si
h ) = A. For the low cost seller, the optimal price announce-
ments are easy to evaluate, as he only needs to decide whether to engage in trade with
only the high type buyer, or both types of buyer. Noting that dS
i
L (m) =
A if m ≤ LR o/w ,
announcing m ≤ L yields the low cost seller Ul(m) = (m − l) = m, while announcing
m ∈ (L,H] yields Ul(m) = (m− l)(1− q) = m(1− q). A simple comparison suggests that
announcing mS
i
l = L is optimal whenever L ≥ H(1− q), or equivalently stated whenever
q ≥ H−LH ≡ qS
i
as in (II.3).
Proof of Corollary II.2. It is clear that whenever Se exists, it is the most efficient equilib-
rium as it achieves first best efficiency. Hence characterization in the case where H > h
follows immediately. In the other case where H ≤ h, for the range where there is no
efficient separating equilibrium, i.e. q ≤ qSe = max{h−Lh , H−LH } = h−Lh , efficiency of the
pooling equilibrium and the inefficient separating equilibrium need to be compared. If
q ≤ H−LH , then in the inefficient separating equilibrium Si, there is trade only between
low cost seller and high type buyer. This is strictly less efficient than the pooling equilib-
rium outcomes where high type buyer trades with both seller types, leading to an expected
surplus improvement of (1− p)(1− q)(H + λH − h) > 0.
Assuming that H−LH ≤ q ≤ h−Lh , there are two equilibria; P which generates expected
surplus of (1−p)(1−q)(H+λH−h)+p(1−q)H versus Si where mSil = L, which generates
expected surplus of pqL+ p(1− q)H. A comparison yields that the pooling equilibrium is
more efficient than inefficient separating equilibrium whenever:
q ≤ (1− p)(H + λH − h)
(1− p)(H + λH − h) + pL
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It is not for certain whether the threshold above is less than h−Lh . Whenever threshold
is below h−Lh , then S
i is more efficient for q in the intermediate range and below the
threshold the pooling equilibrium is more efficient. Otherwise, there is no range for which
Si is the most efficient and thus P is the most efficient for all q ≤ h−Lh . This is summarized
via min operator in the statement of Corollary II.2.
Proof of Corollary II.3. It has been established in Proposition II.1 that there are a contin-
uum of pooling equilibria P varying in the equilibrium price mP whenever they exist; i.e.
q ≤ qP . Because the aim is to characterize equilibria with the highest expected payoff for
the seller, consider the pooling equilibrium with the highest price or mP = E(v|H) with
the payoffs UPts = [E(v|H) − ts](1 − q). On the other hand, the characterization of the
efficient separating equilibria in Proposition II.2 suggests that the expected payoff for the
low type seller is US
e
l = L while for the high type is U
Se
h = [min{ L1−q , H +λH}−h](1− q).
Similarly, Proposition II.3 characterizes that in the inefficient separating equilibria, the
seller’s expected payoffs are US
i
l = max{L,H(1 − q)} and USih = 0. A simple compari-
son yields that the payoffs for both seller types are greatest under P whenever q ≤ qP ,
and otherwise under Se. Note that when comparing the payoffs from P with Se in the
cases where P exists, the efficient separating equilibrium payoff for the high type equals
US
e
h = L − h(1 − q), which is less than UPh . This, in turn allows a clear ranking between
payoffs for both seller types. Namely the expected payoff to the high type seller in Se
equals (H + λH − h)(1 − q), which is larger than UPh only when q ≥ H+λH−LH+λH > qP or
equivalently only when P does not exist.
Proof of Lemma II.4. Given any equilibrium, consider the type ts seller’s beliefs at sub-
games e ∈ {i, o}:
pˆiets(M
i) =
P(tb = L)P(ts)P(Mi)P(ets(Mi) = e)
P(tb = L)P(ts)P(Mi)P(ets(Mi) = e) + P(tb = H)P(ts)P(Mi)P(ets(Mi) = e)
On the equilibrium path, where information set Mˆi and eˆts(Mˆ
i) is reached with positive
probability, it is immediate to see that the beliefs for both seller types are equal to q.
For any out-of-equilibrium information set, on the other hand, the beliefs are defined as
the limits of the sequence of beliefs generated by a sequence of totally mixed strategies
converging to the equilibrium strategies. Then, for any such sequence of totally mixed
strategies {Mi,k}∞k=1 and {ekts(Mi)}∞k=1, Bayes’ rule yields the sequence of beliefs with the
following elements:
pie,kts (M
i) = pik(L|ts, e,Mi)
=
qP(ts)P(Mi,k = Mi)P(ekts(M
i) = e)
qP(ts)P(Mi,k = Mi)P(ekts(M
i) = e)
+ (1− q)P(ts)P(Mi,k = Mi)P(ekts(Mi) = e)
= q
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Hence, pˆiets(M
i) = lim
k→∞
pie,kts (M
i) = q for both types ts, all Mi and e.
Next consider the buyer’s beliefs at subgame e = i where menu Mi is announced and
choice ci is made:
pˆiitb(M
i, ci) =
P(ts = l)P(el(Mi) = i)P(cil(Mi) = ci)P(tb)P(Mi)[
P(ts = l)P(el(Mi) = i)P(cil(Mi) = ci)
+ P(ts = h)P(eh(Mi) = i)P(cih(Mi) = ci)
]
P(tb)P(Mi)
By grouping the same terms in the denominator, it can be seen that the probability of
buyer’s type gets eliminated out of the beliefs. This follows from the fact that the types
are independently distributed. Interestingly, the probability of the intermediary’s menu
choice also gets eliminated, although the specific choice of menu still appears in the beliefs
through seller’s entry and price pair decisions. It will be convenient to define the consis-
tent beliefs for future reference. Consider sequence of strategies {Mi,k}∞k=1, {ekts(Mi)}∞k=1
and {ci,kts (Mi)}∞k=1 converging to their respective equilibrium strategies. Then the beliefs
generated are:
pˆiitb(M
i, ci) = lim
k→∞
pii,ktb (M
i, ci)
= lim
k→∞
pP(ekl (Mi) = i)P(c
i,k
l (M
i) = ci)
pP(ekl (Mi) = i)P(c
i,k
l (M
i) = ci)
+ (1− p)P(ekh(Mi) = i)P(ci,kh (Mi) = ci)
(B.1)
= pˆii(Mi, ci)
Finally consider buyer’s beliefs at subgame e = o, where she observes price announcement
mo from the seller. Just as in the other subgame, due to the independence of the types,
probability of buyer’s type can be factored out in the denominator and hence is eliminated
out of her beliefs. Again, a description of the consistent beliefs are provided for future
reference. Consider sequence of strategies {Mi,k}∞k=1, {ekts(Mi)}∞k=1 and {mo,kts (Mi)}∞k=1
converging to their respective equilibrium strategies. Then the beliefs generated are:
pˆiotb(m
o) = lim
k→∞
pio,ktb (m
o)
= lim
k→∞
p
∫
Mi P(e
k
l (M
i) = o)P(mo,kl (M
i) = mo)P(Mi,k = Mi)dMi∑
ts∈{l,h}
[
P(ts)
∫
Mi P(e
k
ts(M
i) = o)P(mo,kts (M
i) = mo)
P(Mi,k = Mi)dMi
] (B.2)
= pˆio(mo)
Proof of Lemma II.5. Consider an equilibrium. Then in the subgame following e = o,
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both of the buyer’s types have the same beliefs pˆio(mo) which are constant for any menu
announcement Mi. Hence, each buyer type’s optimal decision strategy dˆotb(m
o) is the
same across all menus Mi. This implies, due to sequential rationality, that each seller type
announces mˆots(M
i) which maximizes Uots(M
i,mo) over allmo ∈ [0, H+λH ]. Then, for two
different menu announcements Mi and M´i, it has to be the case that Uots(M
i, mˆots(M
i)) =
Uots(M´
i, mˆots(M´
i)), as otherwise it would be optimal to announce the TIOLI offer that
yields the strictly higher expected payoff in the subgame e = o following either menu
announcements. This equality also extends to the case where the intermediary announces
the equilibrium path menu Mˆi, which is the first statement in the first part of Lemma II.5.
In order to understand the lower bounds on Uˆots , assume that the beliefs of the buyer
in subgame e = o are equal to pio(mo) = 1 for all mo. These are the worst possible
beliefs for the seller in terms of his prospects of securing high expected payoffs in the
subgame, simply because it lowers the maximum TIOLI offer that the buyer types would
be willing to accept. Under these beliefs, it is optimal for the buyer of type tb to accept
any offer mo ≤ tb.1 Then, each seller type could always guarantee securing a minimum
payoff of max{(L − ts), (H − ts)(1 − q), 0}, where 0 is received by announcing an offer
of mo > H, which the buyer optimally rejects. This implies that, for the low type seller
Uˆol ≥ max{L,H(1 − q)} due to the two terms in the max operator being strictly greater
than 0. For the high type, however, Uˆoh ≥ max{(H − h)(1 − q), 0} where the first term
drops out since L < h.
The second part also follows from sequential rationality of seller’s equilibrium strate-
gies. In any equilibrium, Uˆts has to equal Uˆ
o
ts if eˆts(Mˆ
i) = o. If, on the other hand,
equilibrium entry strategy is to choose eˆts(Mˆ
i) = i, then Uˆts = Uˆ
i
ts , which has to be larger
or equal to Uˆots due to the optimality of the entry decision. Similarly, each seller type
might mimic the other type’s equilibrium strategies. Sequential rationality requires that
the expected payoffs resulting from this mimicking behavior has to be less than or equal
to the type’s actual equilibrium expected payoff. For each type of the seller, this condition
amounts to requiring:
Uˆl =
[
mˆs[l]− l
]
Qˆ
(
mˆb[l]
) ≥ [mˆs[h]− l]Qˆ(mˆb[h]) = Uˆh + (h− l)Qˆ(mˆb[h])
Uˆh =
[
mˆs[h]− h
]
Qˆ
(
mˆb[h]
) ≥ [mˆs[l]− h]Qˆ(mˆb[l]) = Uˆl − (h− l)Qˆ(mˆb[l])
Plugging in the normalization of l = 0 and combining the two conditions using max
operator, the two inequalities in the second part of Lemma II.5 are attained.
Proof of Lemma II.6. Firstly observe that in an efficient intermediated equilibrium, the
trade probabilities can be implemented only when the two types of the seller choose dif-
1Note that due to similar reasons as in the proof of Lemma II.2, it is optimal for the buyer to
accept an offer of mo = tb even though she is indifferent between A and R. If the buyer were to
reject the offer, then the seller types could get arbitrarily close to the expected payoff from when
the buyer accepts by approaching mo = tb from below.
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ferent prices. Since mˆb[l] 6= mˆb[h], there is full separation on the equilibrium path, i.e.
abusing notation the buyer’s equilibrium beliefs are pˆi(mˆb[l]) = 1 and pˆi(mˆb[h]) = 0. Fur-
thermore, the implemented trade probabilities require that mˆb[h] ∈ [L+λL, H+λH ] while
mˆb[l] ∈ [0, L].
In order show that in an efficient intermediated equilibrium both seller types have
to choose the intermediary as the entry decision, pursue a contradiction by assuming
the entry decision of at least one seller type is for the direct trade outside option, i.e.
eˆts(Mˆ
i) = o for at least one ts. Then it has to be the case that mˆs[ts] ≤ mˆb[ts]. To see why,
observe that if for type ts entry decision is eˆts(Mˆ
i) = o, then the inequality binds as both
terms equal mˆots(Mˆ
i). Otherwise, the intermediary is chosen only by that seller type and
sequential rationality of the intermediary’s strategy implies the inequality.
Furthermore, optimality of equilibrium prices also require the high type seller’s price to
satisfy mˆs[h] ≥ h, as otherwise he would not be trading with the H type buyer. Combining
these observations yields mˆs[l] ≤ mˆb[l] ≤ L < h ≤ mˆs[h] ≤ mˆb[h].
From the inequalities above, it can be seen that Uˆl = mˆs[l]Qˆ(mˆb[l]) = mˆs[l] ≤ L. On
the other hand, Lemma II.5 suggests that the low type seller’s expected equilibrium payoff
Uˆl has to satisfy:
Uˆl ≥ max{Uˆol , Uˆh + hQˆ(mˆb[h])}
≥ max{L,H(1− q), Uˆh + h(1− q)}
≥ max{H(1− q), h(1− q)} > L
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that Uˆh ≥ 0 and the last inequality
follows from Assumption II.2; i.e. q < qS
e ⇔ L < max{H(1 − q), h(1 − q)}. Combining
above inequalities yields a contradiction, because L ≥ Uˆl > L. In turn this implies that, if
there exists an efficient intermediated equilibrium, then both seller types have to choose
the intermediary.
Proof of Proposition II.4. In an efficient intermediated equilibrium, the total expected gains
from trade is equal to pL + (1 − p)(1 − q)(H + λH − h), while each seller type receives
expected payoff of Uˆts . The difference is the sum of the intermediary’s expected payoff
Vˆ = V (Mˆi) and buyer’s ex-ante expected payoff. Sequential rationality requires these
payoffs to be nonnegative, which in turn yields the inequality in (II.5).
Proof of Theorem II.1. For the necessity part, consider the inequalities from Lemma II.5:
Uˆl ≥ Uˆh + h(1− q) ≥ Uˆoh + h(1− q) ≥ max{H,h}(1− q)
Uˆh ≥ Uˆoh ≥ max{(H − h)(1− q), 0} = max{H,h}(1− q)− h(1− q)
Plugging in these to the condition (II.5) from Proposition II.4 and rearranging the terms
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yields the condition (II.6):
pL+ (1− p)(1− q)(H + λH − h) ≥ pUˆl + (1− p)Uˆh
≥ max{H,h}(1− q)− (1− p)(1− q)h
⇒ p L
1− q + (1− p)(H + λH) ≥ max{H,h}
To show the sufficiency, I will show that there exists an efficient intermediated equilibrium
whenever condition (II.6) holds. Before describing the equilibrium, I define the following
notation, which will be used in the rest of the proof. Consider the subgame e = i, where
the intermediary announces a menu Mi, the seller type ts makes a choice ci ∈ {1, 2} and
buyer’s beliefs are pii(Mi, ci) ∈ [0, 1]. When the seller chooses between the two options
of the menu, he assumes that each buyer type plays her corresponding equilibrium deci-
sion strategy dˆitb(M
i, ci), which depends on her beliefs pii. Given a price pair choice ci,
denote the expected trade probability by Qi(mib(c
i)|pii) for any possible belief. Clearly, the
equilibrium strategies are evaluated using the consistent equilibrium beliefs, i.e. pii = pˆii.
Similarly, denote by U its(M
i, ci|pii) type ts seller’s expected payoff from making choice ci
when the buyer types play their optimal strategies under some beliefs pii. Again, the equi-
librium choice of the seller types cˆits(M
i) are evaluated when the buyer has her equilibrium
beliefs pii = pˆii. It is also important to note that both Qi(mib(c
i)|pii) and U its(Mi, ci|pii) are
weakly decreasing in pii. To see why, observe that each buyer type’s updated value for the
object is equal to tb+ (1−pii(Mi, ci))λtb , which is decreasing in pii. Hence, as pii increases,
it might be the case that the updated value of some buyer type falls below mib(c
i) leading
that type to reject the offer, which consequently decreases the expected trade probabil-
ity and the payoff to the seller types. In the rest of the proof, the terms U its(M
i, ci) and
Q(mib(c
i)) omitting pii refer to the cases, where the respective terms are evaluated at the
equilibrium beliefs pii = pˆii.
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Consider the following assessment:
Mˆi = {(max{H,h}(1− q), L), (max{H,h}, H + λH)}
eˆts(M
i) =
i if Mi = Mˆi OR U its(Mi, cˆits(Mi)) ≥ Uˆots and mib(cˆits(Mi) ≤ Ho o/w
cˆits(M
i) =

1 if ts = l and Mi = Mˆi
2 if ts = h and Mi = Mˆi
1 if U its(M
i, 1) > U its(M
i, 2)
2 if U its(M
i, 2) > U its(M
i, 1)
{1, 2} o/w
mˆol (M
i) =
L if H−LH ≤ q < qS
e
(requires h > H)
H if q < H−LH
mˆoh(M
i) = max{H,h}
dˆitb(M
i, ci) =
A if mib(ci) ≤ tb + (1− pˆii(Mi, ci))λtbR o/w
dˆotb(m
o) =
A if mo ≤ tb + (1− pˆio(mo))λtbR o/w
pˆii(Mi, ci) =

0 if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆih(M
i) = ci 6= cˆil(Mi)
0 if eˆh(Mi) = i, eˆl(Mi) = o, cˆih(M
i) = ci, and cˆil(M
i) ∈ {1, 2}
p if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆil(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) = ci
1 o/w
pˆio(mo) = 1
I will show that above strategies and beliefs form an efficient intermediated equilibrium.
First consider the equilibrium path play and verify that it satisfies the definition of efficient
intermediated equilibrium. On the equilibrium path, intermediary announces menu Mˆi,
both seller types choose i, low type seller chooses option 1 while high type chooses option
2.
The buyer’s beliefs on this path are equal to pˆii(Mˆi, 1) = 1 and pˆii(Mˆi, 2) = 0. Then her
optimal decision strategies satisfy dˆiL(Mˆ
i, 1) = dˆiH(Mˆ
i, 1) = A as mˆib(1) = L ≤ tb + (1 −
pˆii(Mˆi, 1))λtb = tb, and dˆ
i
H(Mˆ
i, 2) = A while dˆiL(Mˆ
i, 2) = R, because mˆib(2) = H + λH =
H + (1− pˆii(Mˆi, 2))λH > L+ (1− pˆii(Mˆi, 2))λL.
The seller’s choices cˆits(Mˆ
i) are optimal as U il (Mˆ
i, 1) = max{H,h}(1−q) ≥ U il (Mˆi, 2) =
max{H,h}(1− q) and U ih(Mˆi, 2) = [max{H,h}− h](1− q) > U ih(Mˆi, 1) = max{H,h}(1−
136
q)− h.
On the out-of-equilibrium subgame e = o, buyer’s beliefs are pˆio(mo) = 1 for all TIOLI
offers. Hence, buyer’s optimal strategy is to accept any offer less than or equal to her
updated belief, i.e. mo ≤ tb. For low type seller, announcing mˆol yields him an expected
payoff of Uˆol = max{L,H(1 − q)}. On the other hand, for the h type seller if h > H,
then there is no TIOLI offer that yields him a strictly positive expected payoff. Thus Uˆoh =
max{(H − h)(1− q), 0} = [max{H,h} − h](1− q).
In light of these, it follows that seller’s entry strategies eˆts(Mˆ
i) = i are optimal, as
each type receives Uˆ its ≥ Uˆots . Finally, the intermediary receives an expected payoff of
V (Mˆi) = pL + (1 − p)(1 − q)(H + λH) − max{H,h}(1 − q), which is nonnegative given
the condition (II.6) is satisfied.
Next, I show the sequential rationality of the strategies starting with the buyer and
work backwards. The buyer’s optimal strategy should be to accept, only when the price
she pays is less than or equal to her updated value for the good, which is precisely what
the strategies formulate.
The seller in subgame e = i should choose the option among the two price pairs that
gives him the higher expected payoff. Clearly, when he is indifferent, he could choose
either of the two options. In the subgame e = o, however, the seller’s optimal TIOLI offer
strategies mˆots(M
i) depend on his type. Given the buyer’s beliefs are equal to pˆio(mo) =
1 for all TIOLI offers, it follows that Qˆo(mo) =

1 if mo ≤ L
1− q if mo ∈ (L,H]
0 o/w
. Then the low
type seller would choose between trading only with the high type buyer or both types.
Hence, he announces H when q is sufficiently small or L otherwise. Note that the optimal
TIOLI satisfies mˆol = L if q is above
H−L
H which can happen only when h > H, due to
Assumption II.2. The high type seller, on the other hand, would never want to trade with
both types of the buyer, as that would cap the maximum TIOLI offer at L which is strictly
less than h. Hence, he chooses to trade with H type buyer at price H only when H ≥ h.
Otherwise, he gets an expected payoff of 0 by announcing any price mo > H, and clearly
mˆoh = h is one such optimal announcement.
The seller, when choosing his entry decision, compares the expected payoffs from
the two subgames evaluated using the continuation equilibrium strategies cˆits , dˆ
i
tb
, mˆots
and dˆotb . Apart from the equilibrium menu announcement Mˆ
i, both types choose entry to
intermediary subgame whenever the expected payoff from intermediary exceeds the direct
trade outside option subgame expected payoff and the buyer’s price of the subsequent
menu choice satisfies mib(cˆ
i
ts(M
i)) ≤ H. Observe that, if the latter condition is violated,
i.e. mib(j) > H where j = cˆ
i
ts(M
i), then the buyer’s equilibrium beliefs are equal to
pˆii(Mi, j) = 1. In turn, both buyer types would choose dˆitb(M
i, j) = R, as mib(j) > H ≥ tb.
Thus U its(M
i, j) = 0 ≤ Uˆots for both types, and eˆts(Mi) = o is indeed optimal.
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Lastly, consider the optimality of intermediary’s menu announcement strategy. In or-
der to check that announcing Mˆi satisfies sequential rationality, I discuss what happens
following any deviation menu announcement Mi ∈ Mi \ {Mˆi}. In particular, I want to
verify that for any deviation menu announcement, the aforementioned sequentially ra-
tional strategies form subgame equilibria, yet the deviation yields the intermediary an
expected payoff that is less than the equilibrium payoff V (Mˆi). I will consider three cases
of a deviation menu Mi; first where mib(j) > H for both j ∈ {1, 2}, second where (WLOG)
mib(1) ≤ H while mib(2) > H and lastly where mib(j) ≤ H for both j ∈ {1, 2}.
Case 1) Starting with the first case, if both mib(j) > H, then optimal entry strategies
specify eˆts(M
i) = o for both seller types. Then for any price pair choices for both seller
types, the buyer’s beliefs are pˆii(Mi, ci) = 1 for both ci, which suggests that dˆitb(M
i, ci) = R
for both buyer types and choices ci. The expected payoff for both seller types from either
choice is equal to U its(M
i, ci) = 0, hence it is optimal to have cˆi(Mi) ∈ {1, 2}. Since
Uˆots(M
i) ≥ 0, it holds that eˆts(Mi) = o is indeed sequentially rational.
To recap, whenever Mi satisfies mib(j) > H for both j, then in subgame equilibrium
the intermediary does not attract either seller type. Hence the expected payoff is equal to
V (Mi) = 0. As V (Mˆi) ≥ 0, there is no profitable deviation from any such menu.
Case 2) Consider the second case where mib(1) ≤ H < mib(2). If buyer’s belief satis-
fies pˆii(Mi, 2) = 1, then dˆitb(M
i, 2) = R for both buyer types, which consequently yields
U its(M
i, 2) = 0 for both seller types. Because mib(1) ≤ H, for any belief pii = pii(Mi, 1) ∈
[0, 1], the high type buyer plays dˆiH(M
i, 1) = A as mib(1) ≤ H ≤ H + (1 − pii)λH , which
implies that Qi(mib(1)|pii) ≥ 1 − q. Thus, it holds that U il (Mi, 1|pii) ≥ U il (Mi, 2) = 0, or
that it is optimal for low type seller to play cˆi(Mi) = 1. For the high type seller, on the
other hand, U ih(M
i, 1|pii) = (mis(1) − h)Qi(mib(1)|pii) ≥ (mis(1) − h)(1 − q) for any pii. If
mis(1) ≥ h, then the expected payoff from choosing 1 is greater or equal to 0 yielding
cˆih(M
i) =
1 if mis(1) ≥ h2 o/w .
Next, consider the entry strategies of the seller types. First consider the high type
seller’s expected payoff U ih(M
i, 1|p) from choosing price pair ci = 1, when buyer’s beliefs
equal pii(Mi, 1) = p. If U ih(M
i, 1|p) ≥ Uˆoh = [max{H,h} − h](1− q), then indeed the high
type seller enters, i.e. eˆh(Mi) = i. In turn, this implies that U il (M
i, 1|p) = U ih(Mi, 1|p) +
hQi(mib(1)|p) ≥ [max{H,h}−h](1−q)+h(1−q) = max{H,h}(1−q) ≥ Uˆol = max{L,H(1−
q)}, where last inequality is due to Assumption II.2. The previous inequalities altogether
suggest that low type seller also enters, i.e. eˆl(Mi) = i. Observe that, in this case, given
both seller types would enter and choose price pair 1, indeed the equilibrium beliefs would
equal pˆii(Mi, 1) = p and pˆii(Mi, 2) = 1.
If, on the other hand, U ih(M
i, 1|p) < Uˆoh, then the optimal entry would be eˆh(Mi) = o,
in which case pˆii(Mi, ci) = 1 for both ci. Note that, U ih(M
i, 1|1) ≤ U ih(Mi, 1|p) which
maintains the optimality of e = o choice for h type seller. Then the entry strategy of the
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low type seller equals eˆl(Mi) = i whenever U il (M
i, 1|1) ≥ Uˆol and equals o otherwise.
To recap, whenever Mi satisfies (WLOG) mib(1) ≤ H < mib(2), then in subgame equi-
librium either both seller types enter choosing option 1, or only the low type seller chooses
option 1 under the intermediary while the high type seller opts for the direct trade outside
option. In the former case, it needs to be the case that mis(1) ≥ max{H,h} for the high
type to come. Consequently, the expected profits to the intermediary are equal to V (Mi) =
[mib(1) − mis(1)]Qi(mib(1)|p) ≤ [H − max{H,h}]Qi(mib(1)|p) ≤ 0. In the latter case,
low type seller choosing intermediary requires U is(M
i, 1|1) = mis(1)Qi(mib(1)|1) ≥ Uˆol =
max{L,H(1−q)}. Then the expected profits for the intermediary from deviation are equal
to V (Mi) = p[mib(1)−mis(1)]Qi(mib(1)|1) ≤ p
[
max{H(1−q), L}−mis(1)Qi(mib(1)|1)
] ≤ 0.
Therefore, deviation to such a menu is not profitable.
Case 3) Finally consider the last case, where mib(j) ≤ H for both j. Assume, WLOG,
that U il (M
i, 1|1) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|1).
Subcase 3.1) If maxj{U ih(Mi, j|0)} < Uˆoh, then it would be optimal for high type seller
to choose eˆh(Mi) = o, where the beliefs equal pˆii(Mi, j) = 1 for both j ∈ {1, 2}. To see
why, observe that maxj{U ih(Mi, j|1)} ≤ maxj{U ih(Mi, j|0)} < Uˆoh. Then equilibrium re-
quires high type seller to play cˆih(M
i) =
1 if U ih(Mi, 1|1) ≥ U ih(Mi, 2|1)2 o/w as his optimal
choice strategy, where WLOG his indifference is broken in favor of price pair 1, while low
type seller playing cˆil(M
i) = 1 and entry strategy eˆl(Mi) =
i if U il (Mi, 1|1) ≥ Uˆolo o/w .
Subcase 3.2) If maxj{U ih(Mi, j|0)} ≥ Uˆoh, on the other hand, specifics of the subgame
equilibrium following deviation depend on whether high type seller prefers price pair 1 or
2 under beliefs pii = p.
3.2.1) In the first case where U ih(M
i, 1|p) ≥ U ih(Mi, 2|p), it would be optimal for
both seller types to enter and choose price pair 1 with beliefs equal to pˆii(Mi, 1) = p and
pˆii(Mi, 2) = 1. To see why the low type seller would also enter, observe that U il (M
i, 1|p) =
U ih(M
i, 1|p)+hQi(mib(1)|p) ≥ U ih(Mi, 1|p)+h(1−q) ≥ Uˆoh+h(1−q) ≥ max{H,h}(1−q) ≥
Uˆol . Furthermore, cˆ
i
l(M
i) = 1 is also optimal here since U il (M
i, 1|p) ≥ U il (Mi, 1|1) ≥
U il (M
i, 2|1).
3.2.2) In the other case where U ih(M
i, 1|p) < U ih(Mi, 2|p), it further depends on low
type seller’s optimal price pair choice for different beliefs.
A: If U il (M
i, 2|p) ≥ U il (Mi, 1|1) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|1), then both seller types enter, i.e. eˆl(Mi) =
eˆh(M
i) = i, and both choose price pair 2, i.e. cˆil(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) = 2, which in turn gener-
ates beliefs pˆii(Mi, 1) = 1 and pˆii(Mi, 2) = p.
B: Otherwise, U il (M
i, 1|1) > U il (Mi, 2|p) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|1) in which case final two scenar-
ios have to be considered.
B.i: For the first subcase where U il (M
i, 1|1) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|0) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|p) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|1),2
2Note that one of the first two inequalities is strict.
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there is an equilibrium such that each seller type chooses a different price pair, which leads
the buyer to infer the types, i.e. pˆii(Mi, 1) = 1 and pˆii(Mi, 2) = 0. The optimal strategies
are eˆts(M
i) = i for both seller types, while choosing cˆil(M
i) = 1 and cˆih(M
i) = 2.
B.ii: The other subcase with U il (M
i, 2|0) > U il (Mi, 1|1) > U il (Mi, 2|p) ≥ U il (Mi, 2|1)
is a situation where both seller types would like to enter, the high type seller would like
to choose price pair 2, however low type seller would like to choose price pair 2 only for
sufficiently high beliefs and otherwise would like to strictly choose price pair 1. I will show
that, it is not possible to have this kind of a problematic case.
Firstly, note that U its(M
i, j|pii) = [mis(j) − ts]Qi(mib(j)|pii) and Qi(mib(j)|pii) ≥ (1 − q)
for both j ∈ {1, 2} and all pii, where the latter inequality follows from mib(j) ≤ H.
Then in light of the inequality U il (M
i, 2|0) > U il (Mi, 2|p), it has to be the case that
Qi(mib(2)|0) = 1 > Qi(mib(2)|p) = 1−q or that mib(2) ∈ (L+(1−p)λL, L+λL]. Plugging in
Qi(mib(2)|p) = (1−q) yields U ih(Mi, 2|p) = [mis(2)−h](1−q) ≥ Uˆoh = [max{H,h}−h](1−q)
or that mis(2) ≥ max{H,h}. Combining these inequalities yields mis(2) ≥ max{H,h} >
L+λH ≥ mib(2). This implies that forMi ∈Mi, it needs to be the case thatmis(1) ≤ mib(1).
On the other hand, one of the conditions in the subcase is that U ih(M
i, 2|p) = [mis(2)−
h](1 − q) > U ih(Mi, 1|p) = [mis(1) − h]Qi(mib(1)|p) ≥ [mis(1) − h](1 − q), which suggests
that mis(1) < m
i
s(2). This inequality, in turn implies that in order for U
i
l (M
i, 1|1) =
mis(1)Q
i(mib(1)|1) > U il (Mi, 2|p) = mis(2)(1− q) to hold, mib(1) ≤ L so that Qi(mib(1)|1) =
1. Plugging these observations into low type seller’s inequalities yields U il (M
i, 1|1) =
mis(1) > U
i
l (M
i, 2|p) = mis(2)(1 − q) ≥ max{H,h}(1 − q). Combining these inequalities
over the price pair for choice ci = 1, it can be deduced that mib(1) ≤ L < max{H,h}(1 −
q) ≤ mis(1), where strict inequality follows from Assumption II.2. Hence, all the conditions
combined require mis(j) > m
i
b(j) for both price pairs, which contradicts with M
i ∈Mi.
To recap, whenever Mi satisfies mib(j) ≤ H for both j, then in subgame equilibrium
it could be that neither seller type enters, or both seller types enter and then choose the
same option or different options, or it could be that only the low type seller enters chooses
one of the two options.3 In the cases where neither seller type enters, the expected profits
are 0, as in Case 1. In the other cases, where only the low type enters or both seller types
enter choosing the same option, the expected profits from deviation are similar to Case
2 that was previously covered; i.e. Mi satisfies mib(1) ≤ H < mib(2) and in equilibrium
either only low type seller enters choosing option 1, or both seller types enter choosing
option 1. Since in those cases deviation is not profitable, neither will it be in this case.
The only case to check is, if both types enter and choose different options; (WLOG) low
type chooses 1 and high type chooses 2. In this case, optimality of the entry decision to
intermediary for each type requires that mis(1)Q
i(mib(1)|1) ≥ max{L,H(1 − q)} for the
low type seller and mis(2) ≥ max{H,h} for the high type seller. Then the expected profits
3In other words, it can never be that only high type seller enters, while the low type chooses
the direct trade outside option.
140
are:
V (Mi) = p[mib(1)−mis(1)]Qi(mib(1)|1) + (1− p)[mib(2)−mis(2)]Qi(mib(2)|0)
≤ p[max{H,L(1− q)} −mis(1)Qi(mis(1)|1)]+ (1− p)[H −max{H,h}]Qi(mib(2)|0)
≤ p[max{H,L(1− q)} −max{L,H(1− q)}]+ (1− p)[H −max{H,h}]Qi(mib(2)|0)
≤ 0
This concludes the sequential rationality checks for the strategies. Lastly, I need to verify
that the beliefs pˆii(Mi, ci) and pˆio(mo) at all information sets (both on and off equilibrium
path) are defined consistently.
I start by showing the consistency of beliefs pˆio(mo) = 1. Given convergent sequences
of totally mixed strategies {Mi,k}∞k=1, {ekts(Mi)}∞k=1 and {mo,kts (Mi)}∞k=1 converging to
their respective equilibrium strategy counterparts, the consistent beliefs must equal to the
limit of the beliefs generated by these strategy sequences. Consider the limit of the beliefs
as defined in (B.2) in the Proof of Lemma II.4:
pˆio(mo) = lim
k→∞
p
∫
Mi P(M
i,k = Mi)P(ekl (Mi) = o)P(m
o,k
l (M
i) = mo)dMi∑
ts∈{l,h}[P(ts)
∫
Mi P(Mi,k = Mi)P(e
k
ts(M
i) = o)P(mo,kts (Mi) = mo)dMi]
= lim
k→∞
pP(Mi,k = Mˆi)P(ekl (Mˆi) = o)P(m
o,k
l (Mˆ
i) = mo) + ∆l∑
ts∈{l,h}
[
P(ts)P(Mi,k = Mˆi)P(ekts(Mˆi) = o)P(m
o,k
ts (Mˆ
i) = mo) + ∆ts
]
(B.3)
where ∆ts = P(ts)
∫
Mi 6=Mˆi P(M
i,k = Mi)P(ekts(M
i) = o)P(mo,kts (M
i) = mo)dMi for each
seller type. Note that ∆ts ∈ (0, 1) for both ts as the strategies are totally mixed along the
sequences.
Now let the convergent strategy sequences satisfy the following:
P(Mi,k = Mi) =
1− 4k if Mi = Mˆi24k
[H+λH ]4
o/w
P(ekl (Mˆi) = e) =
1− k if e = ik if e = o
P(ekh(Mˆi) = e) =
1− 3k if e = i3k if e = o
P(mo,kts (M
i) = mo) =
1− k if mo = mˆotsk
[H+λH ]
o/w
ts ∈ {l, h} and ∀Mi
where  ∈ (0, 1). Note that the space of menusMi has Lebesgue measure |Mi| = [H+λH ]42 .
To see why, observe that for any Mi ∈Mi, the prices satisfy mis(j) ≤ mib(j) for at least one
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j ∈ {1, 2}. WLOG letting mis(2) ≤ mib(2) yields the stated measure. Then the convergent
sequence {Mi,k}k simply uniformly randomizes across the non-equilibrium menus.
Observe that, the sequences for some other strategies (e.g. {ekts(Mi)}k for Mi 6=
Mˆi) were omitted. This is because, the limit to the belief sequences remain the same,
regardless of what convergent sequences are chosen for the omitted strategies. Plugging
in the above probabilities for the sequence of strategies, the limit of belief sequences
becomes:
pˆio(mo) = lim
k→∞
p(1− 4k)kP(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo) + ∆l
p(1− 4k)kP(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo)
+ (1− p)(1− 4k)3kP(mo,kh (Mˆi) = mo) + ∆l + ∆h
= lim
k→∞
p+ ∆′l
p+ (1− p)2k P(m
o,k
h (Mˆ
i)=mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi)=mo)
+ ∆′l + ∆
′
h
where from first to second equality, both numerator and denominator were divided by the
same expression (1 − 4k)kP(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo). Hence, the constant terms are equal to
∆′ts =
23kP(ts)
(1−4k)[H+λH ]4
∫
Mi 6=Mˆi P(e
k
ts(M
i) = o)
P(mo,kts (M
i)=mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi)=mo)
dMi for each seller type. It is
important to note that for both seller types ∆′ts → 0 as k →∞, for any sequence of totally
mixed strategies {ekts(Mi)}k for Mi 6= Mˆi.
A closer inspection of the middle term in the denominator simplifies the limits, because
there are three possible values for the ratios between h and l types of P(mo,kts (Mˆ
i) = mo):
2k
P(mo,kh (Mˆ
i) = mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo)
=

2k if mo = mˆol = mˆ
o
h
2k if mo ∈ [0, H + λH ] \ {mˆol , mˆoh}
k(1− k)[H + λH ] if mo = mˆol 6= mˆoh
3k
(1−k)[H+λH ] if m
o = mˆoh 6= mˆol
In any case after cancellations, k term remains in the expression (1−p)2k P(m
o,k
h (Mˆ
i)=mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi)=mo)
,
which in turn converges to 0 as k goes to infinity. Along with ∆′ts ’s converging to 0 as k
becomes larger, the limit satisfies pˆio(mo) = pp = 1 as desired.
Finally, consider the beliefs pˆii(Mi, ci). Similar to before, sequences of totally mixed
strategies {ekts(Mi)}∞k=1 and {ci,kts (Mi)}∞k=1 converging to their equilibrium counterparts.
The consistent beliefs must equal to the limit of the beliefs generated by these strategy
sequences. Consider the limit of the beliefs as defined in (B.1) in the Proof of Lemma II.4:
pˆii(Mi, ci) = lim
k→∞
pP(ekl (Mi) = i)P(c
i,k
l (M
i) = ci)
pP(ekl (Mi) = i)P(c
i,k
l (M
i) = ci) + (1− p)P(ekh(Mi) = i)P(ci,kh (Mi) = ci)
Observe that the probability P(Mi,k = Mi) is eliminated out of the beliefs along the se-
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quence, because they are part of the observed information by the buyer in the subgame
e = i. This feature has the following implication. Consider an out-of-equilibrium informa-
tion set (Mi, ci) with a deviation menu Mi 6= Mˆi. If it is the case that at least one seller
type enters in the equilibrium strategy and chooses the option ci, then Bayes’ rule can be
applied to define the sequence of beliefs. Hence, the consistent beliefs can be summarized
as follows:
pˆii(Mi, ci) =

0 if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆih(M
i) = ci 6= cˆil(Mi)
0 if eˆh(Mi) = i, eˆl(Mi) = o, cˆih(M
i) = ci, and cˆil(M
i) ∈ {1, 2}
p if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆil(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) = ci
1 if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆil(M
i) = ci 6= cˆih(Mi)
1 if eˆl(Mi) = i, eˆh(Mi) = o, cˆil(M
i) = ci and cˆih(M
i) ∈ {1, 2}
Then in all the remaining cases, the equilibrium beliefs are equal to pˆii(Mi, ci) = 1 and all
that remains to be checked are the consistency of these beliefs. First consider the following
sequences of totally mixed strategies:
P(ekl (Mi) = i) =
1− k if eˆl(Mi) = ik o/w P(ekh(Mi) = i) =
1− 3k if eˆh(Mi) = i3k o/w
P(ci,kl (M
i) = ci) =
1− k if cˆil(Mi) = cik o/w P(ci,kh (Mi) = ci) =
1− 3k if cˆih(Mi) = ci3k o/w
where  ∈ (0, 1). Now the beliefs in the remaining cases are as follows. Given an out-of-
equilibrium information set (Mi, ci), if:
1. eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i and cˆil(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) 6= ci;
pˆii(Mi, ci) = lim
k→∞
p(1− k)k
p(1− k)k + (1− p)(1− 3k)3k = 1
2. eˆl(Mi) = o, eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆil(M
i) ∈ {1, 2} and cˆih(Mi) 6= ci;
pˆii(Mi, ci) =

lim
k→∞
pk(1−k)
pk(1−k)+(1−p)(1−3k)3k = 1 if cˆ
i
l(M
i) = ci
lim
k→∞
pkk
pkk+(1−p)(1−3k)3k = 1 if cˆ
i
l(M
i) 6= ci
3. eˆl(Mi) = i, eˆh(Mi) = o, cˆil(M
i) 6= ci and cˆih(Mi) ∈ {1, 2};
pˆii(Mi, ci) =

lim
k→∞
p(1−k)k
p(1−k)k+(1−p)3k(1−3k) = 1 if cˆ
i
h(M
i) = ci
lim
k→∞
p(1−k)k
p(1−k)k+(1−p)3k3k = 1 if cˆ
i
h(M
i) 6= ci
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4. eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = o, cˆil(M
i) ∈ {1, 2} and cˆih(Mi) ∈ {1, 2};
pˆii(Mi, ci) =

lim
k→∞
pk(1−k)
pk(1−k)+(1−p)3k(1−3k) = 1 if cˆ
i
l(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) = ci
lim
k→∞
pk(1−k)
pk(1−k)+(1−p)3k3k = 1 if cˆ
i
l(M
i) = ci 6= cˆih(Mi)
lim
k→∞
pkk
pkk+(1−p)3k(1−3k) = 1 if cˆ
i
l(M
i) 6= cˆih(Mi) = ci
lim
k→∞
pkk
pkk+(1−p)3k3k = 1 if cˆ
i
l(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) 6= ci
This concludes the consistency check of the beliefs and the proof altogether.
Proof of Proposition II.5. For the necessity part, consider the inequalities from Lemma II.5
again, noting that Uˆots = [E(v|H)− ts](1− q);
Uˆl ≥ Uˆh + h(1− q) ≥ Uˆoh + h(1− q) = Uˆol = E(v|H)(1− q)
Uˆh ≥ Uˆoh = [E(v|H)− h](1− q)
Plugging in these to condition (II.5) from Proposition II.4 and rearranging terms yields
the following condition:
pL+ (1− p)(1− q)(H + λH − h) ≥ pUˆl + (1− p)Uˆh ≥ E(v|H)(1− q)− (1− p)(1− q)h
⇒ p L1−q + (1− p)(H + λH) ≥ E(v|H) = pH + (1− p)(H + λH)
L
1−q ≥ H
The other part, i.e. h > L1−q , is implied by Assumption II.2, because both H ≤ L1−q and
L
1−q < max{H,h} can be simultaneously satisfied only when h > L1−q ≥ H, which is
precisely the condition (II.7).
For the sufficiency part, it is enough to show the existence of an equilibrium whenever
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(II.7) is satisfied. Consider the following assessment:
Mˆi = {(E(v|H)(1− q), L), (E(v|H), H + λH)}
eˆts(M
i) =
i if Mi = Mˆi OR U its(Mi, cˆits(Mi)) ≥ Uˆots and mib(cˆits(Mi) ≤ Ho o/w
cˆits(M
i) =

1 if ts = l and Mi = Mˆi
2 if ts = h and Mi = Mˆi
1 if U its(M
i, 1) > U its(M
i, 2)
2 if U its(M
i, 2) > U its(M
i, 1)
{1, 2} o/w
mˆots(M
i) = E(v|H)
dˆitb(M
i, ci) =
A if mib(ci) ≤ tb + (1− pˆii(Mi, ci))λtbR o/w
dˆotb(m
o) =
A if mo ≤ tb + (1− pˆio(mo))λtbR o/w
pˆii(Mi, ci) =

0 if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆih(M
i) = ci 6= cˆil(Mi)
0 if eˆh(Mi) = i, eˆl(Mi) = o, cˆih(M
i) = ci, and cˆil(M
i) ∈ {1, 2}
p if eˆl(Mi) = eˆh(Mi) = i, cˆil(M
i) = cˆih(M
i) = ci
1 o/w
pˆio(mo) =
p if mo = mˆol = mˆoh1 o/w
Observe that following the equilibrium menu announcement Mˆi, both seller types choose
the intermediary and separate contracts; low type chooses 1 and high type chooses 2.
Thus, by Bayes’ rule, the beliefs are pˆii(Mˆi, 1) = 1 and pˆii(Mˆi, 2) = 0, which suggests that
the desired trade probabilities are implemented. More precisely, dˆiL(Mˆ
i, 1) = dˆiH(Mˆ
i, 1) =
A as mˆib(1) = L ≤ tb for both types, while dˆiL(Mˆi, 2) = R and dˆiH(Mˆi, 2) = A as L+ λL <
mˆib(2) = H + λH ≤ H + λH .
Next, in order to verify the optimality of menu option choices observe that for low type
U il (Mˆ
i, 1) = E(v|H)(1 − q) ≥ U il (Mˆi, 2) = E(v|H)(1 − q) and for high type U ih(Mˆi, 2) =
[E(v|H)− h](1− q) > U ih(Mˆi, 1) = E(v|H)(1− q)− h.
To verify optimality of the entry choice, first consider the expected payoffs from sub-
game e = o. In the subgame, given buyer’s equilibrium beliefs, if the seller announces
mˆo, then the buyer types would optimally decide dˆoL(mˆ
o) = R and dˆoH(mˆ
o) = A as
H + (1 − p)λH = E(v|H) > L + (1 − p)λL. By deviating to any other price mo 6= mˆo,
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the probability of trade, i.e. Qo(mo), decreases as pˆio(mo) = 1. Furthermore, in the case
where mo > mˆo, it holds that Qo(mo) = 0. Altogether, indeed both seller types would
announce mˆo in the direct trade outside option subgame, which yields expected payoffs
Uˆots = U
o
ts(mˆ
o) = [E(v|H) − ts](1 − q). Note that for both types mˆo = E(v|H) is optimal
for all possible menu announcements Mi ∈Mi, which obviously includes the equilibrium
menu Mˆi. In light of these, if follows that both seller types are indifferent between in-
termediary and the outside option for entry choice. Hence eˆts(Mˆ
i) = i for both types are
indeed optimal.
The rest of the proof for sequential rationality is analogous to the corresponding sec-
tion from the sufficiency proof for Theorem II.1. Namely, for any deviation menu an-
nouncement Mi 6= Mˆi, there exists a continuation equilibrium in the aforementioned
strategies and a deviation mechanism is not profitable as it yields V (Mi) = 0 ≤ V (Mˆi).
Thus, all the described strategies satisfy sequentially rationality.
In terms of verifying the consistency of the beliefs, the same sequences of convergent
strategies from the previous proof work for the beliefs pˆii(Mi, ci) and hence are omitted.
Hence, only the consistency of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs from subgame e = o need to
be verified. First, consider the following limit of the beliefs as simplified in (B.3) from the
proof of Theorem II.1, where the beliefs are generated from the convergent sequences of
totally mixed strategies {Mi,k}∞k=1, {ekts(Mi)}∞k=1 and {mo,kts (Mi)}∞k=1 converging to their
respective equilibrium strategy counterparts:
pˆio(mo) = lim
k→∞
pP(Mi,k = Mˆi)P(ekl (Mˆi) = o)P(m
o,k
l (Mˆ
i) = mo) + ∆l∑
ts∈{l,h}[P(ts)P(M
i,k = Mˆi)P(ekts(Mˆi) = o)P(m
o,k
ts (Mˆ
i) = mo) + ∆ts ]
where ∆ts = P(ts)
∫
Mi 6=Mˆi P(M
i,k = Mi)P(ekts(M
i) = o)P(mo,kts (M
i) = mo)dMi for each
seller type. Note that ∆ts ∈ (0, 1) for both ts as the strategies are totally mixed along the
sequences.
Now let the convergent strategy sequences satisfy the following:
P(Mi,k = Mi) =
1− 4k if Mi = Mˆi24k
[H+λH ]4
o/w
P(ekts(Mˆ
i) = e) =
1− k if e = ik if e = o ts ∈ {l, h}
P(mo,kl (Mˆ
i) = mo) =
1− k if mo = mˆok
[H+λH ]
o/w
P(mo,kh (Mˆ
i) = mo) =
1− 2k if mo = mˆo2k
[H+λH ]
o/w
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where  ∈ (0, 1). Note that the space of menusMi has Lebesgue measure |Mi| = [H+λH ]42 .
To see why, observe that for any Mi ∈Mi, the prices satisfy mis(j) ≤ mib(j) for at least one
j ∈ {1, 2}. WLOG letting mis(2) ≤ mib(2), yields the stated measure. Then the convergent
sequence {Mi,k}k simply uniformly randomizes across the non-equilibrium menus.
Observe that, the sequences for some other strategies (e.g. {ekts(Mi)}k for Mi 6=
Mˆi) were omitted. This is because, the limit to the belief sequences remain the same,
regardless of what convergent sequences are chosen for the omitted strategies. Plugging
in the above probabilities for the sequence of strategies, the limit of belief sequences
becomes:
pˆio(mo) = lim
k→∞
p(1− 4k)kP(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo) + ∆l
p(1− 4k)kP(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo)
+ (1− p)(1− 4k)kP(mo,kh (Mˆi) = mo) + ∆l + ∆h
= lim
k→∞
p+ ∆′l
p+ (1− p)P(m
o,k
h (Mˆ
i)=mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi)=mo)
+ ∆′l + ∆
′
h
where from first to second equality, both numerator and denominator were divided by
the same expression (1 − 4k)kP(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo). Hence the constant terms are equal
to ∆′ts =
23kP(ts)
(1−4k)[H+λH ]4
∫
Mi 6=Mˆi P(e
k
ts(M
i) = o)
P(mo,kts (M
i)=mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi)=mo)
dMi for each seller type.
It is important to note that, for both seller types ∆′ts → 0 as k → ∞, no matter what
probabilities are assigned to {ekts(Mi)}k and {mo,kts (Mi)}k for Mi 6= Mˆi.
A closer inspection of the middle term in the denominator simplifies the limits, because
there are two possible values for the ratios between h and l types of P(mo,kts (Mˆ
i) = mo):
P(mo,kh (Mˆ
i) = mo)
P(mo,kl (Mˆi) = mo)
=
1−
2k
1−k if m
o = mˆo
k if mo 6= mˆo
Plugging in the above ratios shows that the beliefs at subgame e = o satisfy consistency:
pˆio(mo) =
limk→∞
p+∆′l
p+(1−p)+∆′l+∆′h = p if m
o = mˆo
limk→∞
p+∆′l
p+(1−p)k+∆′l+∆′h
= 1 if mo 6= mˆo
Proof of Lemma II.7. The thresholds qP and qS
e
are both equal to qP = qS
e
= H−LH as
E(v|H) = H and H > h. Furthermore, whenever condition (II.1) in Proposition II.1 is sat-
isfied, the pooling equilibrium equilibrium exists where the price satisfies max{ L1−q , h,H} =
H ≤ mP ≤ E(v|H) = H. Thus a pooling equilibrium can exist only at price mP = H
whenever q ≤ qP . Similarly, whenever condition (II.2) in Proposition II.2 is satisfied, the
efficient separating equilibrium exists with prices mS
e
l = L and max{h,H} = H ≤ mS
e
h =
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H ≤ min{ L1−q , H} = H, where the last equality is due to q ≥ qS
e
. Thus, in an efficient
separating equilibrium, unique price for high type seller is mˆS
e
h = H. Finally, there are no
longer inefficient separating equilibria as h < H, which violates the necessary condition
for their existence provided in Proposition II.3.
Proof of Proposition II.6. Firstly, observe that in the IPV case, under Assumption II.2, the
seller’s expected payoff from subgame e = o are equal to Uˆots = [H− ts](1−q). To see why,
remember that in the IPV case the parameters satisfy l = 0 < L < h < H. Furthermore,
in the subgame e = o, the buyer accepts a TIOLI offer mo ≤ H for any beliefs she might
have. Then, when q < qS
e
= max{H−LH , h−Lh } = H−LH , it is optimal for both seller types to
announce mˆots = H no matter what beliefs pˆi
o
(mo) the buyer has.
By Lemma II.5, it holds that Uˆts ≥ Uˆots = [H − ts](1 − q). On the other hand, Propo-
sition II.4 suggests that an efficient intermediated equilibrium of Γi exists, only when
condition (II.5) holds. Plugging in the inequality into condition (II.5) yields:
pL+ (1− p)(1− q)(H − h) ≥ pUˆl + (1− p)Uˆh ≥ pH(1− q) + (1− p)[H − h](1− q)
p L1−q + (1− p)[H − h] ≥ H − h(1− p)
L
1−q ≥ H
However Assumption II.2 implies that the necessary condition can not be satisfied, because
H > L1−q . Hence there can not exist an efficient intermediated equilibrium in the IPV
case.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter III
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition III.1. The seller’s ex-ante optimal mechanism is characterized by the
solution to the following optimization program:
P1→ max
{Q,τ}
{∫ 1
0
Us(θs)dF (θs)
}
subject to
IRs : Us(θs) ≥ 0 ∀θs
IRb : Ub(θb) ≥ 0 ∀θb
ICs : Us(θs) ≥ Us(θ˜s|θs) ∀θ˜s, θs
ICb : Ub(θb) ≥ Ub(θ˜b|θb) ∀θ˜b, θb
where the constraints follow from the feasibility of the mechanism.
The ex-ante expected payoff for the seller is equal to the ex-ante expected gains from
trade minus the ex-ante expected payoff of the buyer, as the object is not destroyed. Plug-
ging in the expected payoffs from Remark III.1 and rearranging yields:∫ 1
0
Us(θs)dF (θs) = Us(1) +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θs
qs(x)dxdF (θs)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θb)[v(θs, θb)− c(θs, θb)]dF (θs)dG(θb)−
∫ 1
0
Ub(θb)dG(θb)
= (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dF (θs)dG(θb)− Ub(0) (C.1)
Observe that, the objective function in maximization problem P1 is equivalently the last
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equation above. From the necessary conditions required by feasibility of γ, the constants
Us(1) and Ub(0) have to be nonnegative. It is clear from the equivalent objective function
that, at the optimal mechanism, it has to be U∗b (0) = 0, as otherwise decreasing Ub(0)
would increase the value of the solution. Rearranging above equalities also provides a
description of Us(1) only in terms of the allocation rule. In light of these observations, the
maximization problem can be restated as follows:
P1′ → max
Q(θs,θb)
{
(1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dF (θs)dG(θb)
}
subject to
dqs(θs)
dθs
≤ 0 ∀θs
dqb(θb)
dθb
≥ 0 ∀θb
Us(1) = (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− ψs(θs)]dG(θb)dF (θs) ≥ 0
where the first two inequalities are the necessary monotonicity of the allocation rule re-
quired by the IC constraints, while last inequality amounts to the seller’s simplified IR
constraint.
Ignoring the monotonicity and the seller’s IR constraints momentarilty, consider the
pointwise maximizer of the linear objective function which is equal to:
Qˆ(θs, θb) =
1 if ψb(θb) ≥ θs ⇔ θb ≥ κˆ(θs) = ψ
−1
b (θs)
0 o/w
If the neglected constraints are also satisfied, then this allocation rule defines the solution.
It is easy to see that the monotonicity constraints are satisfied, as κˆ(θs) = ψ−1b (θs) is
strictly increasing in θs. To see why, observe that qs(θs) = 1−G(ψ−1b (θs)) which is strictly
decreasing in θs and qb(θb) = F (ψb(θb)) which is strictly increasing in θb. Hence only the
seller’s IR constraint needs to be checked. Evaluate the expected payoff Us(1) when the
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allocation rule from above is plugged in:
Us(1) = (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Qˆ(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− ψs(θs)]dG(θb)dF (θs)
= (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
κˆ(θs)
[ψb(θb)− ψs(θs)]dG(θb)dF (θs)
= (1− α)
∫ 1
0
[κˆ(θs)− ψs(θs)][1−G(κˆ(θs))]dF (θs)
=
∫ 1
0
[
(1− α)[κˆ(θs)− θs)][1−G(κˆ(θs))]−
∫ 1
θs
[1−G(κˆ(x))]dx
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(θs)
dF (θs)
where going from penultimate to the last line, the following substitutions are made:
(1− α)
∫ 1
0
F (θs)
(1−α)f(θs) [1−G(κ(θs))]dF (θs) =
∫ 1
0
F (θs)[1−G(κ(θs))]dθs
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θs
[1−G(κ(x))]dxdF (θs)
Observe that using integration by parts, the last line can be rewritten as follows:
Us(1) =
∫ 1
0
I(θs)dF (θs) =
[
I(θs)F (θs)
]∣∣∣1
θs=0
−
∫ 1
0
I ′(θs)F (θs)dθs
= 0−
∫ 1
0
I ′(θs)F (θs)dθs (C.2)
where I ′(θs) =
dI(θs)
dθs
. To see why the term in brackets equals 0, observe that I(1) =
F (0) = 0 where the former is due to κˆ(1) = ψ−1b (1) = 1. Therefore, it follows that
I(1) = (1− α)[1− 1][1− 1]− ∫ 11 [1−G(κˆ(x))]dx = 0. Next, evaluate the sign of I ′(θs):
dI(θs)
dθs
=
d
dθs
[
(1− α)[κˆ(θs)− θs)][1−G(κˆ(θs))]−
∫ 1
θs
[1−G(κˆ(x))]dx
]
= (1− α)
[[
κˆ′(θs)− 1
][
1−G(κˆ(θs))
]− [κˆ(θs)− θs]g(κˆ(θs))κˆ′(θs)]
+
[
1−G(κˆ(θs))
]
= −(1− α)g(κˆ(θs)κˆ′(θs)
[
κˆ(θs)− 1−G(κˆ(θs))
g(κˆ(θs))
− θs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψb(κˆ(θs)−θs=0
+α
[
1−G(κˆ(θs))
]
= α
[
1−G(κˆ(θs))
]
where κˆ′(θs) denotes the derivative with respect to θs. The term inside the brackets equals
ψb(κˆ(θs)) − θs, which in turn equals 0. To see why, note that κˆ(θs) = ψ−1b (θs), thus
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ψb(κˆ(θs)) = ψb(ψ
−1
b (θs)) = θs. Plugging the derivative of I(θs) into (C.2) yields:
Us(1) = −
∫ 1
0
I ′(θs)F (θs)dθs = −α
∫ 1
0
[
1−G(κˆ(θs))
]
F (θs)dθs
It is easy to see that, whenever α = 0, the expected payoff constant satisfies Us(1) = 0.
Therefore the allocation Qˆ(θs, θb) along with the cutoff function κˆ(θs) solves the relaxed
program P1′ and consequently the original program P1. Observe that the cutoff function
κˆ(θs) is equal to κ∗(θs) = min{ψ−1b (ψs(θs;µ)), 1} = ψ−1b (θs) for µ = 0, satisfying the
description in Proposition III.1. Along with U∗s (1) = 0, the characterization for the IPV
case is attained, i.e. α = 0.
When α ∈ (0, 1) and there is interdependence, the allocation rule Qˆ along with cutoff
function κˆ do not satisfy the IR constraint for the seller as Us(1) < 0. This means that
in any solution to P1′ in the case of interdependence, the seller’s IR constraint optimally
binds. Letting λ denote the Lagrange multiplier for the seller’s IR constraint, consider the
Lagrangian for the relaxed program after rearranging as follows:
L(Q;λ) = (1− α)(1 + λ)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θb)
[
ψb(θb)− θs − λ
1 + λ
F (θs)
(1− α)f(θs)
]
dG(θb)dF (θs)
= (1− α)(1 + λ)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q(θs, θb)
[
ψb(θb)− ψs(θs;µ)
]
dG(θb)dF (θs)
where µ = λ1+λ . Observe that as the constraint optimally binds whenever α ∈ (0, 1), the
multiplier λ will be strictly positive. In turn, this implies that µ ∈ (0, 1). Now consider the
pointwise maximizer for the Lagrangian:
Q∗(θs, θb) =
1 if ψb(θb) ≥ ψs(θs;µ)0 o/w
However, observe that when µ > 0, for θs large enough, it holds that ψs(θs;µ) > 1.
Therefore, employing the min operator yields the following accurate description of the
cutoff function; κ∗(θs) = min{ψ−1b (ψs(θs;µ)), 1}. Note that, it is exactly the cutoff function
described in (III.1). Furthermore, U∗s (1) = 0 by the binding IR constraint. Hence, the
characterization as described in Proposition III.1 is attained.
Finally, consider the following transfer rule from (III.2) as shown below:
τ∗(θs, θb) = Q∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1− α)θb]− (1− α)
∫ θb
0
Q∗(θs, y)dy
+
∫ 1
θs
∫ 1
0
Q∗(x, θb)dG(θb)dx− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dG(θb)
The aim is to show that γ∗ = {Q∗, τ∗} is an ex-ante optimal mechanism for the seller. This
amounts to showing that γ∗ in truthful type-telling equilibrium implements the outcomes
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described previously. Clearly, the allocation function is precisely the optimal allocation
rule that was characterized. Hence, it only remains to be checked that the transfer rule
yields the expected payoffs under the truthful type-telling equilibrium strategies.
Starting with the seller, consider the expected transfer t∗s(θs):
t∗s(θs) =
∫ 1
0
τ∗(θs, θb)dG(θb)
=
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1− α)θb]dG(θb)− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ θb
0
Q∗(θs, y)dydG(θb)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θs
∫ 1
0
Q∗(x, θb)dG(θb)dxdG(θb)
− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dG(θb)dG(θb)
= θs
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)dG(θb) +
∫ 1
θs
∫ 1
0
Q∗(x, θb)dG(θb)dx
These expected transfers yield U∗s (θs) = t∗s(θs)− q∗s(θs)θs =
∫ 1
θs
∫ 1
0 Q
∗(θs, θb)dG(θb)dx. It is
easy to see that U∗s (1) = 0 and U∗s (θs) is indeed the characterized payoff schedule for the
seller.
Lastly, consider the buyer’s expected transfers:
t∗b(θb) =
∫ 1
0
τ∗(θs, θb)dF (θs)
=
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1− α)θb]dF (θs)− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ θb
0
Q∗(θs, y)dydF (θs)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θs
∫ 1
0
Q∗(x, θb)dG(θb)dxdF (θs)
− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dG(θb)dF (θs)
=
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1− α)θb]dF (θs)− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ θb
0
Q∗(θs, y)dydF (θs)
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θs
q∗s(x)dxF (θs)− (1− α)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[ψb(θb)− θs]dG(θb)dF (θs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
∫ 1
0
Q∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1− α)θb]dF (θs)− (1− α)
∫ θb
0
q∗b (y)dy
where the whole expression with the underbrace equals 0, as was shown in (C.1). Then
evaluating the expected payoffs yields U∗b (θb) =
∫ 1
0 Q
∗(θs, θb)[αθs + (1 − α)θb]dF (θs) −
t∗b(θb) = (1 − α)
∫ θb
0 q
∗
b (y)dy. Again, it is easy to see that U
∗
b (0) = 0 and U
∗
b (θb) is indeed
the characterized payoff schedule for the buyer.
Proof of Proposition III.2. A mechanism γ is ex-ante incentive efficient mechanism if it
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solves maximization of W (γ) subject to IC and IR constraints. Observe that when w = 1,
the objective function equals W (γ) =
∫ 1
0 Us(θs)dF (θs). Thus the problem is equivalent to
the optimization program P1 presented in the proof of Proposition III.1. Hence seller’s
ex-ante optimal mechanism γ∗ is also ex-ante incentive efficient.
C.2 Revelation Principle
Consider the seller’s ex-ante contracting game. At the first stage, the seller announces
a mechanism, before either party learns their private information. Then both the seller
and the buyer learn their private information, followed by them sending their respective
messages and the mechanism implementing its specified outcome.
First, I define the strategies of the players starting from the last stage. The seller, after
he learns his private information, sends a message where a typical action is denoted by ms
and belongs to the set Ms. Similarly, the buyer sends her message where a typical action
is denoted by mb and it belongs to the set Mb. The communication strategy of a player i
is defined by the mapping µi : Θi →Mi for each i ∈ {s, b}.
In the first stage, the strategy of the seller is to announce a contract, or equivalently a
mechanism. In the context of bilateral trade, a mechanism γ = {Q, τ} consists of an alloca-
tion ruleQ and a payment rule τ , where for any given pair of messages (ms,mb) submitted
by the players, the allocation rule determines the probability of the object changing hands
from the seller to the buyer, while the payment (or equivalently transfer) rule determines
the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller. Hence a mechanism can be defined by
the mapping γ : Ms ×Mb → [0, 1]× R.
It is assumed that the message spaces Ms and Mb are rich enough to include a partic-
ular message such that upon sending it, that agent is guaranteed to his/her outside option
payoff of 0.1
Finally, a direct mechanism γ¯ = {Q¯, τ¯} is simply a mechanism where the message
spaces of the seller and the buyer are equal to their type spaces. Hence a direct mechanism
is defined by the mapping γ¯ : Θs × Θb → [0, 1] × R. A direct mechanism satisfies IC if
truthful type-telling forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Similarly, a direct mechanism
satisfies IR if the truthful type-telling equilibrium payoffs are weakly greater than the
outside option payoff, which is normalized to 0. A direct mechanism is feasible if and only
if it satisfies IC and IR.
In this game, the equilibrium notion is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (hence-
forth PBNE) denoted by (γˆ, µˆs, µˆb), where the communication strategies of the seller and
the buyer (µˆs, µˆb) form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism γˆ and the seller
1It is also possible to allow the buyer to choose whether she wants to participate in the mech-
anism or she wants to “stay at home” before sending her message. As the results do not change,
this formulation is preferred for ease of notation.
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announces γˆ that maximizes his ex-ante expected payoff. The beliefs of the players in the
second stage are equal to the priors, as both players participate in the mechanism and
there is no signaling.
The aim of this appendix is to show the following.
Lemma C.1.
Given any PBNE (γˆ, µˆs, µˆb), there exists a feasible direct mechanism γ¯ = {Q¯, τ¯} that has a
payoff equivalent truthful type-telling equilibrium.
Proof. Let (γˆ, µˆs, µˆb) be an equilibrium. The equilibrium expected payoffs are given as
follows:
Us(µˆs|θs) =
∫
θb
[
τˆ(µˆs(θs), µˆb(θb))− Qˆ(µˆs(θs), µˆb(θb))θs
]
dG(θb)
Ub(µˆb|θb) =
∫
θs
[
Qˆ(µˆs(θs), µˆb(θb))[αθs + (1− α)θb]− τˆ(µˆs(θs), µˆb(θb))
]
dF (θs)
The optimality of the communication strategies imply that expected payoffs satisfy:
Us(µˆs|θs) ≥ Us(ms|θs) ∀θs and ms ∈Ms
Ub(µˆb|θb) ≥ Ub(mb|θb) ∀θb and mb ∈Mb
where the terms Ui(mi|θi) denote the expected payoffs from deviating to any different
message mi for each player i ∈ {s, b}.
Now consider the direct mechanism γ¯ = {Q¯, τ¯}, where for any given type pair an-
nouncement (θ˜s, θ˜b), the allocation and transfer functions are defined as follows:
Q¯(θ˜s, θ˜b) = Qˆ(µˆs(θ˜s), µˆb(θ˜b))
τ¯(θ˜s, θ˜b) = τˆ(µˆs(θ˜s), µˆb(θ˜b))
Observe that under truthful type-reporting, the expected payoff schedules are equivalent;
i.e. U¯s(θs|θs) = Us(µˆs|θs) and U¯b(θb|θb) = Ub(µˆb|θb) for all respective types. Furthermore,
truthful type-reporting is indeed an equilibrium of γ¯. To see why, observe for the seller
that:
Us(µˆs|θs) = U¯s(θs|θs) ≥ U¯s(θ˜s|θs) = Us(m˜s|θs)
where m˜s = µˆs(θ˜s). Analogous arguments apply to the buyer. Lastly, observe that the
expected payoffs in the truthful type-telling equilibrium of γ¯ also satisfies IR. To see why,
note that the payoffs from the PBNE of the original game are weakly greater than 0 for the
seller and the buyer. Then, due to the equivalence of the expected payoffs, the truth-telling
equilibrium payoffs of the direct mechanism are also nonnegative.
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